Happy New Year from Columbus, Georgia. After 5 years of publication, I am concluding The Field Grade Leader blog. What started as a place where I could capture my thoughts on leadership expanded and transformed into something much more important. It turned into a community, a space where people could share their ideas and seek resources for their own development. I could not be more proud of what the blog became and the difference it made to so many leaders.
Thanks to the individuals who made it possible, volunteering as the Field Grade Leader expanded. Most notably, there was Augie Gonzalez, who pitched in as an editor back in the early days. Tragically, Augie and other members of his family died in a car crash while PCSing from Fort Leavenworth after completing CGSC. His death still stings and serves as a constant reminder of how fleeting life can be. I’d also like to thank Billy, Russ, and Heather, all-stars among the Field Grade Leader team.
We will leave the articles online as a resource for future leaders in hopes the collective work will continue to provide value.
I wish you all the absolute best in your endeavors and appreciate everything you do for our Nation.
The last few weeks have been incredibly hard to watch. After nearly two decades in Afghanistan, the war has ended. But it did not end with an unconditional surrender and a ticker tape parade, did it? Instead, on live TV, we watched the Taliban rapidly regain control of Afghanistan, ending with a crisis at the Kabul airport as people attempted to flee.
US Air Force Photo
So here we are, two decades later. We are a generation of wartime leaders, who, for a brief moment, have no war to fight. Before we move on, as leaders often do, let’s take a few minutes to talk through what happened, to make an honest attempt to learn through it. By writing this, I offer three simple questions. If you can, take some time today to reflect, think, and discuss.
How are you doing? For many, the end of this war has forced us to address unhealed wounds. We knew the war wouldn’t go on forever when we left in ‘05 or ‘11, but we knew we were contributing to a larger campaign. The war became a constant, something we could point back to and justify the collective sacrifice. Now that the war is over, many are wrestling with the conclusion and wanting to quantify that sacrifice while seeing images of the Taliban inspecting American military equipment.
What did we get right? While we’re working through all of that, it is important to remember what we got right. First, I couldn’t be more proud of how a rapidly formed joint force, including the Devil Brigade, handled a humanitarian crisis at the airport in Kabul. Now, as refugees begin to hit the States, we have ad-hoc teams coming together to welcome them. These efforts should make us all proud. This is the true American spirit, the very ideal we chose to fight for.
Also, many of us “got it right” when we fought in Afghanistan. During my time as a Company Commander in Paktikia Province, we protected the people in our area of operations. We provided them some semblance of stability, giving our enemies no rest as we hunted them through the valleys and into the mountains. Collectively, we gave the Afghan people a taste of freedom, their children watching and learning from our example. We gave their little girls hope. Only history can truly judge the impact of our efforts in Afghanistan.
How can we learn? As we get past the raw emotion of what’s occurred, let’s start talking about what we learned in Afghanistan. At the tactical level, share your experiences and challenges as a leader in combat. For other leaders, it is imperative to discuss our experiences on higher level staffs. These are tough conversations, especially when we discuss our own shortcomings, but they are essential to enabling learning.
This is a tough time, but what do leaders do in the face of adversity? We step up to the challenge and lead. That’s what I am asking each of you to do today. Be a leader and start a dialogue with your network. Together, we can shape how our institution learns and grows.
Editor’s note: As the world watches the best of professional golf in The Master’s this weekend, it is not ironic that we have the opportunity to run this piece. For the Army, the Master Gunner is the foremost professional on how to make our organizations lethal. Their expertise, knowledge, and drive are the same as the individual who will wear the “Green Jacket” on Sunday. If you want to win when you arrive on the next battlefield, find the NCO wearing the “Master Gunner Identification Badge” on your staff, it is imperative to make them a centerpiece of your staff and all training to ensure we do.
Of all the NCOs in the Operations Cell (S3), none is more valuable than a Master Gunner (MG). On any particular morning, you’re most likely to encounter the “Mike Golf” whittling away at one of several projects that seem to require attention. During the humdrum of the morning routine, the MG has to answer emails, re-route correspondence, and oversee both the land manager and the ammunition manager. On a typical day, this takes the first hour to complete before they are free to travel, moving down to the Company’s to catch up on maintenance and crew training. Moving rapidly from place to place, the MG can be difficult to pinpoint unless they are tethered to a computer somewhere, working diligently to generate a product that is as close to complete for the next big brief.
In the last few years, I have heard numerous discussions on what an Operations Sergeant Major (OPS SGM)actually does at the battalion level. Doctrine provides some guidance but truthfully, it is minimal, which could be good or bad depending on the organization, the leaders in the organization, and the OPS SGM. The purpose of writing this article is to offer my thoughts and lessons learned throughout my ten months in the position for two different organizations. It is my hope that it could help a future SergeantsMajor along with his or her field grade counterpart and the Battalion Commanderin the garrison environment.
