Writing with Precision is a practical manual that teaches clarity. The book offers many specific ‘ways’ to be clear; so many in fact, one must practice them to understand. Fortunately for us, Writing with Precision includes a handful of practical exercises.

The author Jefferson Bates is a former NASA writer of some renown and published the first edition in 1978. In the book, he lays out what he learned over four decades as a professional writer who focused on clarity in government documents. His cover letters, memos, instructions, regulations, and reports were the acme of precision, and he was a key player in de-mystifying government writing…and I thought it was bad now. Some may think this is too pedantic a topic but it gives those of us in government service something to ponder. Specifically, what has the culture of the military taught us about writing that isn’t helpful? Bates sees eliminating jargon, vogue words, and gobbledygook as a start.

Bates breaks Writing with Precision into several parts which cover a variety of topics. Part 1 focuses on writing with 10 principles and 7 axioms. Part 2 covers editing skills while Part 3 is a handbook organized in alphabetical order that further explains and complements his principles and axioms. Finally, Part 4 is a series of practical exercises with answers and comments. Throughout all four parts, Bates adds checklists and exercises to drive home his points.

Overall, a worthy read for those on a quest to write better. My two biggest takeaways were a new method for building an outline using index cards and the reasons you SHOULD use passive voice. This will go on my reference shelf. It is a great tool to come back to as you edit your own (or someone else’s) work.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer who tries to write, likes to think, and routinely sips whisk(e)y.

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The latest installment of the Simon Sinek enterprise, The Infinite Game, has a lot of what I found compelling from Sinek’s past works. It explains a big idea in simple terms but this one didn’t seem to deliver. I found the read clunky and disorganized. I am a huge Sinek fan which is probably why I was so distressed. While he presents some valuable ideas in this book, I did not find the depth I was expecting.

That said, the overall premise of The Infinite Game is sound. Sinek starts with the idea that humans view the world in win-lose terms. Stated another way, we believe our games are finite. We know the players, play by agreed-upon rules, have commonly understood goals, and somebody always wins and losses at the end. We yearn for this consistency and often get frustrated with interactions fraught with disorganization and surprise. The win-lose dichotomy clouds our perception of the world, and we view our interactions through this prism.

Infinite games, however, are not the exception; they are common, and viewing the world under this paradigm is more useful than we realize. Known and unknown players play these games, without exact or agreed-upon rules, and they have no practical end. The primary objective of the infinite game is to continue to play. You can win at chess but how do you win in a friendship? Drug dealers aren’t trying to beat police to win; they just want to continue their business. This long-view method of perceiving the world changes incentive structures, understanding risk, and how we manage our resources.

To play the infinite game, you must start by adopting an infinite mindset. Sinek’s prescription is to advance a just cause, build a trusting team, study rivals, show existential flexibility, and lead. A just cause is the feeling of being part of something bigger than yourself supplying a purpose so appealing people will sacrifice for it. Trust is aligned with psychological safety to embolden risk-taking. A worthy rival is a healthy competitor giving your organization a focus. Existential flexibility is the ability to change a process or path to align better with your cause. Finally, leading with an infinite mindset is focusing on a long-term view and taking care of the team.

The key point I took from this book was the need to focus on the long-term vision over a short-term goal-oriented approach. The short-term mindset incentivizes near-term wins without regard to long-term effects. This is akin to an Army unit focusing on individual weapons qualification statistics over the amorphous vision of being lethal when engaged with the enemy. Weapons’ qualification percentages are easily measurable and comparable; they’re also eminently necessary to winning a battle. Succeeding in battle, however, requires many more skills that are much harder to define than just shooting straight. Theoretically, an organization could be successful in battle with poor weapons qualification skills. At least one deep thinker wrote the acme of skill was winning without firing a shot. Thus, too much focus on short-term measures can lead to some great shooters at the expense of honing other necessary skills not easily measured.

In the end, Sinek’s big idea is worthy of reflection, but I recommend watching his talk on the web before picking up this one.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer who likes to write, think, and sip whisk(e)y.

