We acknowledge that emotion can cloud human decision-making and affect action. We also know our mind creates shortcuts that are sometimes faulty. Despite this understanding, we often do not account for it. We think of ourselves as rational decision-makers, doing whatever offers the most utility based on the information available. This is not true. 

We are Predictably Irrational as Dan Ariely describes in this book, a fast and entertaining read. Ariely lays out several common traps found in human thinking with the hope that being aware of the traps helps us dodge the effects. 

Let’s review a few of Ariely’s more common snares: anchoring, the decoy effect, the endowment effect & loss aversion, and short-term thinking. 

Anchoring is when a person depends too heavily on initial information. For some, it is extremely hard to shake that first impression. Most of us compare all later information to the first information that we received. A simple experiment on the power of anchoring asked participants to write down the last two digits of their social security number before estimating the cost of several items. Those with higher social security numbers estimated higher costs. From a military perspective, we can easily imagine ourselves anchoring to a plan, but our anchoring is more systematic. We compare every report of the enemy against the intelligence section’s enemy course of action, a process that also drives our reconnaissance plan. This invites confirmation bias. We desire to find what we are looking for, so we ensure someone is looking for it. 

The decoy effect, otherwise known as the asymmetric dominance effect, is when individuals change preference between two attractive choices when a third similar but less attractive choice is added. The experiment was a decision between an all-inclusive week in Paris versus Rome. When a third choice was added, a week in Paris without breakfast included, participants picked Paris with breakfast. Instead of comparing Rome to Paris, people compared Paris with and without breakfast. The effect’s implication to military planning is to watch out for that throw-away option. Whether creating the courses of action or picking one, keep an eye on distinguishability. 

The endowment effect & loss aversion work together. The endowment effect is when we value something more than others because we own it and loss aversion is when we give greater meaning to a loss over a gain of equal measure. In one famous experiment on the endowment effect, people required twice as much money for a coffee mug they owned, as compared to what they were willing to initially pay for it. An experiment on loss aversion showed that people needed to gain about twice as much as they were willing to lose. Not only do we overly value our assets, but we are also programmed to not risk them. The battlefield lacks a clear measure to gauge the endowment effect or loss aversion, but it would be foolish to think these heuristics don’t affect risk-taking. This concept brings to mind Patton’s quote, “Take not counsel of your fears.” There is no prescription here other than acknowledging that we overvalue what is ours and are loath to risk it without significant return in our decision-making. Keep that in mind when you are debating whether to launch that local counterattack at NTC. 

The final snare about which Ariely writes, short-term thinking; is when we look for the immediate advantage, even when the long-term gain is more desirable. The most famous study on short-term thinking is the marshmallow experiment where a group of preschool children could have one marshmallow now or wait 15 minutes and have two. Most tried, but could not wait. A more recent study showed that the more often an investor checked their portfolio, the more likely they would modify it and reduce their returns losing sight of their long-term investment goal for a short-term gain. This problem is more pronounced in the military environment where survival dominates. We look to overmatch our adversary and throw everything we can at them. Critical thinkers though need to think about the fight tomorrow or we court disaster. Worse, we could follow a series of tactical short-term successes divorced from the long-term strategic objective.  

This book details far more than just the four traps mentioned. What do we make of it? Without conscious thought, we risk making rationally uninformed decisions. Awareness, though not foolproof, is the only way to avoid these pitfalls. Knowing is half the battle…it enables us to observe our decision-making behavior. To fight these traps, be aware of them, and develop ways to avoid them. Red Team your decisions. Give someone the responsibility to challenge your understanding. Take steps to allow debate and effective conflict. Finally, reflect and be introspective about why you are deciding the way you are. 

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.