This is Part 8 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training
Brigade FTX
After completing platoon LFX, battalion STX, and CALFEX, the BCT should identify any outstanding requirements to prepare for their brigade FTX as their final collective training opportunity before deployment to the National Training Center. Individual qualification ranges or secondary crew gunnery may be necessary before or immediately following the brigade FTX, but the brigade will also need a significant amount of time for recovery, unscheduled maintenance, and services after the crucible of training they just completed. The overall planning of a brigade FTX is the responsibility of the division, but the BCT has significant responsibilities in proposing and refining training objectives, integrating external enablers, and meeting preliminary requirements. The division will serve as the HICOM and EXCON for both the brigade and the OPFOR, has responsibility for sourcing and training OCs, and is responsible for spectrum management, approving training objectives, requesting training areas and resources, and the budget. The brigade must assist in the development of the simulations and communications architecture and must request Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and Home station Instrumentation Training System (HITS) for all personnel and equipment, so direct and indirect fire systems register effects during the training.
Conducting a brigade FTX for an ABCT requires most of the available training areas on an installation. Additionally, the BCT commander may have to designate one of the CABs in the BCT to serve as the OPFOR if the division cannot source OPFOR from another BCT. If one of the BCT’s CABs will fight the brigade as the OPFOR, the BCT should work with the division as early as possible to make the OPFOR HICOM battle rhythm, reporting standards, and systems reflect as closely to the BCT’s as possible.
Figure 25: Timeline for planning the BCT FTX. Planning for the event begins more than 180 days from execution, requiring proactive outreach to potential enablers by the BCT, division, and corps. Enabling units should reach out to BCTs heading into a brigade FTX for an opportunity to train with them.
Until this point, the BCT has not had an opportunity to maneuver as a full brigade, test all systems in a live training environment, and deal with the full challenge of the span of control in the BCT. However, the BCT has conducted training that builds in complexity and provides a logical, coherent progression to build competence acrosseach echelon. Most importantly, the brigade has assigned the responsibility to units and C2 nodes and provided leaders opportunities to train their nodes. The natural progression to a BCT FTX style event should not induce major friction for a BCT that trained in the manner outlined in the previous pages.
The division schedules combat power build briefs during RSOI for the brigade FTX that mirror those required at the NTC. This allows the brigade to identify shortcomings in materiel or people prior to deployment to the NTC and builds staff familiarity with the cumbersome reporting requirements that are part of RSOI. All leaders must stress the importance of boresighting MILES twice daily and reinforce standards from gunnery and previous live-fire training. After the completion of RSOI, the BCT should deploy to a TAA, finalize their MDMP, and conduct rehearsals. The BCT should employ all organic capabilities and coordinate for support from EAB assets through participation in the division’s targeting process.
Figure 26: BCT FTX Concept Sketch showing the overall concept of the operation by day.
Even though the brigade has multiple repetitions exercising its battle rhythm, it has not had an opportunity to execute them in a tactical context to ensure that outputs and inputs of battle rhythm events align. The brigade anchors its battle rhythm around the Lethality Board, which ties together the decisions of a targeting decision board with elements of the commander’s update brief. The Lethality Board provides the commander an opportunity to provide direct guidance to subordinate battalion commanders and staff daily.
Figure 27: A visual layout of how reports, meetings, and working groups in the brigade battle rhythm feed the commander’s decisions at the Lethality Board. This graphic also shows how meetings align with the steps of the operations process and targeting process.
Figure 28: A quad chart outlining the purpose, inputs, outputs, PACE Plan, attendees, and agenda for the Lethality Board.
While the BEB has responsibility for securing the BCT in the support area, the BCT employs Task Force Deliverance to control, integrate, and sustain the brigade’s enablers in the close area. During transitions to the defense, Task Force Deliverance synchronizes engineer assets (blade assets and sappers) with the BCT and CABs, coordinates for CL IV, and executes electronic deception. In the transition to the offense, Task Force Deliverance synchronizes electronic deception while protecting and sustaining blade assets. Task Force Deliverance employs any chemical decon teams and synchronizes detainee operations. Task Force Deliverance reports directly to the BDE and includes capabilities to sustain enablers on the move. Task Force Deliverance is led by the BEB S3 or XO, includes the BEB TAC, a small staff package, upper and lower TI communications, a security element from MPs, a M978 fueler, and a maintenance package. Employing Task Force Deliverance allows the BEB to focus on area security operations in the support or consolidation areas.
A brigade FTX allows the brigade to maneuver in a live scenario and a continuous fight over seven days, requiring simultaneous execution of the current operations fight with planning across all echelons against a live, thinking enemy. It also requires the BCT to integrate enabling capabilities and employ all WfFs. This tests all systems and induces friction similar to that which the BCT will experience at the NTC. This training provides leaders at every level an opportunity to correct deficiencies and make final revisions to SOPs and systems prior to deploying to the NTC.
