Over the years, I’ve read a lot about Normandy and left few rocks uncovered. This book was in an Audible 2-for-1 sale, and I had low expectations…but it surprised! James Holland examines historical points of contention and challenges the accepted view. There is some review of well-tilled ground, but I took away several new insights. A few controversial highlights:

The fear of airborne failure was completely unfounded. The airborne drops went well; over 75% of paratroops landed within 5 miles of their DZ, and only 21 of 800+ transport aircraft were shot down.

Pointe Du Hoc was modeled after a British Commando raid on a battery during the Sicily invasion. Though portrayed as a tough fight in American military lore, it was relatively easy. The rangers only suffered 15 killed scaling the cliff. The real fight was their stalwart defense after they found and destroyed the guns.

Holland argues the Allies outfought the Germans, contradicting the standard narrative that Allied success was based on material superiority. The German LXXXIV Corps commander sent 21st Panzer to the wrong location. They misread the airborne invasion for a raid. The German counterattacks were uncoordinated and dispersed, tactical in nature, and mostly local. Had the Germans focused their effort, they might have stalled or even defeated the invasion. If their reinforcements moved to Omaha instead of countering the airborne, the battle might have differed.

The stagnation on Omaha, attributed to effective German fire, was actually ineffective small unit leadership. This is why you see senior leaders taking charge of small units and leading them up the bluff. The confusion on the beach froze many inexperienced small unit leaders.

The larger myth of German superiority was also thrashed. The Allies generally had better and more reliable weapons than the Germans. The Allies are portrayed as less disciplined, but the US Army executed only one person for desertion during the war. The Germans executed 15,000 for desertion and killed another 50,000 others for various reasons.

There were a few other interesting snippets. Only the US Army valued its NCO Corps. The British and German armies did not use NCOs as independent leaders in the field as the US did. This was based on a US expectation that NCOs would make choices, not just follow and enforce orders.

The Allied reliance on firepower curtailed small units’ initiative because of the synchronization needed to use artillery and air support. The Germans were better at maneuver because they only needed to coordinate locally. However, the decentralized command of large units made the Allies more flexible and efficient. On the other hand, the Germans were stymied by centralized the decision-making cycle of higher commanders.

The German penchant for the counterattack increased their casualties, but they tended to hold in the defense. The Allied ‘send bullet, not soldier’ focus on firepower, tended to be slow and deliberate but kept the force intact. Above all, this was a major lesson – you must keep your force alive to fight another day.

Only about 2,000 troops or 10% of a division fights in a battle, but after about four days, the whole division was ineffective and had to be withdrawn. The Allies were able to refit their divisions faster and more efficiently, putting more troops in the line.

I found Holland’s book insightful despite that one can find holes in them. Overall, thinking through the challenges and reimagining history is a great thought experiment and well worth the time.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.