Happy New Year from Columbus, Georgia. After 5 years of publication, I am concluding The Field Grade Leader blog. What started as a place where I could capture my thoughts on leadership expanded and transformed into something much more important. It turned into a community, a space where people could share their ideas and seek resources for their own development. I could not be more proud of what the blog became and the difference it made to so many leaders.

Thanks to the individuals who made it possible, volunteering as the Field Grade Leader expanded. Most notably, there was Augie Gonzalez, who pitched in as an editor back in the early days. Tragically, Augie and other members of his family died in a car crash while PCSing from Fort Leavenworth after completing CGSC. His death still stings and serves as a constant reminder of how fleeting life can be. I’d also like to thank Billy, Russ, and Heather, all-stars among the Field Grade Leader team.

We will leave the articles online as a resource for future leaders in hopes the collective work will continue to provide value.

I wish you all the absolute best in your endeavors and appreciate everything you do for our Nation.

Josh

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So here we are, two decades later. We are a generation of wartime leaders, who, for a brief moment, have no war to fight. Before we move on, as leaders often do, let’s take a few minutes to talk through what happened, to make an honest attempt to learn through it. By writing this, I offer three simple questions. If you can, take some time today to reflect, think, and discuss.

How are you doing? For many, the end of this war has forced us to address unhealed wounds. We knew the war wouldn’t go on forever when we left in ‘05 or ‘11, but we knew we were contributing to a larger campaign. The war became a constant, something we could point back to and justify the collective sacrifice. Now that the war is over, many are wrestling with the conclusion and wanting to quantify that sacrifice while seeing images of the Taliban inspecting American military equipment.

What did we get right? While we’re working through all of that, it is important to remember what we got right. First, I couldn’t be more proud of how a rapidly formed joint force, including the Devil Brigade, handled a humanitarian crisis at the airport in Kabul. Now, as refugees begin to hit the States, we have ad-hoc teams coming together to welcome them. These efforts should make us all proud. This is the true American spirit, the very ideal we chose to fight for.

Also, many of us “got it right” when we fought in Afghanistan. During my time as a Company Commander in Paktikia Province, we protected the people in our area of operations. We provided them some semblance of stability, giving our enemies no rest as we hunted them through the valleys and into the mountains. Collectively, we gave the Afghan people a taste of freedom, their children watching and learning from our example. We gave their little girls hope. Only history can truly judge the impact of our efforts in Afghanistan.

How can we learn? As we get past the raw emotion of what’s occurred, let’s start talking about what we learned in Afghanistan. At the tactical level, share your experiences and challenges as a leader in combat. For other leaders, it is imperative to discuss our experiences on higher level staffs. These are tough conversations, especially when we discuss our own shortcomings, but they are essential to enabling learning.

This is a tough time, but what do leaders do in the face of adversity? We step up to the challenge and lead. That’s what I am asking each of you to do today. Be a leader and start a dialogue with your network. Together, we can shape how our institution learns and grows.

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Editor’s note: As the world watches the best of professional golf in The Master’s this weekend, it is not ironic that we have the opportunity to run this piece.  For the Army, the Master Gunner is the foremost professional on how to make our organizations lethal.  Their expertise, knowledge, and drive are the same as the individual who will wear the “Green Jacket” on Sunday.  If you want to win when you arrive on the next battlefield, find the NCO wearing the “Master Gunner Identification Badge” on your staff, it is imperative to make them a centerpiece of your staff and all training to ensure we do.

Of all the NCOs in the Operations Cell (S3), none is more valuable than a Master Gunner (MG). On any particular morning, you’re most likely to encounter the “Mike Golf” whittling away at one of several projects that seem to require attention.  During the humdrum of the morning routine, the MG has to answer emails, re-route correspondence, and oversee both the land manager and the ammunition manager.  On a typical day, this takes the first hour to complete before they are free to travel, moving down to the Company’s to catch up on maintenance and crew training.  Moving rapidly from place to place, the MG can be difficult to pinpoint unless they are tethered to a computer somewhere, working diligently to generate a product that is as close to complete for the next big brief. 

The Master Gunner is never without responsibilities, whether it happens within the cubicle or down on the Company lines.  This is the result of a laundry list of duties that are required of the unit Master Gunner.  By definition, A master gunner is an institution-trained and certified Soldier on direct-fire weapons, weapon platforms, ammunition, maintenance of weapon systems, and unit training programs.  It is their mission and their charge- and with it comes a drive to preserve the integrity of the unit’s direct-fire training program, no matter the complexity.  

Maintenance: The MG is institutionally trained to support weapons maintenance, and they will be aware of issues that may affect the operation of systems. By spending time with the Forward Support Company (FSC) representatives, the MG is well-informed in matters regarding armament maintenance and deficiencies, which he can then report to XOs for attention. The MG also ensures that weapon record data for 105/120mm cannon tubes and mortars are accurate and up-to-date to prevent overuse or condemnation.  

Training: The pinnacle of the MG’s job is training. The MG establishes the development of an effective live-fire evaluation cohort by training vehicle crew evaluators and certifying live-fire evaluators in the use of Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EO’s) to ensure that grading criteria are effective and fair. The MG ensures that battlefield conditions are replicated by overseeing the use of Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) to supplement force-on-force exercises and adjudication of friendly and enemy weapons. The MG also trains Gunnery NCOs on the proper use of Simulator systems to support gate-to-live-fire (GTLF) proficiency among Squads and Crews.  

Safety: When developing complex training events under live-fire conditions, the MG creates exercises that have been validated as safe through the use of restrictive fire lines, limitations of maneuver elements, and establishment of surface danger zones (SDZs). As a Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet (DRAW) is being generated, the MG identifies the controls that will best mitigate risk during operations, giving Commanders the maximum latitude to accept residual risks.  During operations, the MG confers with the Ammunition NCO to verify that all lots of ammunition drawn are safe for use and are being utilized in conjunction with the approved firing system and platform.  

Resourcing: The unit Master Gunner is not directly responsible for requesting training land, but they are the best resource for determining the appropriate range or training area to conduct specific events.  As the land manager, they can ensure that the area meets the needs of the exercise provided they understand the Commander’s concept well enough to make a determination. The MG also coordinates with the installation’s Training Support Center (TSC) for the issuance of TADSS to make sure that units do not prevent the effective circulation of resources to facilitate realistic training, such as vehicle MILES or simulator systems.  

Reporting: Following any training event, the Master Gunner is poring over volumes of data to help the unit improve its capabilities.  The information includes the consumption rate of ammunition, the accuracy of individual platform weapon systems, the efficacy of Squad compositions, and proficiency of enablers (UAS, Higher HQ support, Artillery, and Mortar Fires). The information serves the Unit as a touchpoint for future training exercises and also supports the development of the curriculum that is taught at institutional training for MOS proficiency and ASI producing schools.  

Staff Synchronization: The Master Gunner operating in support of Field Training Exercises (FTX) has an additional opportunity to elevate training that is often overlooked, and that is the utilization of the Unit supply chain as an ammunition supplier.  During ranges, Units tend to lean on the FSC to draw deliver ammunition for training events. As Units evolve toward Collective training, the emphasis should be placed on the Platoon leadership to send ammunition consumption reports and coordinate for resupply, as they would in a combat environment. The Master Gunner can assist Company level planners in effectively managing this resource, providing learning opportunities during the preparation cycle for large-scale training events.  

Implementation: So what do you do with your Master Gunner when there are no ranges? What if all of the planning is done? The responsibility of the MG is to collaborate with the battalion intelligence staff officer, advise the commander of the tactical capabilities and limitations of all weapons, systems, and platforms against anticipated or expected threats. This includes validating Platoon fire plans, identifying gaps in defensive plans, and providing crew-proficiency scores to the Commander’s direct-fire plan (blue-banding).  

The Master Gunner is an irreplaceable resource to increase the quality of any training event.  They are advisors, analysts, architects, and ambassadors to ensure that the unit achieves the highest caliber of training. What the Commander should expect from their MG is the ability to deliver detail-oriented and complete products for implementation at all Echelons of training in accordance with the Integrated Weapons Training Strategy.  

SFC Zack Eckert is the Senior Instructor, Stryker Master Gunner Course, assigned to Maverick Troop, 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. His previous assignments include Brigade Master Gunner, 1st Brigade (Stryker), 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; Squadron Master Gunner, 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; Senior Instructor, 2-16 Cav, 316th Cav Brigade, Fort Benning; and Reconnaissance Instructor, 2-16 Cav, 316th Cav Brigade, Fort Benning. SFC Eckert’s military schools include the Stryker Master Gunner Course, Master Gunner Common Core, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Scout Leader Course, Maneuver Senior Leader’s Course, and Advanced Leader Course. He is working on an Associate’s Degree in Criminal Justice at Troy University.SFC Eckert’s awards include the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with second oak-leaf cluster, the Master Gunner Identification Badge, and the Combat Action Badge. 