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We acknowledge that emotion can cloud human decision-making and affect action. We also know our mind creates shortcuts that are sometimes faulty. Despite this understanding, we often do not account for it. We think of ourselves as rational decision-makers, doing whatever offers the most utility based on the information available. This is not true. 

We are Predictably Irrational as Dan Ariely describes in this book, a fast and entertaining read. Ariely lays out several common traps found in human thinking with the hope that being aware of the traps helps us dodge the effects. 

Let’s review a few of Ariely’s more common snares: anchoring, the decoy effect, the endowment effect & loss aversion, and short-term thinking. 

Anchoring is when a person depends too heavily on initial information. For some, it is extremely hard to shake that first impression. Most of us compare all later information to the first information that we received. A simple experiment on the power of anchoring asked participants to write down the last two digits of their social security number before estimating the cost of several items. Those with higher social security numbers estimated higher costs. From a military perspective, we can easily imagine ourselves anchoring to a plan, but our anchoring is more systematic. We compare every report of the enemy against the intelligence section’s enemy course of action, a process that also drives our reconnaissance plan. This invites confirmation bias. We desire to find what we are looking for, so we ensure someone is looking for it. 

The decoy effect, otherwise known as the asymmetric dominance effect, is when individuals change preference between two attractive choices when a third similar but less attractive choice is added. The experiment was a decision between an all-inclusive week in Paris versus Rome. When a third choice was added, a week in Paris without breakfast included, participants picked Paris with breakfast. Instead of comparing Rome to Paris, people compared Paris with and without breakfast. The effect’s implication to military planning is to watch out for that throw-away option. Whether creating the courses of action or picking one, keep an eye on distinguishability. 

The endowment effect & loss aversion work together. The endowment effect is when we value something more than others because we own it and loss aversion is when we give greater meaning to a loss over a gain of equal measure. In one famous experiment on the endowment effect, people required twice as much money for a coffee mug they owned, as compared to what they were willing to initially pay for it. An experiment on loss aversion showed that people needed to gain about twice as much as they were willing to lose. Not only do we overly value our assets, but we are also programmed to not risk them. The battlefield lacks a clear measure to gauge the endowment effect or loss aversion, but it would be foolish to think these heuristics don’t affect risk-taking. This concept brings to mind Patton’s quote, “Take not counsel of your fears.” There is no prescription here other than acknowledging that we overvalue what is ours and are loath to risk it without significant return in our decision-making. Keep that in mind when you are debating whether to launch that local counterattack at NTC. 

The final snare about which Ariely writes, short-term thinking; is when we look for the immediate advantage, even when the long-term gain is more desirable. The most famous study on short-term thinking is the marshmallow experiment where a group of preschool children could have one marshmallow now or wait 15 minutes and have two. Most tried, but could not wait. A more recent study showed that the more often an investor checked their portfolio, the more likely they would modify it and reduce their returns losing sight of their long-term investment goal for a short-term gain. This problem is more pronounced in the military environment where survival dominates. We look to overmatch our adversary and throw everything we can at them. Critical thinkers though need to think about the fight tomorrow or we court disaster. Worse, we could follow a series of tactical short-term successes divorced from the long-term strategic objective.  

This book details far more than just the four traps mentioned. What do we make of it? Without conscious thought, we risk making rationally uninformed decisions. Awareness, though not foolproof, is the only way to avoid these pitfalls. Knowing is half the battle…it enables us to observe our decision-making behavior. To fight these traps, be aware of them, and develop ways to avoid them. Red Team your decisions. Give someone the responsibility to challenge your understanding. Take steps to allow debate and effective conflict. Finally, reflect and be introspective about why you are deciding the way you are. 

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany. 

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Over the years, I’ve read a lot about Normandy and left few rocks uncovered. This book was in an Audible 2-for-1 sale, and I had low expectations…but it surprised! James Holland examines historical points of contention and challenges the accepted view. There is some review of well-tilled ground, but I took away several new insights. A few controversial highlights:

The fear of airborne failure was completely unfounded. The airborne drops went well; over 75% of paratroops landed within 5 miles of their DZ, and only 21 of 800+ transport aircraft were shot down.

