Collectively, the U.S. Army understands the philosophy of Mission Command and defines it well in current doctrine, yet fails to understand how to effectively execute mission command.
This paper will highlight two significant areas of improvement in the execution of current mission command doctrine within the U.S. Army. First, commanders at echelon must understand well defined strategic and operational objectives in priority order. A greater understanding of the strategic and operational objectives by tactical and operational commanders will encourage disciplined initiative in achieving higher objectives where appropriate. Understanding initiative and risk because immense responsibility has been laid at their feet with unbalanced authority to execute the mission within the commander’s intent. The concept of risk acceptance weighs heavily in this dynamic. Adjustments in the practice of mission command in these two areas will have far reaching effects across domains.
System of Mission Command
The U.S. Army released the latest publication on mission command in July of 2019 titled: “APD 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces”. According to ADP 6-0, mission command in the U.S. Army can reference a war-fighting function (WfF), a system of command and control, and a philosophy of effective leadership in war. Mission command is defined in ADP 6-0 as “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.” It is based on the idea that a tactical leader in the field may have a better overall understanding of what is happening than a higher level staff and could respond more effectively to emerging situations based on that understanding. ADP 6-0 highlights the purpose of creating the mission command doctrine: “Subordinate commanders needed the authority to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the plan.”
Understanding the Objectives
Commanders must understand the strategic and operational objectives in order to design tactical and operational objectives to achieve the larger goal as effectively as possible. This concept has become more important over time as media and social media messaging and control of the narrative has become an essential component of armed conflict. Tactical actions can have strategic implications. Understanding operational objectives allows a commander to synchronize with larger objectives and understand the linkages from the strategic objectives through the operational objectives to the tactical efforts at hand. A platoon, company, or battalion level leader that understands the implications of a tactical unit’s actions within the larger strategic environment, and the impact on strategic communication efforts, can significantly enhance the overall ability of a unit to accomplish strategic and operational objectives through the manner in which tactical objectives are accomplished. Many junior leaders have become far too comfortable executing only their “piece of the pie” and leaving the rest to higher echelons. Junior leaders must return to active participation in the larger effort to fully synchronize efforts through mission command.
A common understanding of the strategic and operational environment is critical to building an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding between commands. ADP 6-0 recognizes the importance of this by establishing “mutual trust” and “shared understanding” as two of the seven principles of mission command. Echelons must share an understanding of the same overarching objectives to work in concert toward those objectives. Additionally, mutual trust is gained through a shared understanding that all parties are working toward the same overall objectives. Without this shared understanding, tactics and operations can become desynchronized and strain trust between commanders. This erodes synchronization and damages the ability for commanders to innovate new activities on the battlefield.
A lack of trust between commanders can have a huge impact. In just one example, a lack of trust from the higher echelon can create an environment where Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) are restrictive in an effort to reduce risk to strategic objectives. This can prevent tactical commanders from seizing opportunities to apply appropriate force or measures to accomplish those same strategic objectives. In contrast, a lack of trust from a lower echelon to a higher echelon can create an environment where tactical commanders are unwilling to accept risk because they do not trust their higher echelon. This may be because a commander fears prosecution for the risk they accepted or because a commander is unsure that the higher echelon fully understands the environment and may react poorly to the actions taken.
Authorities Commensurate with Responsibilities
A second great challenge emerges even in the context of overarching shared understanding and mutual trust. Because personalities and differing perspectives will influence behavior, all authorities must be granted to a commander commensurate with the responsibilities held. Each leader may interpret this idea differently, resulting in a challenging environment for subordinate leaders to rapidly assess. This builds upon the idea of mutual trust. A commander who holds the responsibility over a certain aspect of his unit should be granted the authority to execute within the context of shared understanding and mutual trust between commands. For example, a commander who holds the responsibility to maintain standards and discipline within his organization, should hold the authority to enforce those standards and discipline through the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In this case, one could easily argue that a commander does hold this authority in the form of UCMJ Article 15 adjudications. Conversely, the U.S. Army executed studies on the amount of mandatory training and activities that a company level commander is required to follow in the form of Army Regulation 350-1 and others. The studies found that all of the annual requirements could not possibly be completed within a year. Because these are regulations, any diversion from the standard is an offense that could result in a commander being fired from a command position. This places subordinate commanders in the consistent position of choosing which regulation to follow and where to accept risk. The commander arguably assumes risk in the areas least likely to cause problems or become visible. In an environment of low trust, this instantly degrades the relationship between the higher and lower commands.
Digging deeper in analysis dictates that one must overlay this concept with the mission command principle of “risk acceptance” from ADP 6-0. In discussions of authorities and responsibilities, analysis of where risk is accepted is important. As exemplified above in the discussion of burdensome regulations in AR 350-1, the risk is commonly accepted by the subordinate leaders. In fact, many of the regulations created at the upper levels of the Department of Defense network are likely designed to reduce risk by mandating compliance. In essence, this simply transfers risk down to subordinate commanders who bear the burden to accomplish all of the regulatory activities set upon them. This erodes trust between echelons and sets an environment contrary to the doctrine of mission command. In mission command, each command must accept risk and build shared understanding to develop mutual trust. What risk is actually shared by the higher level command and how is that acceptance of risk displayed to the lower echelon in a way that promotes trust? The impact of a sense of assuming all risk at the subordinate levels decimates the relationship between commands. This concept was not lost on those who wrote the Army’s Mission Command Doctrine. ADP 6-0 states: “Unfortunately for today’s junior commanders, the concept has not been fully executed across the army.”
Conclusion
One could argue that this dynamic of limited mutual trust only holds true to the environment and commanders at echelon adhere more closely to the mission command doctrine in the tactical environment. While there are aspects of this that are true, the dynamic between the strategic, operational, and tactical realms is still upended by eroded mutual trust. None worded it better than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, who stated: “We preach mission command, but we don’t necessarily practice it on a day-to-day basis in everything we do… If we’re going to have to operate like that in warfare, we have to train as we’re going to fight. We have to live and operate like that on a day-to-day basis, even on daily administrative tasks you have to do in a unit area.” Until these dynamics are resolved, mission command as defined in doctrine will remain elusive.
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CPT(P) Sean Fraser is currently a Master’s Degree Student at the Naval War College. As an Armor officer, he has served in an Armored Cavalry Regiment as well as Armor, Stryker, and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with deployment experience in Iraq, Kuwait, and Europe. He commanded a Tank Company and a Headquarters Company in an Armor Brigade Combat Team. Sean recently transitioned to the Simulation Operations Functional Area where he deployed to Afghanistan with the 101st Sustainment Brigade.
Bibliography
Burke, MAJ Crispin J. “No Time, Literally, For All Requirements.” 04 April 2016. Accessed on 09 February 2020. https://www.ausa.org/articles/no-time-literally-all-requirements
Headquarters Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 Mission command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19189_ADP_6-0_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf
Townsend, Stephen, Douglas Crissman, and Kelly McCoy. “Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Mission Command: It’s Okay to Run with Scissors (Part 1).” Military Review 99, no. 3 (May, 2019): 4-9. https://search-proquest-com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/docview/2218226932?accountid=322.