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In the last few years, I have heard numerous discussions on what an Operations Sergeant Major (OPS SGM) actually does at the battalion level.  Doctrine provides some guidance but truthfully, it is minimal, which could be good or bad depending on the organization, the leaders in the organization, and the OPS SGM. The purpose of writing this article is to offer my thoughts and lessons learned throughout my ten months in the position for two different organizations. It is my hope that it could help a future Sergeants Major along with his or her field grade counterpart and the Battalion Commander in the garrison environment. 

Garrison Responsibilities 

The few doctrinal references for an OPS SGM focus on the Main Command Post (MCP) and outline some duties and responsibilities. Outlining tactical and field duties is important but the organization spends minimal time in the field throughout the course of a fiscal year. It is important that the S3 and the Battalion Commander outline clear duties and responsibilities in the garrison environment with the OPS SGM’s feedback.  The areas that I believe the OPS SGM is responsible for are taskings, schools, current operations (CUOPS), DTS, DTMS, S3 manning, Weekly FRAGO, S3 rating scheme, and staff NCO integration and development. 

The Staff 

A complaint I have often heard is the XO does not have a dedicated senior enlisted advisor. While the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) is often the clear choice, I feel that the OPS SGM can be that person for a few reasons.  First, the obvious reason that they will both work with each other more in the main command post (MCP) than the CSM and the OPS SGM’s counterpart, the S3.  The OPS SGM and XO both own staff duty operations and the staff duty roster.  Lastly, my argument against the CSM is that he or she has a lot more meetings and focus areas than the OPS SGM, so the OPS SGM can focus some of his or her time with staff NCOICs. 

Most of the staff sections receive little professional development from higher staff counterparts besides the few SAVs and informal dialogue and meetings. The OPS SGM can fill this gap first by attending the weekly Staff Syncs to help the XO and to ensure there is NCO presence in those meetings from the shop NCOICs. Too often I hear that many organizations are officer-centric (from both officers and NCOs), yet no NCOs are present at various unit meetings. Hold the staff NCOICs accountable by having them present meetings and take turns briefing to help with their public speaking and overall development. Lastly, take ownership of the NCOIC’s professional development (PD) with monthly PD sessions focused on their section training plans and how sections developing their counterparts at the troop/company/battery. 

The OPS SGM, along with XO, needs to plan and implement more PD sessions outside of command post exercises (CPX) to help build a more cohesive staff. At the least, the SGM needs to hold his or her own NCOPD with the staff NCOICs to bridge their knowledge gap between their own officer counterparts in the shops regarding MDMP and planning efforts. Additionally, these NCOPDs or professional development sessions can help the OPS SGM inform the XO on decisions regarding senior ratings in the shops which is often a question asked by my battalion XOs. 

NCO professional development is often a second thought and we as a Corps continually keep relegating development to the institutional domain. The average NCO spends just a few months in PME up to Master Sergeant, meaning that most of our training comes from on-the-job (OJT) or through lessons learned in the operational domain. Never mind, that this is shocking low for a professional force but it becomes apparent that we must do better in the operational domain to enforce NCOPDs and Sergeant’s Time Training at the battalion and company level. Ensure that it is always on the LRTC and SRTC and protect them as much as possible. 

S3 Garrison Duties and Responsibilities 

OPS SGMs can and should take on more responsibilities in garrison to help the S3 focus on the most important tasks. My first time as a BN OPS SGM I did not hold a weekly 1SG meeting to discuss taskings, schools, borrowed military manpower, and other areas. During my second assignment, I ensured these areas were properly resourced through a separate forum. It is too easy to “shoot an email” and expect results but I found that a dedicated meeting with the CUOPS, schools, and 1SGs will ensure a “common operating picture” and that the OPS SGM is not the single point of failure with knowledge spread across the S3 shop.  

Many leaders are against increasing the number of regular meetings and some of these topics are covered in the battalion training meeting. Too often the battalion training meeting goes too long because it covers too many topics already.  A separate but short “1SG sync” with the CSM included could help shorten the battalion training meeting. In our current meeting, the CSM covers anything he has regarding personnel, slotting or anything else that is “hot”. Then I normally cover schools, DTS, BMM, taskings, and then anything else that needs to be addressed or mentioned.  Additionally, I have the respective NCOs (CUOPS, Schools, DTS) build the slides which have the added benefit of feeding the training meeting and provides me an opportunity to review for accuracy. 

Another piece of advice is to be present at meetings, you may not be the CSM but you are “a” SGM and still can provide experience, expertise, and advice. In an armor CAB I am the senior Infantryman, so own that aspect of your job but do not neglect the other parts of the formation. It’s ok to be uncomfortable in a new platform and not know everything, but go out and spend time out in gunnery or in the motor pool with maintenance and learn about the maintainers and sustainers. I didn’t know much about gunnery so being present there helped me learn how it runs and now I can help with identifying friction points. Go to company training meetings to ensure what has been briefed nests with what you know and to offer insights to what made you successful as a 1SG and ensure that NCOs are doing the proper METL crosswalks and assessment of individual training to help develop bottom-up refinement to the training schedule. 

I debated on what forum to write this on and decided to choose this route to remain informal. I hope that this will reach as many as possible and can help guide them to areas that might be friction points in garrison. I plan to submit another article with lessons learned in the tactical environment. It’s critical that we keep ourselves involved to remain relevant to our Soldiers and the unit and the officers that we serve and advise. 

SGM Benge is currently the OPS SGM for 1-77AR, 3-1AD. An Infantryman, he is a graduate of the SGM-A Class 70 and has served in Armor and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. 

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“In the beginning, there were majors.” 

The first standardized brigade in the continental Army had one major.  As the staff expanded, the Army increased the number of officers in a brigade and battalion. For a company-grade officer who has never been on a battalion staff, the majors may seem unapproachable, but they have always been essential to a unit’s operation.  Their experience, relationships, and leadership help the unit function.  Whether you are a Company Commander or a member of the staff, it is important to know who the majors are, what their jobs entail, what roles they play, and how you can build a relationship with them. 

Who Are They? 

“The Iron Majors” 

Majors, with 10-14 years of experience, are some of the most experienced leaders in a battalion. They have likely attended Intermediate Level Education, either with the Army or another service, making them proficient in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Most majors have served in multiple types of units and are able to draw on a wealth of knowledge from their school and operational experiences.  Though battalion staff time is critical for their professional development, and often key in Battalion Command considerations, the best majors are experts in building teams and work together for the good of the unit. 

Job Responsibilities 

First and foremost, majors support the battalion commander and the unit. While the exact details of how duties and responsibilities are delegated may vary between units, there are some common ways of sharing responsibilities.  

“The Staff cannot win a battle, but they sure can lose it”  

For MDMP, review  FM 6-0 and the specific roles for the XO, S3, and rest of the staff.   Know that both officers are essential to produce a good, well–planned order.  The XO must drive the process, set timelines, and ensure that the staff remains focused.  The XO usually supervises the assembly of MDMP briefs to the commander.  The S3 owns the Warning Order, Operations Order, operations graphics, and the OPORD Brief to the Company Commanders.  A good S3 imbeds planners with other staff sections to ensure planning includes all facets of the staff, especially during Mission Analysis and during the production of staff annexes.  As one of the final events, the XO runs the Combined Arms Rehearsal, bringing the order to life.  The worst outcome is the S3 shop developing a plan in a vacuum, without the input of the staff or the benefit of MDMP.   

“The Staff was on the dreaded ‘Road to Abilene.’ They started planning without direction, no idea how they got there, and they were nowhere near what the CDR wanted.” 

During MDMP, majors are the direct link to the BC, ensuring that the staff has the guidance to produce the plan the BC wants.  Nothing is more demoralizing for staff than realizing their plan is nowhere near what the commander expected.  The XO or S3 should provide planning updates to the BC and solicit guidance when needed.  

“Good units do routine things routinely well” 

In garrison, the XO is overall in charge, but the S3, especially at BDE, may have up to half the staff under the “Operations” umbrella.  The XO is the “process” master and can answer questions on staffing a product or routing.  If it involves planning, tasking, training, or ammunition, go to the S3.  These roles, especially in garrison, may shift between the XO and S3, so communication among the staff is key. Make sure that daily operations in the staff are codified and you know who to update. 

“Don’t wait till things go poorly to get the NCOs involved.” 

Never underestimate the Operations Sergeant Major (OPS SGM). Despite the name of the position, the OPS SGM supports the BC, CSM, XO and S3.  This individual should not be relegated to just setting up the terrain model for rehearsals, but should be involved in the planning, execution, and task tracking throughout the battalion.  Even when the XO and S3 can’t link up, the OPS SGM acts as a link between the two. 

Field Grade Roles 

“Allow the Commander to do the things only they can do” 

For the Battalion Commander, the XO/S3 acts as a buffer, allowing the important information to go through, and the mundane to stay out.  Majors handle the commander’s priorities and keep the battalion on track.  They are also a buffer; anything going to the commander will be reviewed by one of the majors or the CSM before coming to the BC. 

“Tough Love” 

For the staff, the majors are the leaders of the organization. The majors and the OPS SGM have the experience and authority to solve most of the Battalion’s problems– This doesn’t mean that they won’t occasionally tell you to work it out on your own.  Good majors take the time to train and develop the staff. 

“A Sounding Board” 

For the Company Commanders, the majors are an outlet.  Tell them what you are thinking and how things are going in your unit.  To a good company commander, one of the field grades should be a stop before, or after you see the BC.  As a major, having a Company Commander stop by your office will probably be the best part of your day. 

How to build a relationship with the Majors 

“The Golden Rule” 

The best way to build a relationship with the majors is by threatening them the way you would want to be treated:   

–Keep them informed.  If you are going to tell the BC something, let the XO/S3 know beforehand.  Never go behind the back of the XO and S3. 

-Seek their advice. The XO and S3 have more than likely done your job and excelled in it.  Whether you are a Company Commander or on the staff, most field grades enjoy talking to you about their experiences.  Typically, Company Commanders spend a lot of time with the S3 and the staff spend a lot of time with the XO, but you might naturally gravitate toward one or the other based on personality.  

–Work hard.  The XO and S3 know who is working hard.  They appreciate those who work hard to advance the team.  Try and solve problems before it comes to their level. 

-Don’t play games. Never play the XO and S3 off one another.  This only causes problems, and it won’t take long for the majors to find out what you are doing. 

What to expect from them? 

“Even on a staff, you never stop being a leader” 

Expect the majors to be leaders.  They should give guidance, direction, and make hard decisions.  They shouldn’t be afraid to talk to the BC about issues in the battalion. They should be willing to help and develop you.  They should be approachable.  If you can’t figure something out, ask the major- don’t suffer in silence.     

“What Sticks” 

When I think about the majors when I was a young officer, I admired those who tackled every task with all of their might and maintained a good attitude.  Sure, they sometimes look agitated and tired, but I never doubted their commitment and felt that they genuinely enjoyed their jobs.  Their experience brought calm to the staff and reassured the unit, even in difficult situations.  The majors knew their roles and responsibilities.  Whether we were deployed, in the field, or in garrison, the majors knew what needed to be done.  They didn’t have “lanes” that could be encroached on – they helped one another for the good of the unit.  They were the best mentors, and I wanted to have a great working relationship with them.  I hope these are the same experiences you have when you meet your majors.  

LTC Aaron Childers is an infantry officer who has served in both light and heavy formations.  He was the Brigade S3 for TF Strike (2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne) during the Mosul Counter-Attack.  Following his BDE S3 time, he completed a three-year assignment to the Joint Staff J5, and is currently serving on the Army Staff, G-3/5/7 Readiness Division.  Connect with him on Twitter @childersaw or via Linkedin. 

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This is Part 8 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Brigade FTX

After completing platoon LFX, battalion STX, and CALFEX, the BCT should identify any outstanding requirements to prepare for their brigade FTX as their final collective training opportunity before deployment to the National Training Center. Individual qualification ranges or secondary crew gunnery may be necessary before or immediately following the brigade FTX, but the brigade will also need a significant amount of time for recovery, unscheduled maintenance, and services after the crucible of training they just completed. The overall planning of a brigade FTX is the responsibility of the division, but the BCT has significant responsibilities in proposing and refining training objectives, integrating external enablers, and meeting preliminary requirements. The division will serve as the HICOM and EXCON for both the brigade and the OPFOR, has responsibility for sourcing and training OCs, and is responsible for spectrum management, approving training objectives, requesting training areas and resources, and the budget. The brigade must assist in the development of the simulations and communications architecture and must request Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and Home station Instrumentation Training System (HITS) for all personnel and equipment, so direct and indirect fire systems register effects during the training.

Conducting a brigade FTX for an ABCT requires most of the available training areas on an installation. Additionally, the BCT commander may have to designate one of the CABs in the BCT to serve as the OPFOR if the division cannot source OPFOR from another BCT. If one of the BCT’s CABs will fight the brigade as the OPFOR, the BCT should work with the division as early as possible to make the OPFOR HICOM battle rhythm, reporting standards, and systems reflect as closely to the BCT’s as possible.

Figure 25: Timeline for planning the BCT FTX. Planning for the event begins more than 180 days from execution, requiring proactive outreach to potential enablers by the BCT, division, and corps. Enabling units should reach out to BCTs heading into a brigade FTX for an opportunity to train with them.

Until this point, the BCT has not had an opportunity to maneuver as a full brigade, test all systems in a live training environment, and deal with the full challenge of the span of control in the BCT. However, the BCT has conducted training that builds in complexity and provides a logical, coherent progression to build competence acrosseach echelon. Most importantly, the brigade has assigned the responsibility to units and C2 nodes and provided leaders opportunities to train their nodes. The natural progression to a BCT FTX style event should not induce major friction for a BCT that trained in the manner outlined in the previous pages.

The division schedules combat power build briefs during RSOI for the brigade FTX that mirror those required at the NTC. This allows the brigade to identify shortcomings in materiel or people prior to deployment to the NTC and builds staff familiarity with the cumbersome reporting requirements that are part of RSOI. All leaders must stress the importance of boresighting MILES twice daily and reinforce standards from gunnery and previous live-fire training. After the completion of RSOI, the BCT should deploy to a TAA, finalize their MDMP, and conduct rehearsals. The BCT should employ all organic capabilities and coordinate for support from EAB assets through participation in the division’s targeting process.

Figure 26: BCT FTX Concept Sketch showing the overall concept of the operation by day.

Even though the brigade has multiple repetitions exercising its battle rhythm, it has not had an opportunity to execute them in a tactical context to ensure that outputs and inputs of battle rhythm events align. The brigade anchors its battle rhythm around the Lethality Board, which ties together the decisions of a targeting decision board with elements of the commander’s update brief. The Lethality Board provides the commander an opportunity to provide direct guidance to subordinate battalion commanders and staff daily.

Figure 27: A visual layout of how reports, meetings, and working groups in the brigade battle rhythm feed the commander’s decisions at the Lethality Board. This graphic also shows how meetings align with the steps of the operations process and targeting process.

Figure 28: A quad chart outlining the purpose, inputs, outputs, PACE Plan, attendees, and agenda for the Lethality Board.

While the BEB has responsibility for securing the BCT in the support area, the BCT employs Task Force Deliverance to control, integrate, and sustain the brigade’s enablers in the close area. During transitions to the defense, Task Force Deliverance synchronizes engineer assets (blade assets and sappers) with the BCT and CABs, coordinates for CL IV, and executes electronic deception. In the transition to the offense, Task Force Deliverance synchronizes electronic deception while protecting and sustaining blade assets. Task Force Deliverance employs any chemical decon teams and synchronizes detainee operations. Task Force Deliverance reports directly to the BDE and includes capabilities to sustain enablers on the move. Task Force Deliverance is led by the BEB S3 or XO, includes the BEB TAC, a small staff package, upper and lower TI communications, a security element from MPs, a M978 fueler, and a maintenance package.  Employing Task Force Deliverance allows the BEB to focus on area security operations in the support or consolidation areas.

A brigade FTX allows the brigade to maneuver in a live scenario and a continuous fight over seven days, requiring simultaneous execution of the current operations fight with planning across all echelons against a live, thinking enemy. It also requires the BCT to integrate enabling capabilities and employ all WfFs. This tests all systems and induces friction similar to that which the BCT will experience at the NTC. This training provides leaders at every level an opportunity to correct deficiencies and make final revisions to SOPs and systems prior to deploying to the NTC.

During a brigade FTX, the BCT trains on expeditionary deployment operations, movement to contact, a hasty defense, and an attack that will expose deficiencies related to personnel, materiel, training, and/or SOPs. Additionally, the artillery battalion works with the Division Artillery Brigade (DIVARTY) to complete Artillery Table XVIII (AT XVIII) as part of the overall scenario design. The keys to success and making the BCT FTX a worthwhile training event lie in the preparation and progression of the training the brigade already completed.

Conclusion

Effectively harnessing the combat power of the ABCT enables winning in LSCO and requires all echelons of the ABCT to function as intended. The ABCT is a complex organization with approximately 4,200 personnel in 7 different battalions and 36 different companies, troops, and batteries. BCT commanders and staff cannot plan discrete training events for all personnel and echelons in the brigade, but by clearly defining how the brigade fights and assigning leader responsibilities for those functions the brigade can ensure all personnel understands how they contribute to the fight.