The first standardized brigade in the continental Army had one major.As the staff expanded, the Army increased the numberof officers in a brigade and battalion. For a company-grade officer who has never been on a battalion staff, the majors may seem unapproachable, but they have always been essential to a unit’s operation.Their experience, relationships, and leadership help the unit function. Whether you are a Company Commander or a member of the staff, it is important to know who the majors are, what their jobs entail, what roles they play, and how you can build a relationship with them.
After completing platoon LFX, battalion STX, and CALFEX, the BCT should identify any outstanding requirements to prepare for their brigade FTX as their final collective training opportunity before deployment to the National Training Center. Individual qualification ranges or secondary crew gunnery may be necessary before or immediately following the brigade FTX, but the brigade will also need a significant amount of time for recovery, unscheduled maintenance, and services after the crucible of training they just completed. The overall planning of a brigade FTX is the responsibility of the division, but the BCT has significant responsibilities in proposing and refining training objectives, integrating external enablers, and meeting preliminary requirements. The division will serve as the HICOM and EXCON for both the brigade and the OPFOR, has responsibility for sourcing and training OCs, and is responsible for spectrum management, approving training objectives, requesting training areas and resources, and the budget. The brigade must assist in the development of the simulations and communications architecture and must request Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and Home station Instrumentation Training System (HITS) for all personnel and equipment, so direct and indirect fire systems register effects during the training.
Upon completion of the gap crossing and battalion STX, one company from the battalion proceeds immediately to the CALFEX while the other companies proceed to STX. The battalion establishes its CTCP, MCP, FTCP, and Main CP in their TAA. The FLE or BSA remains established throughout the execution of CALFEX to support units as they train. The battalion retains control of its companies executing company STX. The battalion has responsibility for planning, resourcing, and executing the company STX. The battalion should adopt a similar model as they did for platoon STX, including training on company mounted and dismounted maneuver, changing movement techniques, changing movement formations, movement to contact, attack, hasty defense, breaching, and battle handoff. Cavalry troops should train zone reconnaissance, screen, and reconnaissance handoff.
Gap Crossing (Battalion STX); setting the stage for CALFEX
After completing platoon LFX, the battalion redeploys to their motor pools and conducts an abbreviated recovery. After a few days, the battalion prepares to deploy to the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX). This brief recovery period allows all battalions to refit personnel, clean equipment, and conduct unscheduled maintenance. The battalion motor pool serves as the Division Support Activity (DSA), and the battalion receives an OPORD tasking them to deploy to a Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) to defend Atropia from invading Donovian forces. This deployment operation serves as a battalion STX lane, providing the battalion an opportunity to exercise tactical control of multiple companies, assign tasks and purposes to different C2 nodes, and integrate attachments. This battalion STX also prepares the battalion to conduct Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI) in a theater of war.
Platoon Training, Battalion STX, and CALFEX: Maximizing Combined Arms Lethality
The decisive point of the ABCT’s training progression is building lethal companies and platoons which occurs during platoon LFXs and the CALFEX. Much like crew gunnery, these training events involve the integration of all C2 and sustainment nodes. These events require the participation of the entire brigade and battalion staff to synchronize all WfF and forge the brigade into a combat-ready team. Without putting all WfFs together, the brigade cannot function effectively. The purpose of combined arms training is training the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each arm was used separately or sequentially. Combined arms enables the ABCT to overwhelm and destroy enemies on the battlefield. To compress the time required for training and prevent the need to conduct ten days of deliberate recovery after training each echelon, the ABCT should structure training so that the ABCT conducts platoon through battalion training in one continuous block through multi-echelon design.
Exercising CPs and staffs requires a deliberate training approach. Trained staffs enable lethal crews, platoons, and companies to win. The BCT fight requires shaping the enemy in the deep fight and destroying the enemy in close combat with an overwhelming shock through violent, synchronized, combined arms maneuver. Achieving these outcomes requires effective staff at the battalion and brigade. Training staffs and CPs requires regular employment and exercise at echelon. Without regular exercise, CPs will fail to integrate resources or synchronize the fight. For this reason, ABCTs should conduct Lethality Validation Exercises (LVEs) every month where they do not deploy CPs as part of another collective training event. LVEs validate the setup standards, layout, and infrastructure of CPs as a TENTEX, validate communications systems configurations during a COMMEX, train plans sections by conducting tactical MDMP and rehearsing distribution of an Operations Order (OPORD) including all fighting products, and validate that fighting products enable current operations functions during a Command Post Exercise (CPX).
