I forget what time it was, but it was dark, and we had finally gotten the semblance of a TOC established “in the box” after a long day leaving the RUBA. I was trying to account for the trail of equipment scattered along the route when the wind picked up – somehow the Ops Group was able to conjure up a dust storm just in time for our push through the “whale’s gap.” I could not help thinking to myself that this was just the beginning.
The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are a crucible experience that field grade officers either get results or get exposed. They are awesome experiences for company-grade leaders, yet home station training can replicate many of those operational environments. It is at the field grade level that organizations endure stresses at scales that are difficult to reproduce elsewhere.
The purpose of this essay is to offer my insights from a recent rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). I witnessed events from the perspective of the battalion executive officer of 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment. I will use the lens of nine NTC goals that I gave my organization across three lines of effort: Operations, Sustainment, and the Staff. I endeavored to make the goals sound simple but represent difficult systems that would enable a successful rotation. In hindsight, we did not reach any of these goals, yet had a highly successful rotation. The accomplishment of these goals was not as important as the process we took to try and accomplish them. Most of these goals should drive home station training—you cannot “fix” large organizations once you reach the crucible. I believe these to all to be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound, but in the laboratory of the CTCs, you will realize attaining them to be just out of reach.
Operations
Rogue Discipline – “SP On-Time!”
Most anyone that has served long enough will joke that being in the right place, time and uniform is 90% of what it takes to succeed in the Army. As depressing as that may be to the proponents of talent management, there are a lot of conditions that allow a large organization to actually move on time at echelon. While I will touch on many of these conditions under other goals, the most important driver of this goal is the enforcement of standards and the troop leading procedures at the lowest echelon—what we referred to as “Rogue Discipline.” Constant checks on Soldiers and equipment, routinized briefs and back briefs, and exercising disciplined initiative is required to prevent the ubiquitous “Murphy’s Law” unlucky breaks when your unit is supposed to be moving. The truth is there are no unlucky breaks—you just failed to do the routine things routinely which resulted in failure.
“Can you Talk?” PACE Plan
Most cadets can tell you what a PACE plan is, but sadly most of our knowledge ends at reciting the acronym. If I have four different plans to communicate with you, we should have no problem transferring information to each other, right? Like most of these goals, I would like to meet the person that was actually able to communicate effortlessly across their formation for an entire rotation. In fact, so many units fail to understand the enemy is jamming a particular communications platform because they just assume the equipment is not working. A lack of competence, proficiency, and architecture is what will truly hinder the ability to execute a PACE plan.
First, there is a bewildering amount of communication platforms available to units today, which is a blessing as well as a curse. Who can effortlessly operate FM, HF, TACSAT, JCR, JBCP, Ventrillo, or the myriad other options available? We referred to this as the hardware problem. In reality, there are three common radio operators: the “MacGyver” that knows a little about each thing, the “expert” that is really good at setting up the HF radio, and just about everyone else; those who know just enough to change the frequency on their FM radio. Units try signal academies, radios at staff duty, or other novelties to bridge this gap, but the reality of manning cycles renders these to be short term gains. Therefore, units end up with single points of failure to place equipment into operation. The only remedy I can come up with to change this is culture; Refuse to allow the MacGyvers and experts to touch anything-make them use others to work on things, forcing them to be teachers rather than executors. Working communications is more apprenticeship than anything else, and this shift may actually diffuse knowledge.
Second, there is a “software problem”. How many Soldiers can communicate effectively on each platform and utilize its true capabilities? In the simplest form, it is the RTO in the TOC that has no idea how to actually talk on the radio or understand the meaning of transmissions they receive. In other cases, very few understand how to send data files over HF or JBCP that could contain important operational documents. I believe you can attack this with nature and nurture. By nature, I mean to say that new Soldiers do not belong in a TOC or headquarters. Instead, battalions should treat these positions as broadening assignments for prospective NCOs, taking talented senior specialists that already understand downstream problems and returning them to the line as sergeants that understand higher headquarters problems. Ranger Regiment sends future team leaders to Ranger School; BCTs need to send them to their own headquarters. By nurture, I mean how you run your headquarters. Force RTOs, staff soldiers, or others to run a 2-minute drill, not just the battle captain-use these moments to develop them and force them to understand what they are doing, empowering them through trust and shared understanding to take disciplined initiative when necessary.