Adapting this training progression as a template dramatically improves the ability of leaders in the ABCT to structure a training progression that builds lethality. Additionally, this template provides opportunities to forge relationships between ABCTs, corps separate brigades, enablers across the Army, and joint enablers.

Surprisingly little has changed with training management since H.L. Scott identified the most important parts of training cavalry in 1861. The instruction of the “men and the horse” remains the central focus for ensuring that the ABCT can fight and win. Effective training management reinforces how all systems and personnel in the brigade fight to support the “men and the horse,” developing all units in the ABCT into combat-ready formations. Effectively achieving this level of readiness and lethality requires a clear vision, careful planning, and the full effort of leaders across the ABCT. These efforts are rewarded with units capable of the “perfect management of the horse” and the full lethality, shock, and firepower of the ABCT.

**Editor’s Note: Thank you to the authors for their time and effort on this series.  The lessons are invaluable to leaders.  Undoubtedly, many of these lessons were hard-learned in planning and training.  Taking the time to offer insight and recommendations to those who follow cannot be under-appreciated.  Who’s up next?**  

About the Authors

COL Michael Schoenfeldt is the Commander of the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 23 years of experience as an Army Officer including Tank Platoon Leader, Tank Company Commander, Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer, Brigade Executive Officer, and Combined Arms Battalion Commander. He can be reached at michael.d.schoenfeldt.mil@mail.mil.

MAJ Patrick Stallings is currently the Cavalry Squadron Operations Trainer at the National Training Center and was the Brigade S3 for the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 15 years of experience as an Army Officer including Armored Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, and Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer. He can be reached at michael.p.stallings4.mil@mail.mil.

Special credits to the following personnel who made invaluable contributions to this paper:

LTC Rich Groen, Commander, 1-7 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Neil Hollenbeck, Commander, 2-5 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Steve Jackowski, Commander, 2-8 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Ron Sprang, Commander, 2-12 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Nick Dvonch, Commander, 1-82 FA, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC John Ordonio, Commander, 91 BEB, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Stacy Moore, Commander, 115 BSB, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ Brian Bifulco, Brigade XO, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ George Gordon, Brigade FSO, 1ABCT, 1CD and 1-82 FA Artillery BN XO

MAJ Josh Schulz, Brigade S2, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ Chad Lorenz, Brigade S2, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ Randy Donathan, Brigade S6, 1ABCT, 1CD and Brigade XO, 7^th Signal Brigade

MAJ Bernie Mabini, Battalion XO, 2-5 CAV (2-5 CAV Embedded Graphics)

MAJ CJ Wonsettler, Battalion XO, 2-12 CAV (2-12 CAV Embedded Graphics)

MAJ Tommy Sacchieri, Brigade XO, 3ABCT, 1CD (1CD Brigade Standard Training Model)

MAJ Bo Olsen, Squadron XO, 1-7 CAV (1CD Brigade Standard Training Model Whitepaper)

CPT Alex Forman, Brigade Planner, 1ABCT, 1CD

CPT Raymond Leroux, Brigade Planner, 1ABCT, 1CD

CPT Erica Ndlovu, Brigade Adjutant, 1ABCT, 1CD (Editior)

Continue the conversation on Twitter or Facebook with more articles to follow:

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 8: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.

This is Part 7 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Company STX and CALFEX

Upon completion of the gap crossing and battalion STX, one company from the battalion proceeds immediately to the CALFEX while the other companies proceed to STX. The battalion establishes its CTCP, MCP, FTCP, and Main CP in their TAA. The FLE or BSA remains established throughout the execution of CALFEX to support units as they train. The battalion retains control of its companies executing company STX. The battalion has responsibility for planning, resourcing, and executing the company STX. The battalion should adopt a similar model as they did for platoon STX, including training on company mounted and dismounted maneuver, changing movement techniques, changing movement formations, movement to contact, attack, hasty defense, breaching, and battle handoff. Cavalry troops should train zone reconnaissance, screen, and reconnaissance handoff.

CALFEX is the single most critical training event to train companies and platoons to fight and win as a tactical formation. During CALFEX, the battalion has the responsibility to sustain the company executing the CALFEX, but the brigade runs EXCON and HICOM for each company with a cell including the Brigade S3, Brigade Operations SGM, Brigade S2, Brigade FSO, and BAE. The brigade executes CALFEXs for 38 days including the setup, validation, training, and retraining of companies. No single unit is committed to the field for the entire 38 days, but CALFEX decisively engages significant portions of the brigade staff and the brigade commander’s attention. The brigade assumes tremendous overhead to effectively execute CALFEX, but this overhead translates into world-class training that forges lethal companies capable of destroying the enemy through shock, fire, and maneuver.

The Brigade Commander is the senior trainer for each company. CALFEX enables brigade and battalion commanders to observe each company as they conduct rehearsals, uncoil, cross the Line of Departure (LD), maneuver during the FTX, the transition to LFX, execute the breach, assault, conduct LRP operations, and defend in their Battle Position (BP). Ideally, a single company executes a dry or live-run daily. However, in a time-constrained environment, two companies can train each day by conducting Forward Passages of Lines (FPOLs) and Rearward Passages of Lines (RPOLs) with each other onto and off of the ranges during the CALFEX, staggering their start times in the FTX by a 2-3 hours. Pushing two companies per day reduces the duration of CALFEX by as much as 15 days, but significantly increases the amount of support personnel required. Additionally, training two companies per day increases the load on the commander, S3, operations SGM, FSO, and S2. Pushing multiple companies through a quality CALFEX each day is not sustainable for more than a few days at a time.

For an individual company, the LFX takes three days. On the first day, a brigade planner and S2 analyst issue a battalion OPORD to the company leadership. The OPORD includes different tasks, purposes, and graphics for infantry companies, tank companies, and cavalry troops. Company teams receive a variation of the infantry company OPORD. The company spends the first-day executing TLPs. Linkup with OCs occurs no later than the company commander’s OPORD brief. After the first iteration, a new company begins its TLP day while the first company executes its live-fire day.

Figure 20: Concept of the Operation for a Company Team Live Fire; The Company Team LDs from their TAA, passes through their Task Force Scout Platoon, and attacks to clear or seize four objectives. The attack includes a combined arms breach of a mine and wire obstacle, an air assault of a dismounted platoon onto an urban objective, a transition to a hasty defense, and a counterattack.

Figure 21: A daily (micro) SYNCMAT for CALFEX. The company should spend one-day conducting TLPs, a second day on dry fire, and a third-day conducting live fire. The BCT HICOM controls the unit over FM and JCR as though they are the company commander’s parent battalion commander or S3.

On the dry fire day, the infantry company begins in their assembly area and uncoils to their Line of Departure (LD) under Weapons Control Status (WCS) amber/hold. They leave one platoon of dismounts at Pickup Zone (PZ) Tin for an Air Assault. The company crosses the LD, which marks the beginning of the FTX, and moves to a contact point to conduct far recognition and begin passage through their battalion scout platoon. They execute a reconnaissance handover in accordance with their TACSOP. The company passes forward through the scouts and maneuvers through the training area traveling overwatch, scan for the enemy, and execute battle drills as appropriate. They use the information provided by the battalion scouts to find a crossing for an antitank ditch and maneuver to an assault position. OCs inject MESLs to the platoons including indirect fire contact, casualties, and a mired track requiring like-vehicle recovery. At the assault position, the company remains out of direct fire contact and observation of the enemy to ensure conditions are set for the breach. Nearby, an artillery platoon occupies its Position Area for Artillery (PAA) to support the breach, and an AAA platoon of 4 x AH-64s enters into an air corridor waiting to attack.

From the assault position, the company attacks on three separate avenues of approach on Browns Creek Multi-use Range, Clabber Creek Multi-Use Range, and Jack Mountain Multi-Use Range. A platoon fights along each avenue. The enemy presents as the S2’s SITEMP projected. As the company crosses the phase line at the entrance to the range, they transition to WCS red/free, and employ the tenants of breaching. As the 120mm High Explosive (HE) mortars and company’s 25mm suppress the enemy, AAA occupies an ABF to destroy an enemy platoon overwatching the point of breach. 155mm smoke obscures the breach site from the enemy. The sappers secure a foothold at the point of the breach and reduce the obstacle with a MICLC fired from an Armored Breaching Vehicle (ABV). The company assaults through the breach as the 155mm smoke dissipates and the company Fire Support Officer (FSO) shifts the 155mm to suppressing fires.

The commander bounds his platoons and the HICOM, talking over radio and JBCP as the parent battalion, provides SITREPs on adjacent units and enemy. These SITREPs slow or expedite the company’s attack from phase line to phase line. As the company assaults through the breach, they experience FM jamming, and the company commander executes his jamming battle drill. He transitions to fighting primarily on JCR and changes FM frequencies. His lead element takes contact from enemy artillery, which delivers a non-persistent chemical. The platoons continue the fight under elevated Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP).