During a brigade FTX, the BCT trains on expeditionary deployment operations, movement to contact, a hasty defense, and an attack that will expose deficiencies related to personnel, materiel, training, and/or SOPs. Additionally, the artillery battalion works with the Division Artillery Brigade (DIVARTY) to complete Artillery Table XVIII (AT XVIII) as part of the overall scenario design. The keys to success and making the BCT FTX a worthwhile training event lie in the preparation and progression of the training the brigade already completed.
Conclusion
Effectively harnessing the combat power of the ABCT enables winning in LSCO and requires all echelons of the ABCT to function as intended. The ABCT is a complex organization with approximately 4,200 personnel in 7 different battalions and 36 different companies, troops, and batteries. BCT commanders and staff cannot plan discrete training events for all personnel and echelons in the brigade, but by clearly defining how the brigade fights and assigning leader responsibilities for those functions the brigade can ensure all personnel understands how they contribute to the fight.
Adapting this training progression as a template dramatically improves the ability of leaders in the ABCT to structure a training progression that builds lethality. Additionally, this template provides opportunities to forge relationships between ABCTs, corps separate brigades, enablers across the Army, and joint enablers.
Surprisingly little has changed with training management since H.L. Scott identified the most important parts of training cavalry in 1861. The instruction of the “men and the horse” remains the central focus for ensuring that the ABCT can fight and win. Effective training management reinforces how all systems and personnel in the brigade fight to support the “men and the horse,” developing all units in the ABCT into combat-ready formations. Effectively achieving this level of readiness and lethality requires a clear vision, careful planning, and the full effort of leaders across the ABCT. These efforts are rewarded with units capable of the “perfect management of the horse” and the full lethality, shock, and firepower of the ABCT.
**Editor’s Note: Thank you to the authors for their time and effort on this series. The lessons are invaluable to leaders. Undoubtedly, many of these lessons were hard-learned in planning and training. Taking the time to offer insight and recommendations to those who follow cannot be under-appreciated. Who’s up next?**
About the Authors
COL Michael Schoenfeldt is the Commander of the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 23 years of experience as an Army Officer including Tank Platoon Leader, Tank Company Commander, Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer, Brigade Executive Officer, and Combined Arms Battalion Commander. He can be reached at michael.d.schoenfeldt.mil@mail.mil.
MAJ Patrick Stallings is currently the Cavalry Squadron Operations Trainer at the National Training Center and was the Brigade S3 for the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 15 years of experience as an Army Officer including Armored Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, and Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer. He can be reached at michael.p.stallings4.mil@mail.mil.
Special credits to the following personnel who made invaluable contributions to this paper:
LTC Rich Groen, Commander, 1-7 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD
LTC Neil Hollenbeck, Commander, 2-5 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD
LTC Steve Jackowski, Commander, 2-8 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD
LTC Ron Sprang, Commander, 2-12 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD
LTC Nick Dvonch, Commander, 1-82 FA, 1ABCT, 1CD
LTC John Ordonio, Commander, 91 BEB, 1ABCT, 1CD
LTC Stacy Moore, Commander, 115 BSB, 1ABCT, 1CD
MAJ Brian Bifulco, Brigade XO, 1ABCT, 1CD
MAJ George Gordon, Brigade FSO, 1ABCT, 1CD and 1-82 FA Artillery BN XO
MAJ Josh Schulz, Brigade S2, 1ABCT, 1CD
MAJ Chad Lorenz, Brigade S2, 1ABCT, 1CD
MAJ Randy Donathan, Brigade S6, 1ABCT, 1CD and Brigade XO, 7th Signal Brigade
MAJ Bernie Mabini, Battalion XO, 2-5 CAV (2-5 CAV Embedded Graphics)
MAJ CJ Wonsettler, Battalion XO, 2-12 CAV (2-12 CAV Embedded Graphics)
MAJ Tommy Sacchieri, Brigade XO, 3ABCT, 1CD (1CD Brigade Standard Training Model)
MAJ Bo Olsen, Squadron XO, 1-7 CAV (1CD Brigade Standard Training Model Whitepaper)
CPT Alex Forman, Brigade Planner, 1ABCT, 1CD
CPT Raymond Leroux, Brigade Planner, 1ABCT, 1CD
CPT Erica Ndlovu, Brigade Adjutant, 1ABCT, 1CD (Editior)
Continue the conversation on Twitter or Facebook with more articles to follow:
The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training
- Embedded Charts (includes full page slides of each figure in this paper)
- IRONHORSE Playbook
- 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
- DA Big 12
- Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)
5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)
- Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
- Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
- CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
- CALFEX OC Packet Example
- FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
- Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD