July 2019 saw a huge revision of U.S. Army doctrine. Like everything in the Army though, as much as things change they also stay the same. One of the biggest revisions is the reintroduction of Command and Control into Army lexicon. One of the main reasons this was done was because the concept of Mission Command never took hold across the joint community. The joint force maintained command and control and when joint operations took place that was the terminology used. The reintroduction of command and control into army doctrine synchronizes the Army with the rest of the military arm of national power, yet how the Army approaches command and control will be familiar to anyone who has been leading in the Army over the last decade.
The Army has relegated mission command from being a warfighting function and redefined the essence of mission command. Mission command is now “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.” It is how the Army will conduct command and control of assigned and attached forces. Yet this new definition does not fix a problem the Army has struggled with since the inception of mission command, what does it really mean and how do we effectively execute the concept? The concept is easy enough as defined by doctrine, let subordinate commanders make decisions that are best for their formations and that fit within the higher commander’s intent. Commanders should let go of micromanaging their formations and let leaders lead. Yet this concept is where commanders are getting into the most trouble.
Commander’s Intent remains a critical component and arguably the most important principle of mission command. Too many times, the staff plans and develops operations without the commander’s input. The commander does not take an active role in the planning process and therefore does not adequately provide the needed intent. Without the commander’s intent subordinates cannot use their judgment and initiative to make decisions that further their higher commander’s intent. The result is the cascading of an operation further from what the command may truly want executed. The execution of operations becomes like the game of telephone with messages being altered and modified the further down they travel. Ultimately what you end up with is an exercise or operation that is not what the commander envisioned but is the collaborative project of the staff guessing what the commander wants to achieve.
Commanders may be doing this with the intention of exercising mission command, but with the intent of allowing their staff the freedom to plan in an unconstrained environment. But the intent of mission command is to allow subordinate commanders the freedom to act within set parameters and guidance, not the staff. The staff requires the active engagement of the commander to develop courses of action that fit the stated guidance and intent. They need active injection of the commander’s vision during the process so the end product is unified under one intent. This critical step then allows subordinate commands the freedom to make decisions in environments that prevent consultation with higher. Subordinate commanders would all have the same broad concept and understanding of where their left and right limits are and what decisions they can make that they believe will lead to the end-state the commander desires. This is achieved through the addition of a new critical principle of mission command that rivals in importance to commander’s intent.
The addition of competence also changes how one views commanders and leaders as it is now a critical component and arguably the foundation of successful execution of command and control using the mission command approach. Competence starts with the leader being tactically and technically proficient but also requires that all the leaders and soldiers under that commander be competent. Competence directly feeds the other principles of mission command, such as mutual trust, and shared understanding. A leader builds competence in their teams through training which builds that trust and gives everyone a common upbringing to fall back on when forces are separated. A competent leader providing their intent is the backbone for the execution of mission command under the command and control construct.
The new definition of mission command has not done much for helping a force that struggled with its understanding in the first place. However, identification and application of the key principles to the successful implementation of the mission command will help bridge that gap. Commanders must be involved in the planning and execution process and cannot ride-along while the staff attempts to guess at the vision and intent for the operation. Competent leaders will provide their intent and in doing so will enable their staff to plan training that builds competence, trust, and understanding throughout the formation.
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MAJ M. Reece Collins is an Active Guard Reserve Signal Officer in the United States Army Reserve. He currently serves as a Current Operations Officer in an Expeditionary Sustainment Command and completed his KD time in Armored Brigade Combat Teams and a Combat Aviation Brigade.
This article dances around the central issue – higher commander’s propensity to mistrust, and micromanage. For example, live video feeds from drones. Why must the most very senior officers have to have this video available to them with all of the cost and bandwidth required? Because they do not trust those with the authority to act. Simple. So I see the real issue is a lack of trust from higher command – those that endorsed the mission command doctrine. Hypocrisy at its finest.
Implementation is the enduring challenge of doctrine, and it’s great to see professional discussion on this same thing. As the TRADOC Commander, GEN Townsend published a series of articles that described why the Army was bringing back command and control, and how to train for mission command. The latter article is available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2019-OLE/July/Townsend-Reinvigorating/
Probably the single greatest problem with the 2012 ADP 6-0 was the fact that we made mission command everything. It went from being the Army’s preferred method of exercising command and control (FM 6-0, 2003), to being a philosophy of command, a warfighting function, and system. From about 2011 on, we had no common language with our joint and multi-national partners, and it would often take a few minutes of discussion just to determine what context someone was using when discussing mission command. We also have an entire generation of officers that believe command and control is bad, and that mission command is good. There’s nothing wrong with command and control. It’s fundamental for the conduct of operations. It’s how you exercise command and control that matters. And, depending on the situation, a little tighter rein may be required.
The real tragedy was that mission command, which was always associated with the human aspects of operations, became associated with systems and technology. The current ADP 6-0 tried to correct that by bringing back command and control to describe the exercise of authority and direction, the warfighting function and the system.
One of the misconceptions we tried to fix in this ADP 6-0 was that mission command is a laissez-faire approach to command and control, where the commander issues broad guidance, and then leaves detail up to his subordinates. That has never been the case. The commander owes his subordinates a decent plan. That’s why driving the operations process is a C2 task.
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, is really a companion manual to ADP 6-0. In fact, all operations process discussion used to be in 6-0. The ops process is our framework for organizing and putting command and control into action. ADP 5-0 goes into pretty good detail on the interaction between the commander and staff as they help the commander achieve situational understanding, so he can make and implement better decisions. All our planning doctrine contains multiple touch points for the commander to issue intent, come up with an operational approach, approve the mission statement and the course of action, and ultimately, approve the order.
In a perfect world, we could just execute a plan. But we all know friction kicks in. People get lost, communications are disrupted, and the enemy gets a vote. That’s when the commander’s intent becomes invaluable. It provides the left and right limit on disciplined initiative and allows subordinates to make decisions and act in response to threats and opportunities without having to wait for instructions.