Platoons bound from fighting position to fighting position along their avenue of approach. On the attack, the company echelons platoons to the right to prevent the enemy from exploiting a seam between them and the company to the south. Eventually, the company pushes near its Limit of Advance (LOA) with fields of fire overwatching the urban objective on OBJ Bradley South. This triggers the air assault of a platoon of dismounts from PZ Tin to HLZ lead. As the helicopters approach HLZ Lead, 120mm mortars suppress enemy dismounts on the urban objective, and 155mm High Explosive (HE) suppresses enemy mechanized forces beyond the CFL. The BFVs remain in support by fire, suppressing the enemy and enabling the dismounted platoon to clear the objective. OPFOR on the urban objective fight until only two wounded Donovians remain. The attached HUMINT Collection Team conducts tactical questioning while the dismounts tie into the company’s hasty defense.

After clearing the objectives, the company transitions to the defense, expecting the enemy to attack shortly after dark. The company conducts Engagement Area (EA) Development for EA Bronze and executes an LRP to resupply fuel, hot chow, and ammo as they evacuate dead, wounded, and a disabled BFV. The section that took the chemical attack bounds back along a dirty route to a decontamination site established by a CBRN platoon. The company prepares for an attack by a reinforced Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) into the battalion’s sector. HICOM relays that reinforcements from the 51^st Atropian Brigade are en route to reinforce them but are unlikely to arrive before the enemy makes contact. The company conducts a quick LRP, pulling back a section from each platoon while continuing EA Dev. The platoon leaders complete their sector sketches and the company conducts additional priorities of work. While the company conducts EA development and resupply, Joint Terminal Air Controls at the battalion control a sortie of F-16s that drop 4 x 500-pound bombs on enemy Electronic Warfare vehicles identified beyond the CFL.

Shortly after darkness, Ground Moving Target Indicating (GMTI) Radar picks up an enemy Mechanized Infantry Battalion moving in a column with only a few minutes until contact. HICOM relays the SPOTREP from the GMTI to the commander, and he prepares a company fire command. All three platoons report visual contact with the enemy within seconds, and the commander gives the command to fire. The company fires, destroying 2 platoons in the initial volley. The company fights, with platoons bounding between primary and alternate Battle Positions (BPs).

Eventually, the HICOM tells the commander to bound his company back to a subsequent BP, two-phase lines back. The company to his south has collapsed, and the brigade reserve has established a BP behind him. The subsequent BP ties in a cohesive defense. The company commander bounds his platoons back, with platoons continuing to engage the enemy to their front.

After establishing at the subsequent BP, the company commander calls for his Final Protective Fire (FPF), triggering a 120mm and 155mm barrage. As the FPF impacts less than a kilometer to his front and flank, the commander prepares to break contact. HICOM relays that the enemy is changing directions, and the S2 assesses they are retreating; the Brigade Commander orders a hasty counterattack to reestablish the original BPs. The company commander counterattacks forward and reestablishes his original BP. After establishing his BP, the 51^st Atropian Brigade scouts make radio communications. HICOM directs the company to conduct an RPOL through the 51^st Atropian Brigade scouts to their rear and return to their Tactical Assembly Area.

The dry iteration tests the company on several METs and requires them to fight for 16 hours. Upon return to their TAA, they conduct a hotwash with their OCs and prepare for their live iteration by uploading ammunition and conducting other priorities of work, including a short period of crew rest. In addition to training the company, the BAE, brigade FSE, and JTACs exercise in the synchronization of attack aviation, lift aviation, fires, and CAS to support the combined arms breach, attack, and defense.

The following day the company executes the live iteration of the CALFEX with minor adjustments from the dry iteration. The BCT commander gives instruction to scale the complexity of the training up or down by refining MESLs based on the performance of the company. The feedback of live rounds, live MICLCs, artillery, and mortars give the company confidence in their combat platforms and a better understanding of the real-life considerations for echeloning fires, employing smoke and white phosphorus, fighting and winning.

During the live iteration, live OPFOR does not participate. At the conclusion of the live iteration, the 51^st Atropian Scouts (replicated by OCs) verify that they properly cleared their weapons and send them to the AAR site, where they conduct a formal AAR with the Brigade and Battalion Command Teams.

For tank companies, adjustments to the concept of the operation are minor, but the BCT commander evaluates them closely on the violence of action and audacity. The tank company is not tasked to clear the urban objective and does not have an associated air assault. The premium is in maximizing the destructive power and shock of the attack.

Figure 22: Tank company concept of the operation for CALFEX. The change to the concept of the operation is a lack of any actions on the urban objective, air assault, or clearing.

Cavalry Troops execute an air assault and infiltration of a long duration OP in the early morning before they LD on their zone reconnaissance. The troops should plan for the employment of their raven during the reconnaissance and the security phases of the operation. During the zone reconnaissance, they encounter and reconnoiter an incomplete obstacle, bypass it, and report it to higher. They fight in accordance with their reconnaissance guidance until they reach their LOA. At their LOA, they transition to a screen and fight in accordance with their security guidance.

Figure 23: Cavalry Troop concept of the operation for CALFEX. The cavalry troop air assaults and infiltrates a long duration OP the night before LD. The cavalry troop conducts a zone reconnaissance instead of an attack and does not breach. Instead, the cavalry troop identifies an incomplete obstacle, bypasses, and reports it. The cavalry troop also answers PIR about the urban objective, the terrain around it, and the enemy COA based on contact they make. Instead of defending, the cavalry troop sets a screen.

CALFEX Support and Details

The brigade sets conditions for the successful execution of the CALFEX by carefully identifying all support requirements and conducting a scaled-down rehearsal of the CALFEX before the first dry iteration. OCs and range support details attend a daily in-brief and conditions check each evening to verify all support requirements for the following day. OCs and Tower Officers in Charge (OICs) receive OC Packets that provide them EXCON information including shot sheets, MESLs, EXCON reporting requirements, timelines, and graphics. Incoming OCs conduct a right seat ride with a trained OC for a dry or live iteration prior to assuming duties.

It is important to synchronize the support requirements for CALFEX with the execution of platoon LFX. The brigade must task a CAB or the cavalry squadron to support range requirements, but those units cannot support CALFEX while conducting their own training. Names for all positions must be submitted to the Brigade Operations Sergeant Major at least two weeks prior to the beginning of CALFEX to ensure all prerequisites for the training have been met.

The range support requirement for a company LFX is high. An example CALFEX Range support package includes 1 x Overall Officer in Charge (BCT S3), 1 x Range Safety Officer (BCT MG), 1 x Scorer (CPT), 1 x Range Support Synchronizer (BCT Ops SGM), 1 x ADAM/BAE (CPT / CW2), 1 x FSO (BCT FSO), 1 x Fires NCO (SSG), 1 x AFATDs Operator (SPC),  1 x Battle NCO (SSG), 1 x OPFOR Coordinator (BCT S2), and 1 x MESL Synchronizer (BCT S2 All Source Tech). Every day the supporting battalion can expect to provide at least 2 x Company OCs with drivers, vehicles, and radios (CPT), 4 x PLT OCs with drivers, vehicles, and radios (LT/SFC), 2 x Mortar OCs with drivers, vehicles, and radios (LT / SSG), 2 x Dismount Safeties with radios, 3 x Range Officers In Charge (LT / SFC), 4 x Range Safety Officers (SSG), 3 x Range Tower RTOs, 6 x Range gate guards, 30 x Fire Detail personnel, 4 x Medics with drivers, 4 x Road Guards, 2 x OPFOR NCOICs (SFC), and 10 x OPFOR with HMMWVs (BRDMs) or Bradleys (BMPs).

The battalion STX and gap crossing include its own set of support requirements that frequently overlap with the execution of CALFEX. All taskings and support should be assigned to one CAB or to the cavalry squadron on a rotational basis so that the support package has a cohesive chain of command for the Operations Sergeant Major to coordinate with. The Brigade should finalize and publish the SYNCMAT for executing platoon LFX, the gap crossing, and the company LFX at least 9 weeks out from execution to allow battalions time to synchronize their own internal requirements.

Cavalry Squadron and Artillery Battalion Fires Coordination Exercise (FCX)

Figure 24: Concept of the operation for the cavalry squadron fires coordination exercise. The cavalry squadron and the artillery battalion execute this training before redeploying from CALFEX, but the other units do not participate.

