The new mission command approach to command and control identified a confusing gap in command techniques for Army leaders. Prior to the revised 2019 publication of ADP 3-0 Operations and ADP 6-0 Mission Command, mission command and command and control were presented as two techniques for leaders to accomplish their mission. Both techniques had guiding principles, but the commander ultimately chose how much to empower or control a subordinate’s initiative. Both Mission command and command and control, as described in doctrine prior to 2019 strove to reach a similar endstate. A commander wants his subordinates to understand what they have to do and what information he needs to know throughout an operation. He understands that the “fog” of war will present unforeseen challenges to his unit. The two previous concepts were simply different ways to manage multiple subordinates working towards an end state. Today, these concepts have been codified into Mission Command doctrine. The new Mission Command doctrine lays out what the Army wanted to emphasize all along which is the importance of leadership.
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. – The Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene 1.
CPT Alan Hastings was on the right track in his article Mission Command and Detailed Command – It’s Not a Zero-Sum Game when he alluded to the combination of these leadership styles stating that, “both mission command and detailed command provide value to the tactical leader during operations.” (Hastings 2017). CPT Hastings’ argued that command and control is necessary to solve complex problems that a unit cannot overcome utilizing its organic assets. This supports the idea of command and control as a warfighting function (WfF). A commander requires detailed systems to synchronize assets in order to solve complex problems, but all other tasks can be accomplished through individual initiative. This kind of freedom of maneuver for leaders to exercise individual initiative starts with mutual trust and shared understanding built through training and experience. It is simple to train units with a detailed command mindset to accomplish tasks, but leaders will need to be comfortable giving subordinates freedom to exercise initiative when the “fog” blurs the connection between their command and their control of their commander. Units need to be prepared to operate without specific guidance from a higher headquarters during periods of degraded communication. The command and control WfF would be ineffective during this period because it involves the systems used by a Commander to integrate the other WfFs and determine a course of action for his subordinates. A commander must then rely on the mutual trust developed with his subordinates in order for a unit to function in the absence of guidance. This is where individual initiative makes the difference. A successful unit in this situation will be one that has developed its mission command philosophy, which is what multi-domain operations will require (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 2018). However, how does a unit develop the mission command philosophy in leaders in the garrison and training environment?
A mission command approach and effective command and control systems are essential for combat leadership. Control requires technical knowledge and detailed planning trained through professional military schooling and unit-level exercises. A mission command approach is developed over time. It is a human endeavor that requires continuous assessment and refinement in order to be successful. Before the new doctrine, the mission command philosophy focused on empowering subordinates. However, the continuous assessment from leaders that goes into developing a culture of empowerment is forgotten. Mission command is no more a single action taken by a superior officer than tossing a seed into loose soil unattended is considered growing a garden. Discussions about mission command need to talk about how to tend the garden. It is unlikely that a single checklist to follow when implementing mission command will work for every organization since the individuals in those organizations will react differently to different approaches (McChrystal 2015). However, there are recurring themes from experienced leaders that could help with implementation.
The new doctrine identified a major principle not included in the previous mission command philosophy, competence. There must first be a certain level of competence in subordinates before a leader can empower them. Empowering subordinates without first assessing their capabilities can be dangerous. Most organizations will need to begin by training through less empowerment. Leaders will need to maintain a certain level of control over subordinates, based on their initial assessment, during training as they develop an idea of how to empower them before “letting go of the reins”. Second, there must be an environment of shared context where subordinates are able to understand their higher headquarters’ purpose. Some argued that leaders should use mission orders to do this, but this did not distinguish a mission command management style from a command and control one since any orders would include a unit’s mission. The emphasis must be on the commander’s intent. These two aspects ensure a subordinate can execute his mission and understand operations at least two levels up. Once these two themes are within an organization, a leader can begin to move past controlling to empower subordinates.
Direct-level leaders can develop their units’ culture of empowerment during training through rehearsals, simulations, and after-action reviews (AARs) by allowing leaders to understand how their subordinates process information and make decisions. Digital simulations, such as EST or VBS, and hands-on simulations, such as training ranges and FTXs, can both support mission command implementation if the commander allows subordinates to create plans formed from intent-based guidance. A commander should provide minimal input during rehearsals as subordinates fine-tune plans prior to execution, but he should remain silent during the simulation. The AAR process is where the bulk learning takes place. The learning focus may be on the leader understanding the subordinate’s thought process or the subordinate noting the leader’s reaction to certain situations. The tone of training AARs will set the tone of a unit’s empowerment culture. A deeply critical AAR, condemning the actions of subordinates, will crush an empowerment culture from leaders.
Organizational-level leaders possess the greatest capacity to influence a culture of empowerment within a unit. A way for organizational leaders to promote empowerment is through the exercise of Key Critical Task Lists (KCTL) and Sergeant’s Training Time. Commanders must allow subordinates to develop their own KCTLs, consisting of those mission-essential tasks that subordinate leaders assess they can effectively train for and accomplish in accordance with their higher commander’s intent and the time available. Organizations should create training plans based on a KCTL rather than an entire METL because this will allow them to develop a higher level of proficiency in their most relevant collective tasks.
Empowerment is relative to a subordinate’s competence and confidence. His competence relies on his experience when it comes to the level of empowerment afforded. For example, a Platoon Leader may be tactically and technically competent; but a Battalion Commander will afford greater freedom of maneuver for an experienced Company Commander to make a decision based on his intent. That Battalion Commander may tell a Company Commander what needs to occur but not how it needs to be accomplished. On the other hand, that Company Commander may need to elaborate more on how to accomplish a task for a new Platoon Leader. This kind of empowerment is on a case-by-case basis that relies on a leader’s ability to assess his subordinates’ abilities. Another useful addition in the new Mission Command doctrine is the “Levels of Control”, which explains a way to assess the level of empowerment for subordinates (ADP 6-0, 2019,p. 18, Figure 1-1).
The mission command approach to command and control is essential to combat leadership as it emphasizes empowering subordinates after careful assessment of their abilities. While command and control systems are developed through schooling and unit training, mission command is cultivated over time as leaders assess and improve their subordinates’ competence and confidence. A leader who utilizes strict control alone will micromanage and create distrust with subordinates. However, those who emphasize blind empowerment of subordinates without properly “tending the garden” are asking for disaster. Military leaders seeking to determine ways to implement a mission command approach have a better tool at their disposal with the new doctrine, ADP 6-0.
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CPT Andrew Bordelon is an Assistant Operations Officer at 3-187th Infantry with 3 BCT, 101st ABN DIV (AASLT). As an Infantry officer, he has served as a platoon leader during Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan and company executive officer in an IBCT. He previously served as an Instructor and Assistant Operations Officer at the 6th Ranger Training Battalion.
Hastings, Alan. “Mission Command and Detailed Command – It’s Not a Zero-Sum Game.” From the Green Notebook, February 1, 2017. Accessed October 28, 2018. https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2017/02/01/mission-command-and-detailed-command-its-not- a-zero-sum-game/
McChrystal, Stanley. Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. (Audible – Audio Medium).
Training and Doctrine Command, US Army. “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. November 30, 2018. Accessed December 20, 2018. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf
United States. Department of the Army. Headquarters. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 Mission Command, Command and Control of Army Forces. July 31, 2019.
United States. Department of the Army. Headquarters. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 Operations. July 31, 2019.