Third, take a look at the architecture of your PACE plan. Is it feasible? Brigades love to rely on upper TI, but forget that battalions rarely have that asset up and running. That leads to how people know when to go up or down the PACE chain, and what type of transmission it is. For example, FM is on everyone’s PACE plan, but how good is that for transmitting graphics? Likewise, a VOIP phone call may be a horrible means to conduct a rehearsal.
“Rehearse, Rehearse, Rehearse!”
Rehearsals are truly the only effective means to build shared understanding prior to an operation. Orders and back briefs are important, but useless if not rehearsed. Units should execute an IC/Fires, CAR, and Sustainment Rehearsal prior to each operation. In many cases, due to compacted timelines, the rehearsal is the first time that leaders are looking at a plan, and that is okay. The alternative could be even worse.
We all aspire to avoid scripted rehearsals in order to identify friction points yet we normally devolve into reciting tasks, purposes, and other diatribes that do little to help identify the seems in our plans. This is human nature. For many, it is our comfort zone, and for others, it is an unconscious posturing exercise in front of our raters. Only commanders can halt this, by immediately stopping any portions that do not affect the actions of other elements. Otherwise the rehearsal will drag on with little actually accomplished beyond a recitation of the operations order. Remember that formats matter-sometimes a radio rehearsal can be more effective than a large terrain model.
Sustainment
“PMCS the RIGHT way!”
The “5988 count” has become something akin to “lying to ourselves” as we focus on the metric of how many 5988s were distributed vs. collected. This is understandable. The actual metric we want to measure is how accurately are operators identifying faults and are we expeditiously ordering parts to keep our equipment fighting. Unfortunately, there is not an easy metric to describe that. The “5988 count” is what we gravitate toward, yet it only measures quantity, not quality.
The true use of the 5988 flow is to fix non-deadlining faults rather than deadlining faults. Deadline faults will receive enough attention to get fixed without a proper 5988 flow because that combat power is lost until it gets fixed. They are like gunshot victims in the emergency room-impossible to ignore. The non-deadlining faults are what gets ignored in the absence of good maintenance-and these can metastasize into future deadlining faults over time. So, how do we build a system that properly does this?
I argue that it takes training, time, and leader engagement. Does your formation know how to conduct proper -10 and -20 inspections of their equipment? Do your mechanics know how to identify the root causes of faults rather than simply treating symptoms? Do they and your clerks know how to find proper NSNs for ordering parts? Can your shop office track and find those parts? Can your leaders actually read their ESR and apply pressure where it indicates they need to? All these steps take time. Our original goal was to distribute 5988s, execute PMCS, and update faults in GCSS-A every 24 hours, but I believe that goal was too ambitious if the goal is quality. Instead, this process takes 48 hours, sometimes 72 hours depending on the environment. Ultimately, any maintenance program that succeeds or fails will depend on how much you are able to empower Soldiers at the lowest level to take ownership of their equipment, which relies more on doing things right rather than fast in order to check a block.
“Deliberate LOGPAC”
The intent of this goal is to avoid emergency resupply missions at all costs. We aspired to plan LOGPAC missions 72 hours out with timelines understood at the company level. Operations are hard to plan more than 24 hours out at NTC, frustrating attempts to achieve this goal. However, there is a rhythm to operations that can allow predictive analysis by logisticians. This can at least allow daily changes to a plan based on new information than continually reacting each day. Likewise, dissemination of this “shadow operational plan” is equally important as the plan to fight the enemy. Timelines matter and everyone needs to know when the next resupply arrives. This affects the tempo of operations, movement of people, and locations of key leaders on the battlefield.
“Tactical CSDP”
This goal highlights the key role of front-line leaders to constantly check on their people. At higher levels, we tend to assume every squad leader carries a laminated MAL in his or her pocket and our “Green 2” reports are the end result of their twice daily (at least) checks on all equipment they are accountable for. First, see if they actually have that MAL handy. Second, think about the downstream effects of accountability reports due at certain times to higher echelons. Do you expect this check to occur on the ground at 0300? Set the conditions for leaders to be successful.
Staff
Predictable-Precise-Professional
I feel that these three principles concisely articulate what a staff owes their organization. Being predictable requires adhering to the 1/3-2/3 rule, focusing staff efforts on planning beyond the current fight, and sticking to your battle rhythm or adjusting it as far in advance as possible. Companies should be free to react to contact, but not have to “react to higher.”