When the cavalry squadron completes their CALFEXs, they have an opportunity to conduct a Fires Coordination Exercise (FCX) with the field artillery battalion. Effectively executing this training, requires establishing the full brigade FSE, the cavalry squadron FSE, and maneuvering the squadron with observers. The artillery battalion can execute AT XV or a modified version of AT XV tables in conjunction with this training. All other units are replicated by the EXCON. Adding CAS to this training allows the BCT to train on joint fires and greatly increases the BCT FSE’s proficiency in prosecuting the deep fight. During the FCX, the squadron conducts a zone reconnaissance and establishes a guard, with the full artillery battalion firing in support of them. The squadron’s forward observers call for fire as part of their tactical movements, routing missions to batteries. This FCX pays dividends in building the necessary partnership between the squadron and the field artillery battalion. They are the BCT commander’s two organic capabilities to shape the deep fight. Additionally, this FCX validates sensor to shooter linkages from the troops to the firing guns.

Continue the conversation on Twitter or Facebook with more articles to follow.

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 7: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.

This is Part 6 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Gap Crossing (Battalion STX); setting the stage for CALFEX

After completing platoon LFX, the battalion redeploys to their motor pools and conducts an abbreviated recovery. After a few days, the battalion prepares to deploy to the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX). This brief recovery period allows all battalions to refit personnel, clean equipment, and conduct unscheduled maintenance. The battalion motor pool serves as the Division Support Activity (DSA), and the battalion receives an OPORD tasking them to deploy to a Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) to defend Atropia from invading Donovian forces. This deployment operation serves as a battalion STX lane, providing the battalion an opportunity to exercise tactical control of multiple companies, assign tasks and purposes to different C2 nodes, and integrate attachments. This battalion STX also prepares the battalion to conduct Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI) in a theater of war.

Figure 16 Concept of the operation for a BN STX requiring RSOI and movement from the Division Support Area (DSA) to a Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) with a Gap Crossing; This provides battalion and company leadership an opportunity to maneuver their units prior to CALFEX.

The Brigade OPORD lays out the situation for the battalion: Hostilities between Atropia and Donovia continue to escalate. Two weeks ago, Donovian conventional forces invaded Atropia and Donovian Special Purpose Forces (SPF) and began a campaign of direct action against critical infrastructure. The SPF have armed disenfranchised ethnic Bilasuvars across Atropia and reinforced the irregular forces known as the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB). Atropian forces remain decisively engaged with the numerically superior Donovian Operational Strategic Command – South (OSC-South) 60 miles north of the DSA. Upon the Donovian invasion, U.S. forces began flowing into theater, drawing Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) equipment and building combat power.

The threats that operate in the 1CD security area are Donovian Division Tactical Group (DTG) reconnaissance equipped with BRDMs, AT weapon systems, and mortars. SPF, BFB, and DTG reconnaissance work together to disrupt U.S. and Atropian forces as they move toward the front, and they have damaged the only bridge capable of trafficking tanks, BFVs, and M88s across Cowhouse Creek. This damage degraded the bridge’s load capacity and now it can only support wheeled vehicles lighter than HMMT fuelers. While engineers continue repairs on the Cowhouse Creek bridge, Donovian forces continue to attack southward.

The 74^th Military Ribbon Bridge Company (MRBC) and the 1^st Cavalry Division Aviation Brigade have assets to enable the brigade to conduct a wet gap crossing and resume the movement of combat forces north to establish a defense at key terrain near Jack Mountain and Clabber Creek. The purpose of this defense is to allow 1CD and other Allies to build additional combat power in theater, thwarting the Donovian political goal of a rapid, swift victory. DTG recon, BFB, and SPF overwatch several of the limited options for crossing sites, as well as the damaged Cowhouse Creek bridge.

Figure 17: Enemy SITEMP for the gap crossing and battalion STX

Figure 18: A more detailed scheme of maneuver for the execution of the rafting and bridging operation to support the battalion STX.

The BSB, with a fleet of wheeled vehicles light enough to cross the Cowhouse Creek Bridge, prepare to establish the FLE, ATHP, and a 17 point Refuel on the Move (ROM) site. These enabling capabilities extend the operational reach of the brigade and enable battalions to continue movement to the TAA after successfully completing the gap crossing. The Brigade TAC will deploy to synchronize the movement of forces and de-conflict activities between the 74^th MRBC, the 1CD Combat Aviation Brigade, and the battalions. The battalion receives TACON of its habitually aligned cavalry troop and Engineer Reconnaissance Teams (ERTs) for the operation. The battalion plans to employ those forces for reconnaissance and security at the engineer staging site, rafting sites, and bridging site. For two days at the DSA, the battalion plans the operation, publishes an order, conducts rehearsals, conducts PCIs and PCCs, and prepares for onward movement from the DSA.

Before daylight, the BSB pushes serials along Route Green and Route Amber to establish the FLE. The habitually aligned cavalry troop departs and pushes scout sections to establish nearside security while ERTs assess the rafting and bridging sites. Deception 155mm fires and suppressive 155mm fires from the field artillery battalion enable the cavalry troop as it maneuvers into position. The troop pushes two dismounted scout teams across the rafting site in Zodiacs to establish initial far side security. The Combat Aviation Brigade sling loads rafts to the rafting site. With the rafts, the MRBC loads a scout section in BFVs shuttles them across the rafting site. Once across the rafting site, the scout section moves to the far side of the bridging site. They push dismounted scouts teams into the nearby hills to establish two OPs, listening and scanning for BFB, SPF, or DTG recon.

With farside security established, the MRBC begins construction of the ribbon bridge. After 2 hours of work, the bridge is complete and the entire cavalry troop has crossed Cowhouse Creek at the rafting site. The cavalry troop continues their reconnaissance further forward and establishes a screen and security area three kilometers north of the bridgehead. At the bridging site, the MRBC takes mortar contact, indicating that SPF or BFB observe their activities. The battalion’s attached Q50 radar identifies the point of origin of the mortars, allowing them to fire their own mortars back and neutralize the threat before it disrupted the bridging operation.

The battalion carefully pushes its companies forward; disorganization during movement along the narrow trails and in the marshalling areas would delay onward movement of the battalion for several hours. Through close coordination with the Brigade TAC and the MRBC, the battalion pushes companies across at a rate of one company every 45 minutes; within 5 hours the battalion successfully crosses Cowhouse Creek with all elements. The task force scouts conduct the initial reconnaissance handoff with the cavalry troop, and continue a route reconnaissance to the TAA. After passing through the cavalry troop’s screen, the companies make contact from a DTG reconnaissance BRDM.

The battalion establishes its CTCP beyond the cavalry troop’s screen to pull in units as they clear the crossing site. The battalion commander moves with the TAC to push his companies forward, maintaining communications with his company commanders over FM and JCR. During the movement, the CTCP tracks the status of maintenance and recovery operations, and the battalion TAC tracks the movement of units as they close at the TAA. At the ROM site, each company tops off on fuel provided by the BSB, allowing them to close on the TAA ready to attack. At the TAA, the battalion Main CP rapidly establishes upper TI and pulls down the latest reports from the brigade.

Figure 19: CALFEX, Company STX, and BN STX Area of Operations at Fort Hood

While the OPORD describes the battalion as the lead element of a broader brigade operation, each battalion conducts a gap crossing as their own iteration of a battalion STX lane. During the gap crossing, the battalion gets an opportunity to command and control their formation and exercise multiple tactical systems and develop a RETRANS plan to support communications over extended distances. When the cavalry squadron executes the gap crossing, they do so with all assigned troops as a squadron STX lane. Nevertheless, each of the cavalry troops participates in the gap crossing a second time, with each troop working in concert with their habitually aligned battalion. This repetition builds familiarity between the cavalry troop commander, the CAB commander, and the CAB scout platoon leader. While 155mm planning and fires are part of the training event, the field artillery battalion does not support the training due to ongoing AT XV, platoon LFX support, and CALFEX support.

Continue the conversation on Twitter or Facebook with more articles to follow!

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 6: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.

This is Part 5 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article and all enclosures are available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Platoon Training, Battalion STX, and CALFEX: Maximizing Combined Arms Lethality

The decisive point of the ABCT’s training progression is building lethal companies and platoons which occurs during platoon LFXs and the CALFEX. Much like crew gunnery, these training events involve the integration of all C2 and sustainment nodes. These events require the participation of the entire brigade and battalion staff to synchronize all WfF and forge the brigade into a combat-ready team. Without putting all WfFs together, the brigade cannot function effectively. The purpose of combined arms training is training the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each arm was used separately or sequentially. Combined arms enables the ABCT to overwhelm and destroy enemies on the battlefield. To compress the time required for training and prevent the need to conduct ten days of deliberate recovery after training each echelon, the ABCT should structure training so that the ABCT conducts platoon through battalion training in one continuous block through multi-echelon design.

