The July 2019 update of ADP6-0 contained several changes, notably the reintroduction of command and control as both a method for executing mission command and a warfighting function. The manual’s introduction explains that this was necessary because, since the 2012 edition, the term mission command had become something of a catch-all phrase, muddying definitions and diluting the potential found in decentralized operations. As the Army refocuses on large scale ground combat operations (LSGCO) in a multi-domain environment, differentiating between mission command and command and control is necessary. For the Reserve Components (RC), constrained by time and distance, employing an integrated Mission Command + Command and Control (MC+C2) approach is critical to building readiness. When the commander owns MC and the staff enables C2, units turn the inherent constraints of the RC into building blocks for readiness.
The RC needs MC+C2. Geographic dispersion, time constraints, competing requirements, and disrupted communications are all characteristics of LSGCO and multi-domain operations, challenges the Reserve Components (RC) face on a daily basis. Training to overcome them and establishing a habitual environment of mutual trust, shared understanding and commanders who drive the operations process makes units more effective in major collective training events, when mobilized, or when supporting short-notice domestic operations. An MC+C2 approach empowers the Reserve Components by focusing on their inherent constraints: geography and time.
Most RC units are geographically distributed. For example, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard’s 56th Stryker Brigade is spread from Philadelphia to Erie, roughly 375 miles and a 6-hour drive, assuming good weather “north of the wall.” The 2IBCT is spread from Pittsburgh to north of Scranton; roughly the same time and distance factor. The RC is further constrained by time; in a ‘typical’ year, the units are authorized 39 man-days, although more is required as units progress in the readiness cycle. In a CTC year, Soldiers will easily spend more than 100 days on active duty; leaders must balance military, civilian, family, and employer commitments to establish a climate of MC+C2 while being mindful of incurring extra time commitments of part-time Soldiers.
The Commander owns Mission Command. Mission Command is, well, commander-centric. A common theme throughout ADP6-0 is the commander’s personal role in establishing MC+C2. The commander is responsible for the seven principles of mission command outlined in Chapter 1, but most importantly, competence, mutual trust, and shared understanding. A key observation for me was doctrine’s concession that not all subordinates are created equal. Commanders assign tasks, responsibilities, and resources based on their assessment of subordinate commands. When a commander assesses a lower level of proficiency, that unit may get fewer or simpler tasks, more resources to accomplish the same tasks as another unit, or more controls, restrictions, and supervision placed on that unit.
The important thing is that this condition is not meant to be static. Having identified shortcomings, the commander has a responsibility to be personally involved in building that level of competence to a point where the unit can be afforded greater latitude more complex tasks, or fewer restrictions. To do so, the commander must establish a climate of mutual trust, shared understanding, and learning, where falling-forward mistakes are underwritten, and leaders grow more technically and tactically proficient. This often requires the commander to have hard, frank conversations with subordinates. However, these conversations should be a candid two-way dialog, not a beat-down. The senior commander must be ready to listen, open to another perspective, and committed to resolving the discrepancy. As a respected senior NCO periodically reminds me, we have ‘two ears and one mouth.’
The Staff Supports Command and Control. Although the commander leads the staff, Command and Control is staff-centric, and as the method for the commander to exercise mission command, is focused on helping the commander make good decisions. The battle rhythm is one way the staff does this. In the RC, a battle rhythm that balances drill periods with off-drill “dark night” calls can help manage competing requirements from families, civilian employers, and life. The battle rhythm is not just a tactical tool; commanders and staffs use it in garrison to provide predictability and guide decision-making. The staff uses running estimates to manage data, but uses meetings to convey critical information and help commanders make decisions. When the commander can review data and running estimates at leisure, meetings become focused on discussion and decisions rather than spewing data at the boss. As the staff and commander interact over time and learn each other’s leadership styles, the staff becomes more efficient at enabling the commander’s decision making. The staff learns how to help the commander see the ‘so what,’ understand key issues, anticipate decisions, manage risk, and know when to “put the silver leaf in” resolve a problem.
An effective method in the RC is to conduct staff and data-centric meetings during drill periods, and commander-centric meetings off-drill, but on a consistent, recurring basis. Because the staff normally drills at the same place and time, they can provide data-centric updates to the commander, conduct training meetings to plan and resource future events, and synchronize the staff and headquarters company. Off-drill meetings then become focused on commander to commander discussion, collaboration, and multi-directional communication, enabling MC+C2. With a good read-ahead, commanders come prepared and meetings become a venue for sharing best practices, pooling resources, and solving problems. This also fosters an environment where leaders are not competing with each other or holding back information to play ‘I’ve got a secret,’ but recognize their part in the larger organization and become committed to everyone’s success. In a recent meeting I attended, one commander reported a challenge in training his supply personnel; another commander immediately shared that the state’s expert worked in his office and offered to schedule a training session.
An integrated approach to Mission Command and Command and Control is an imperative for Reserve Component units. A culture of mutual trust, grounded in candid dialog, and supported by a commitment to growth can overcome geographical constraints. A staff using command and control to enable quality commander decisions can balance the constraints of time and proximity. When commanders own MC and staffs enable C2, Reserve Component units are better prepared to operate in a contested multi-domain environment, whether in their domestic or federal role.
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Jon Farr is a National Guard officer with field grade experience at the squadron, brigade, division, and JFHQs levels. The opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the DOD, US Army, or the National Guard.