The Need to Incentivize the Well-Rounded Leader

A Guest Post by Jamison Richart

Military leadership understands there is a problem with retention. Across the services, a common hot button issue is how to maintain a force large enough to meet the military’s requirements.  To maintain current strength the services must recruit 150,000 individuals per annum to replace those who are choosing to leave, and this training bill in terms of manpower and money greatly detracts from readiness. This is true in both the enlisted and officer ranks and across career fields.  With some training pipelines lasting anywhere from six months to two years the numbers game is academic.

With people choosing to leave rather than stay, the question has been asked with no perfect answer, “Why is retention proving to be so difficult?”  This article addresses one issue that many consider when deciding whether to stay or go: leadership expectations.  This is a complex topic, but in its most basic form, leadership is exemplified by the individual who is an excellent process manager as well as caretaker of those in his or her command. Regretfully, the perception, and sometimes sad reality, is that the promotion system is heavily weighted towards a process manager rather than a caretaker.

Currently the Army and Air Force both are working on new promotion structures, in part to incentivize more well-rounded leaders.  What these new systems will reward in terms of values has yet to be revealed.  Hopefully it rewards those individuals that ensure the sustainable health of those under them.

As a young 0-2, my commander told me, “You don’t get promoted, your records do.”  Fair enough. In an organization as large as the military, the efforts and talents of the individual must be condensed into something manageable.  The problem is that in our system what “right looks like” has become one-dimensional and, over time, morphed into something that mirrors a desired formula.  In turn, what is rewarded is a very finite set of qualities, normally personified as a paperwork trail that consists of big numbers, mass progress, and project success.  Generally speaking, records that advertise an individual’s efforts to support the day-to-day health of peers and subordinates are viewed as fluff, if they are recognized at all.

Some will disagree. However, consider two different scenarios of two theoretical lieutenants.  Lieutenant (Lt) #1 spends three days a week for six months working with five enlistees struggling financially and physically.  Lieutenant #1 coaches them on money management, checks in regularly, and succeeds at improving each enlistee’s financial readiness so that they are no longer in danger of losing their security clearance.  At the same time, Lieutenant #1 reviews the airmen’s diet plan, goes to the gym several hours a week with them, and ensures they pass their next physical fitness test.  The result is five military personnel greatly improved in self-confidence, abilities, and possibly motivated to re-enlist in an organization that took such great care of them.  Now consider Lieutenant #2, who was put in charge of the change of command ceremony.  The event went well, and several members of Command attended and recognized a well-run event.  Which Lt would be considered the stronger officer using current practices?  The actions of a change of command are more quantifiable and have the attention of many in the chain of command.  Moreover,  Lt #1 may struggle to describe his contribution in a current performance report format despite the platitudes his actions deserve.

Why should we as FGO’s care?  If the road to promotion is well documented, then why not do what works and press?  Beyond the hopefully obvious—that of taking care of your troops as being a cornerstone of being a good leader—ensuring the health of subordinates also enhances unit effectiveness. In his real-life example of taking the worst submarine in the fleet, both in terms of morale and performance, and transforming it into the Navy’s premier crew, ex submarine commander David Marquet says his real measure of success was not being awarded for being the Navy’s #1 boat.  Rather, it was the turnaround in re-enlistment numbers and recurring award of #1 boat for years after his departure as his former lieutenants took charge and continued his policies. In the book Turn the Ship Around!, Marquet suggests that leaders should be judged not only by how their commands perform during times of leadership, but also how they perform after they leave and how long former subordinates remain in service.  Good commanders will create atmospheres that cause an organization to succeed even in their absence and incentivize individuals to stay in service.  The quantifiable result(s) of an effective unit is an increased retention rate.

In the current crises of poor retention, it is critical that we look at examples like Marquet and actively incentivize the leadership he describes. It is important because the type of leader we incentivize will not only enable promoting the correct people, but also the retention rates of enlisted personnel. A study by 30-year Army veteran Col Erich W. Randall concluded that leadership played a key role in the Army National Guard’s re-enlistment rates. Surveying 26,250 Army Guard soldiers revealed that leaders who met the needs of soldiers while deployed could rely on higher retention rates back home.  Meeting the needs in this study meant that—in addition to the standard food, shelter, bullets, and other essential supplies—leaders must produce to simply survive, the average USANG soldier also needed interactions that included mentorship, counseling, and assurances of family well-being to return for multiple re-enlistments. Simply put the soldier needs the impression that the commander values the health of the rank and file, and will ensure his or her well-being; without that distinct impression, retention rates drop.  The question must be asked then: what type of leadership traits do we want to promote as desirable?

If the goal is to retain personnel, then we need to re-evaluate how we view what “right looks like” and ensure that promotions consider an individual’s history as a caretaker.  This is not to suggest we do away with the qualities of organizational management, but rather actively balance it with qualities that support the rank and file.  We do this by actively incentivizing leaders to exhibit the behaviors that will keep talent.  What these incentives look like can come in many forms.  We can re-shape the service records or promotion boards to contain areas specifically geared to recognize efforts that ensure the health of the people. The Army is already testing this idea when selecting leaders for Battlion level by requesting opinion submittals from past subordinates and peers.  With this system the hope is to catch potentially inappropriate personalities before they are promoted.  An idea to take this one step further is to track re-enlistment rates and record the health of the unit in terms of total structure including, but not limited to, the financial, emotional, and physical health of peers and subordinates.  Make it clear, “if you cannot show that you took care of the individuals under you, you are not fit for promotion.”

Without question, the actions suggested above require deliberation on how we view the placement of a leader’s talent as well as the commitment of resources.  However, in terms of resources dedicated to tracking the health of a unit and the commander’s effect on it, how much is the military currently investing in new personnel to replace those now leaving?  Failure to change what we value in promotion only results in the continued loss of critical talent.

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Maj Richart is currently serving as an instructor pilot and Safety Officer at the United States Air Force Academy.  An Air Force pilot, he has operational experience with various aircraft including C-130s, MC-12s, and remotely-piloted aircraft in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa.  His most recent experience in operations was as the Detachment Commander for the 432 WG, Jalalabad Afghanistan in support of JTF Operations. These views are his own and do not reflect the opinion of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Air Force.