Figure 11: BCT SYNCMAT for BN LFX and CALFEX. Battalions conduct Platoon STX and LFX in a waterfall. The training progression continues with a BN STX (Wet Gap Crossing) that transitions directly into Company STX and CALFEX

The first events during this progression are platoon STX and LFX. Battalions have the responsibility for planning and executing platoon STX and LFX. The BCT remains responsible for budgeting time and resources for this training, but must synchronize these events to meet support requirements for the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX). The BCT must synchronize artillery platoons to support platoon LFXs and CALFEX while building in space for them to complete Artillery Table XV (AT XV). In accordance with TC 3-20.0, Integrated Weapons Training Strategy, “During the unit training plan, the tables are typically executed in sequence; however, commanders have the flexibility to execute tables in a varying sequence based on their training need, accessibility to resources, and other synchronization requirements.”

For Platoon LFX certification, the squadron and three CABs will each need seven to nine days to rotate their platoons through training. If all three platoons in a company proceed through LFX in a single day the battalion will need seven days. If only two platoons execute LFX per day, the battalion will need nine days. Regardless of throughput, each platoon should have at least two days of STX, one day for TLPs, and one day for dry and live runs of the LFX. The platoons then have one day to conduct any necessary retraining and two days to conduct training support, such as range details or serving as Observer Controllers (OCs).

Figure 12: SYNCMAT for waterfalling platoons through Platoon STX and Platoon LFX (Formerly Gunnery Table XII). This example requires nine days as two platoons execute LFX per day.

Platoon STX and Platoon LFX

While executing Platoon LFXs, each battalion deploys their C2 and sustainment nodes to the field to support the training. Just like crew gunnery, the brigade organizes under their National Training Center (NTC) or deployment task organization. Sapper platoons train as part of their CABs. With a focus on reconnaissance, the cavalry squadron is well suited to take ownership of the Electronic Warfare / SIGINT platoon and employ them in a modified platoon LFX. While battalions are responsible for the overall design of their platoon STX and LFX, best practices are listed below:

The motor pool serves as the Division Support Area (DSA). Companies and platoons issue an OPORD articulating an enemy threat (Special Purpose Forces) that requires continuous security posture prior to their deployment. Once the platoon leaves the DSA, there are no “administrative moves.” Movement, maneuver, planning, preparation, and execution happen in a tactical environment. The battalion’s Higher Command (HICOM) and EXCON (led by the battalion S3) ensure subsequent OPORD and FRAGOs reflect this reality to keep the platoon properly engaged. The brigade resources battalions with ranges that support combined arms breaches including the use of artillery and mortars that impact on the range to support maneuver against the templated enemy. Adjacent training areas should provide enough maneuver space for platoons to conduct STX nearby.

As platoons deploy to the field for their STX, they rotate to a series of lanes where they receive an FM, JCR, or written FRAGO. The battalion develops and resources the training; the battalion commander defines the training objectives; and company leaders run the STX lanes while a leader in the battalion Top 5 oversees STX as a whole. The STX lanes take place in a nearby training area with platoons rotating through lanes. CAB STX lanes include changing movement techniques and movement formations, movement to contact, attack, hasty defense, and battle handoff. Cavalry platoons conduct zone reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, and reconnaissance handoff. CAB commanders give their battalion scouts a second repetition with the cavalry squadron, so platoons and troops gain familiarity working with each other. Each type of platoon should have slightly different tasks and STX lane design to support their METs. The overall structure of the STX lanes remains similar between platoons as units “waterfall” through the training. Allocate time for hotwashes between STX lanes as well as time for retraining tasks and skills that platoons struggle with each day. This pays tremendous dividends and prepares the platoons for their LFX.

Figure 13: Platoon STX SYNCMAT and Tasks

Figure 14: Platoon STX Concept

During the LFX, finding ways to safe artillery, mortar fire, bangalores, Mine Clearing Line Charges (MCLCs), TOW missiles, and Javelins on ranges requires dialogue and iterative staff work with range operations personnel. That staff work must begin six months before the execution of the training. Increasing STRAC allocations for Javelins and TOW missiles can greatly improve the training outcomes for platoons and companies by providing additional Soldiers the opportunity to employ these munitions. Requesting additional allocations requires coordination through HQDA G-3 and HQDA G-4 and the process should begin at least three months before the training event begins. Safeing indirect fires and MICLCs on the live-fire range allows units to echelon fires and gain experience with the difficult task of synchronizing the effects of indirect fires, including obscuration, with mounted and dismounted maneuver.

The training value is extremely high for a platoon to receive reports on the reconnaissance of the objective from a Raven, employ the tenants of breaching as they maneuver elements into a support by fire with Army Attack Aviation (AAA), obscure the point of breach from enemy observation, and secure a foothold for the breach. The platoon suppresses the enemy with direct and indirect fires as attached sappers reduce the obstacle, triggering the platoon to assault through and continue the attack as they echelon fires. Tank platoons assault to establish an ABF and destroy additional enemies, while infantry platoons assault through to suppress and clear a trench on the far side of the obstacle. Each platoon should conduct LFX in day and nighttime.

Figure 15: Concept for Platoon FTX and LFX Certification. This training event incorporates Sappers, Mortars, Artillery, a combined arms breach, and support from Army Attack Aviation, and integration of the company’s raven.

When designing the scheme of maneuver for the platoon LFX, the FTX and LFX should flow into one another as a coherent training event. The Platoon Leader receives an OPORD from the battalion S3 or planner and conducts his own TLPs. The platoon uploads ammunition in the training area and transitions from a Weapons Control Status (WCS) of green or amber to red based upon the threat. When the platoon leader crosses a phase line and enters the range, they do so as a part of the tactical scenario and not through administrative commands. Throughout the TLPs and execution of the FTX and LFX, each platoon has an OC to assist the battalion commander in assessing the performance of the platoon.

OCs should be equipped with a packet that gives them an overview of the training and provides metrics for assessment. Objective T training standards and the NTC’s version of the Department of the Army (DA) Big 12 provide an excellent starting point assessment, and the platoon’s lethality score (percentage of targets destroyed) is an important metric to include. Only by reinforcing lethality and violence of action will subordinate leaders understand the ultimate metric of success— achieving the mission by winning in a fight with a peer adversary. During training, the CEMA section should assess each platoon as they train and show the platoon their electromagnetic signature at the AAR.

The design of the FTX and LFX varies between different types of platoons. Tank platoons do not require trenches or dismounted support by fires, so the design should emphasize direct fire employment, violence of action, and shock. Infantry platoons incorporate their dismounts to seize complex terrain, clear bunkers, and clear trenches that support mounted maneuver. Training with live hand grenades as infantry squads assault trench lines requires prerequisite training but provides infantrymen realistic close-quarters feedback. Scout platoon qualifications should not include a breach; however, they should identify, classify, report, and bypass an obstacle. Scouts should conduct reconnaissance through lateral routes in complex terrain using dismounted teams to pull mounted sections forward in a manner that makes sense based on the SITEMP. The battalion’s OPORD tasks scout platoons to observe an NAI that requires the employment of dismounted teams using long-range optics. Additionally, the cavalry squadron trains the CEMA platoon with a specially designed lane that includes detection of emitters and call for fire against those emitters. The brigade must resource the squadron and each CAB with an artillery platoon and ammunition to support the platoon LFX. Each platoon gains invaluable experience by echeloning fires from 155mm to 120mm mortars and then transitioning to direct fire weapons systems in a combined arms fight.

Finally, platoon training presents an opportunity for incorporating enablers, particularly rotary wing support. Infantry platoons train on air assault and air movement operations as part of their STX. Battalions gain experience synchronizing AAA to support the combined arms breach by planning the lateral and vertical de-confliction of artillery, mortars, aviation, and ground direct fires. Only live-fire exercises crystallize the realities of employing combined arms effects in a manner that doctrine and force-on-force training cannot.

Continue the conversation on Twitter #ABCTLethality or Facebook with more articles to follow:

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full-page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 5: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.

This is Part 4 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Lethality Validation Exercises

Exercising CPs and staffs requires a deliberate training approach. Trained staffs enable lethal crews, platoons, and companies to win. The BCT fight requires shaping the enemy in the deep fight and destroying the enemy in close combat with an overwhelming shock through violent, synchronized, combined arms maneuver. Achieving these outcomes requires effective staff at the battalion and brigade. Training staffs and CPs requires regular employment and exercise at echelon. Without regular exercise, CPs will fail to integrate resources or synchronize the fight. For this reason, ABCTs should conduct Lethality Validation Exercises (LVEs) every month where they do not deploy CPs as part of another collective training event. LVEs validate the setup standards, layout, and infrastructure of CPs as a TENTEX, validate communications systems configurations during a COMMEX, train plans sections by conducting tactical MDMP and rehearsing distribution of an Operations Order (OPORD) including all fighting products, and validate that fighting products enable current operations functions during a Command Post Exercise (CPX).

Figure 8: Lethality Validation Exercises refresh the systems in all C2 Nodes, integrate all WfFs, and ensures the BCT can control a fight.

