January 18, 2013 – Photo by Sgt. Scott Tant

“Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things.” –Henry David Thoreau

Army digital Mission Command Systems (MCS) are supposed to increase efficiency by developing a common operational picture (COP) and improving situational awareness. However, they often produce the opposite: a false depiction that inhibits subordinate initiative as we fixate on systems at the expense of time, effort, and larger than necessary command posts. Unless we approach their use in a disciplined manner, judiciously applying when and how to utilize digital systems, even the best systems will create additional work, waste time, and inhibit Mission Command.

Army Mission Command, influenced by the Wehrmacht concepts of Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt, emphasizes subordinate initiative to execute the commander’s intent and the use of Mission Orders. The Army, on the other hand, tends to overemphasize data to the detriment of analysis and context, which often inhibits the exercise of Mission Command. We expect our digital systems to derive precision from an imprecise, complex world; rather than accept the historical reality of a chaotic, bloody, unknowable battlefield. We often presume our systems will cut through the fog of war.

If we believe absurdities, we shall commit atrocities– Voltaire

A COP is fictional because it only represents how the units see itself and the enemy. Understanding this is a key task for leaders and it requires substantial discipline. Our systems present the COP authoritatively—a screen is truer than a human-produced map—which causes leaders to let the digital veneer wash out inconvenient truths. The COP also discourages timely reporting because it updates automatically. Consequently, units may not report critical information such as friendly locations. Digital COPs present a reassuring façade of situational awareness which is unachievable in warfare due to fog, friction, and chance.

Planning

Digital systems also incentivize bad habits because battlefield information does not necessarily translate into success. Merely possessing data is “not an indication of superiority.” Our systems rarely address the pitfalls of too much data. Since warfare (and leadership) is “not an optimization problem,” digital systems are not a substitute. Our goal is to train agile and adaptive leaders, who succeed regardless of technology. The fog and friction of war cannot be eliminated and proposing otherwise is a fallacy. Too often, however, we confuse action for effect and become satisfied with the immediate at the expense of long-term progress. We end up doing tasks well but don’t stop to consider whether these tasks are beneficial or necessary.

Digital MCSs do not improve the planning process because digital systems are individual-centered. At its best, planning remains an in-person collaborative effort; leaders gathered around a HMMWV hood comes to mind. Digital planning has advantages, but its utility remains limited, especially when systems are degraded due to movement, weather, or maintenance. Analog systems may actually “work better and more efficiently in time-constrained conditions.”

Our digital systems often become focal points of self-induced frustration. Ironically, experience at CTCs show units have more situational awareness during their first 72 hours of operations when using analog products than after switching to digital platforms. Rather than creating dilemmas for the enemy, we often create them for ourselves instead. Digital systems promise simplicity but deliver staff-crushing complexity. At JRTC and NTC, staffs duplicate work for no reason other than to brief higher headquarters using a prescribed digital format. Accordingly, units become focused on systems, “updating slides instead of developing executable plans.”

It takes substantial effort to write an effective, concise Concept of the Operation, translating commander’s intent into mission graphics and orders. By simplifying our tools, we can gain time and can concentrate cognitive power to produce effective plans and fighting products.

Conclusion:

In some cases, digital systems undoubtedly reduce workload, foster collaboration, and promote dissemination of information, but they are not always the optimal solution. Too often, Army Digital Leadership is just cutting-edge micromanagement. The Army can choose between Mission Command and directive control but it cannot have both. History clearly shows that decentralized execution and subordinate initiative creates a far more effective fighting force.

Rather than “cutting our feet to fit the shoes” of digital systems, commanders must strike a balance between detailed and directive control; this balance will adjust based on the mission, trust between units, and the nature of the environment. Mission Command requires discipline from leaders, especially those who may feel discomfort when not in direct control. It takes substantial personal discipline to watch a subordinate fail at an assigned task. The urge to reach down is often insatiable and the “thousand-mile screwdriver” is very real.

Misusing digital systems short-circuits Mission Command. An ill-disciplined approach ignores the human nature of warfare and the importance of commanders driving operations and facilitating decentralized execution. Battlefield circulation, effective staff analysis, and intelligence preparation all remain important aspects of developing situational awareness. They cannot be replaced by technology, and digital systems can only augment this process. “Accepting and managing these liabilities prudently will develop leaders capable of serving in complex and rapidly changing environments.”

John Bolton is the Executive Officer for the 2-25 Assault Helicopter Battalion in Hawaii. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College’s Art of War Scholars Program and holds degrees from West Point and American Military University. His assignments include 1st Engineer Battalion, 1-1 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, and 4/25 IBCT (Airborne) with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The views presented here are his alone and not representative of the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, or the U.S. government.