Precision is difficult at the battalion level since the staff is relatively junior. Still, it must remain a goal. In general, that means to be specific. There is a reason the Army writing style is active voice: it requires the writer to articulate who is actually doing what action. Being precise can be as simple as providing a realistic timeline or a thorough list of tasks to subordinate units. Higher-level staffs can afford hand-wave concepts, but at the tactical level, they need precision.
Professionalism is an all-encompassing trait that should guide the actions of the staff. Using doctrinally correct terms, proper radio etiquette, and showing due respect to visitors are all simple ways to display professionalism. In addition to that, professionals “police their own” and develop knowledge in their profession. This requires us to constantly find improvements in how we operate and maintain high standards.
Synchronize
Achieving a common operational picture is extremely difficult, and at the battalion level, the systems available make achieving this goal nearly impossible. Synchronizing the warfighting functions is a constant struggle. Battle rhythm events are the best way to force cross-talk and synchronization. The “2-minute drill” forces the staff to coalesce and talk to each other. Do the 2-minute drill hourly. First, the 2-minute drill will take about 20 minutes for a novice staff, but get more efficient the more they practice. Second, the 2-minute drill forces each staff member to constantly update their estimates. Third, it forces them to listen to what the rest of the staff is doing. Over time, if the staff is doing really well, force the staff to brief other warfighting functions, and force more junior members of the staff to brief their portions.
Forcing synchronization is difficult enough if the staff is consolidated in one location, but a combined arms battalion has five command posts: the TOC, TAC, CTCP, UMCP, and FTCP. In addition, each command post is resourced with various non-compatible communications systems that hinder tying together. The CPs are geographically dispersed enough that FM will not realistically reach across them simultaneously. HF radios can do this, but the lack of allocated base stations and speakers means that it is a capability that will only be available during scheduled windows, and only available in a static position. Upper TI capabilities are only available at the TOC, so it is not a capability between the CPs. JBCP is the only capability that you can realistically allocate to each node, but because there are not enough TOC kits some nodes will operate out of a vehicle.
In reality, the only means of synchronizing the command posts were the daily circulation of the battalion executive officer to each node. Unfortunately, the recency of these visits may only last a few hours before the situation changes. In hindsight, the only other person with the flexibility to do this is the HHC commander. Use your “extra field grade” to circulate as well, and if you deconflict your circulation times you can increase synchronization across the 24-hour cycle.
Brigade and higher command post exercises are poor replicators of the stresses a battalion will experience with multiple command posts as they are usually resourced for only one battalion command node. Work with your MTC to execute a battalion CPX that replicates all five command posts.
“Equality of Expertise”
One horror story field grade officers hear is about the major that loses all functionality as he operates without sleep for 3 days straight. Indeed, the combat training centers have corroborating data to show how this lack of sleep results in poorer and poorer decision-making and ultimate success. The lack of a deep “bench” at the battalion level encourages the “never leave your post” mentality, since the person covering down while you sleep may be significantly junior to you. This extends to the rest of the staff; many times, a specialist is all that is left when a lieutenant goes to sleep.
The first way to combat this is the way you build your team; you cannot put all your “studs” on one shift and your “duds” on another. The second mitigator is by training down to the lowest level, as previously discussed. The last reality is to determine when to accept risk. There will inevitably be a time when the team in the TOC is weak, but if it is during lulls then that is an acceptable risk.
Final Remarks
These are field grade organizational goals; there is no goal that one person can force to completion through sheer will. Instead, you must set the conditions through the systems you develop and how you train them (I constantly pondered how to emulate Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s Antifragile organizations that strengthen from stress). The metaphor of the “iron major” is misleading- if you are constantly rowing then no one is steering the boat. Realize that field grades have the best jobs in the Army- they don’t actually do anything. If you are, then ask yourself why you have not made someone else capable of doing it instead, and why you made yourself a single point of failure.
Hopefully, this serves as a starting point for introspection. Take big problems and make them small. Even simple concepts like these can become quite complex once you begin to peel the onion.
MAJ Kevin Krupski is currently a Professor of Military Science at Dickinson College. An Infantry officer, he has served in Armor and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. He completed his KD time in 1/3 ID (ABCT).