Unfortunately, C2 nodes typically have a turnover rate exceeding maneuver platoons and companies. Because each person on a staff executes a unique and specific set of tasks, new personnel require immediate training. High turnover can result in a “reset” of a C2 node where all resident knowledge leaves with the transitioning personnel. CP SOPs mitigate the impact of personnel transition, but frequent training is the only way to maintain proficient C2 nodes. Most company-grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) have limited experience working on staff at the battalion and brigade level. These factors make the frequent exercise of CPs necessary.

Fortunately, CPs can train without tying up company and below leadership. As CPs gain more comfort deploying and conducting MDMP in accordance with their SOPs, the time and effort required to run a LVE continue to decrease. Execution of the LVE can take place in a single calendar week with two half days spent by brigade and battalion staffs turning a tactical OPORD, one-half day conducting a COMMEX, and two half-days executing the CPX. This provides a critical opportunity to test all communications systems and perform end-to-end maintenance. Additionally, LVEs should account for ongoing training and planning as well as training objectives that are scalable to reflect competing requirements. If a BCT has multiple competing requirements, the LVE may only consist of a TENTEX where CUOPS sections establish their nodes to train new personnel on the setup, tear down, and layout of the node.

Planning for the LVE requires confirmation of the training objectives, selection of a site for training, and the identification of an Exercise Control (EXCON) cell to facilitate execution. At a minimum, training objectives should include deploying C2 nodes, establishing communications across the entire PACE plan, training current operations, conducting MDMP, transmitting fighting products, validating a play from the Playbook, and rehearsing sensor to shooter linkages. The sensor to shooter linkage should test the execution of preplanned fire missions, call for fire from the cavalry squadron to a battery over a quick-fire net, and call for fire from a Shadow UAS or a targeting message from the BISE. The fires enterprise must validate Sensor to shooter linkage over all mediums, including digital fires over upper TI, FM, and HF.

After identifying the training objectives and scheduling the LVE, each battalion should identify where they will establish their CPs. Fortunately, local training areas near motor pools or headquarters buildings are suitable for achieving the training objectives of an LVE. The brigade main CP, brigade TAC, battalion main CPs, SOC, FDCs, and at least one howitzer per battery should participate in LVEs. The EXCON can consist of planners or officers and NCOs transitioning into or out of the unit soon. The EXCON should have a minimum of one person per battalion and 2-3 to cover the Brigade, with an overall Officer in Charge (OIC).

In the prepare phase of the LVE, the brigade should confirm satellite time for upper TI and turn an OPORD through MDMP. The installation Mission Training Center (MTC) can provide a division OPORD in a scenario that allows the BCT to validate the appropriate play on terrain they would like to plan on. No later than the week prior to the execution of the CPX, the brigade staff turns the OPORD through MDMP using Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and their PSOP. The outputs of the MDMP include all fighting products, including a SITEMP, EVENTEMP, Intelligence Collections Synchronization Matrix (ICSM), Red Checkbook, Blue Checkbook, NAI Overlay, Operations Overlay, Fires Overlay, Aviation Overlay, Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM), SYNCMAT, Decision Support Matrix (DSM), Attack Guidance Matrix, High Priority Target List (HPTL) by Phase, LOGSYNCMAT, and OPORD with annexes. The Brigade must distribute these products through analog and upper TI as they would in a tactical environment.

During the execution of the LVE, all elements in the brigade deploy their CP nodes with a full day to conduct a COMMEX and troubleshoot communications. After the COMMEX, the CUOPS phase of the CPX begins. Plan the tactical operation to begin at the same time as the start time of the LVE. For example, if the LVE begins at 0900, the Brigade should LD at 0900 in the OPORD. Ideally, the LVE Execution occurs with a dry run from 0900-1200, and a live run the following day from 0900-1200. During the dry run, the EXCON ensures that the CP understands how to follow the SYNCMAT and provides expected contact reports to Radio Telephone Operators (RTOs) through “white card” injects. Contact reports and fighting products drive operations and reporting in the CPs, with each WfF executing battle drills. White card injects drive fire missions over all medium, and observers for fire missions should come from all battalions with missions forward and behind the Coordinating Fires Line (CFL).

Figure 9: An example of the tactical maneuver concept for an LVE. All C2 node CUOPS sections track and exercise battle drills for an operation using fighting products and a Master Scenario Events List. The overall design of the LVE validates or identifies necessary changes for a specific play from the Playbook.

During the dry run of the LVE, staff train new personnel, familiarize themselves with the operation and execute battle drills they can easily anticipate. The EXCON works with the commander to revise the Master Scenario Events List (MESL) for the live run to include hard-to-anticipate events, such as a power outage, casualties at the CP, or an unexpected COA from the enemy. As the LVE continues, the battalions feed fire missions, Battle Damage Assessments (BDA), and routine reports to the BCT CPs. The LVE enables leaders in CPs to identify which human systems, technical systems, and SOPs need changes. Following each LVE S3s, XOs, and brigade staff AAR the training to make necessary updates to SOPs and recommend adjustments to training objectives for follow on LVEs.

Preparing for Platoon Live Fire Certifications

After the primary crew gunnery, the brigade sets aside time and space on the training calendar for a full ten-day recovery of personnel and equipment, individual training, team and squad LFXs, LVEs, unscheduled maintenance, and vehicle services.

Recovery is an operation of its own. Proper recovery requires resources, time, and leader oversight. Subordinate leaders back brief their plans and friction points prior to executing recovery. Staff track the completion of recovery tasks and commanders supervise the process.

Figure 10: All units conduct recovery following each major training event and report completion of tasks to the BCT. Recovery is its own operation and requires planning, resourcing, and commander/staff oversight

Like recovery, services must have a plan more comprehensive than a banner on the long-range training calendar. Battalions align resources to support required services while company commanders and platoon leaders back brief their plans to execute services. The battalion maintenance control section tracks the progress of services and the commander receives a services out brief upon completion.

This 1-3 month window allows the brigade to take on limited red cycle or installation support tasks for the division and installation while subunits train individuals, teams, and squads. The red, amber, green tasking cycle must be managed at all echelons. Any unit designated to take red cycle should absorb all taskings for the BCT so that other units can effectively train. The red cycle unit will have difficulty for the month they are in red cycle but will enjoy protection from training detractors for all other months.

Squad LFXs in the cavalry squadron requires the employment of the BFV with the scout team and require qualified BFV crews to support the training to fight as designed in ATP 3-20.98, Scout Platoon. This means the cavalry squadron cannot certify squads prior to crew gunnery. Whereas, the organization of scout squads enables the incorporation of Vehicle Drop Offs (VDOs), dismounted infiltration, dismounted reconnaissance of Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), establishing Observation Posts (OPs), and understanding engagement criteria/disengagement criteria. Cavalry squad LFXs are great opportunities for scouts to practice Call for Fire (CFF) training and employ the troop’s organic mortar section. Even though infantry squads do not technically require the incorporation of BFVs to meet TC 3-20.0 standards, incorporating a VDO and BFV support by fire with battalion mortar targets provides better training realism for the ABCT infantry squad and should occur in this timeframe.

All dismounted training should incorporate squad load plans for Anti-Tank (AT) systems, crew-served weapons, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) equipment, long-range optics, batteries, FM and HF communications, pyrotechnics, and grenades. Additionally, teams and squads must train on land navigation using a map and compass, execution of select battle drills, trench and obstacle marking procedures, and long-range movement. Several of these training objectives can be incorporated into the Team and Squad STX design, but Squad LFXs should reinforce combined arms maneuver. The SITEMP given to squad leaders should include consideration of the effective range of enemy AT systems. BFVs should maneuver to a point where the enemy AT threat increases, where the conduct a VDO of dismounts to maneuver to destroy the enemy in complex terrain, a trench, or a bunker system and pull the BFV forward into a new Support by Fire (SBF) or Attack by Fire (ABF) position.

Ultimately, the design and execution of team and squad LFX is up to battalion and company leaders, but the brigade has the responsibility to resource the training with ammunition, land, time, and training dollars.

Disclaimer

This series is a fusion of doctrine and regulations with the authors’ experience in training and warfighting. It does not constitute the official position of FORSCOM, TRADOC, the Army, or the Department of Defense.

COL Michael Schoenfeldt is the Commander of the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 23 years of experience as an Army Officer including Tank Platoon Leader, Tank Company Commander, Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer, Brigade Executive Officer, and Combined Arms Battalion Commander. He can be reached at michael.d.schoenfeldt.mil@mail.mil.

MAJ Patrick Stallings is currently the Cavalry Squadron Operations Trainer at the National Training Center and was the Brigade S3 for the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 15 years of experience as an Army Officer including Armored Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, and Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer. He can be reached at michael.p.stallings4.mil@mail.mil.

Continue the conversation on Twitter or Facebook with more articles to follow!

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 4: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.