Pointe Du Hoc was modeled after a British Commando raid on a battery during the Sicily invasion. Though portrayed as a tough fight in American military lore, it was relatively easy. The rangers only suffered 15 killed scaling the cliff. The real fight was their stalwart defense after they found and destroyed the guns.

Holland argues the Allies outfought the Germans, contradicting the standard narrative that Allied success was based on material superiority. The German LXXXIV Corps commander sent 21st Panzer to the wrong location. They misread the airborne invasion for a raid. The German counterattacks were uncoordinated and dispersed, tactical in nature, and mostly local. Had the Germans focused their effort, they might have stalled or even defeated the invasion. If their reinforcements moved to Omaha instead of countering the airborne, the battle might have differed.

The stagnation on Omaha, attributed to effective German fire, was actually ineffective small unit leadership. This is why you see senior leaders taking charge of small units and leading them up the bluff. The confusion on the beach froze many inexperienced small unit leaders.

The larger myth of German superiority was also thrashed. The Allies generally had better and more reliable weapons than the Germans. The Allies are portrayed as less disciplined, but the US Army executed only one person for desertion during the war. The Germans executed 15,000 for desertion and killed another 50,000 others for various reasons.

There were a few other interesting snippets. Only the US Army valued its NCO Corps. The British and German armies did not use NCOs as independent leaders in the field as the US did. This was based on a US expectation that NCOs would make choices, not just follow and enforce orders.

The Allied reliance on firepower curtailed small units’ initiative because of the synchronization needed to use artillery and air support. The Germans were better at maneuver because they only needed to coordinate locally. However, the decentralized command of large units made the Allies more flexible and efficient. On the other hand, the Germans were stymied by centralized the decision-making cycle of higher commanders.

The German penchant for the counterattack increased their casualties, but they tended to hold in the defense. The Allied ‘send bullet, not soldier’ focus on firepower, tended to be slow and deliberate but kept the force intact. Above all, this was a major lesson – you must keep your force alive to fight another day.

Only about 2,000 troops or 10% of a division fights in a battle, but after about four days, the whole division was ineffective and had to be withdrawn. The Allies were able to refit their divisions faster and more efficiently, putting more troops in the line.

I found Holland’s book insightful despite that one can find holes in them. Overall, thinking through the challenges and reimagining history is a great thought experiment and well worth the time.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.

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Philbrick writes an extremely accessible and well-balanced account describing the opening phase of the American Revolution. The Battle of Bunker Hill, certainly the centerpiece of the story, is only part of the narrative. In true historical form, Philbrick provides both the context and happenstance of events beginning with Paul Revere’s warning and ending with the British evacuation of Boston. The allure of this book is not the history but the detail that causes you to question the commonly understood narrative.

The revolution was not a forgone conclusion. The New Englanders initially revered King George III and the other colonies thought them radical in their opposition to Parliament. Even the spark on Lexington green was contingent on happenstance. During the march, a New England militiaman stood in the middle of the road and fired his musket at the approaching British column.  It was a ‘flash in the pan’ that did not ignite the charge. Had the musket fired, a New Englander would have been the cause of the violence, eliminating a grievance that unified the colonies. Additionally, it was that incident that caused the British to load their weapons. Marching into Lexington with unloaded muskets would have slowed down the escalation on the green and certainly prevented an accidental discharge…

But that’s not all. The profile of Joseph Warren is remarkable. Commissioned by the Continental Congress on June 14th, Warren was a well-respected doctor when he arrived on Breed’s Hill. The assembled militia leaders asked him to assume command, but Warren refused. He told them his appointment was political and that he was inexperienced in military matters. One can only assume he felt deficient in the task, but he didn’t lack courage. Warren took to the redoubt as a private soldier and was killed during the British attack on the 17th. Was it possible that a coordinated defense led by Warren might have offered some better outcome for the revolution? And had he lived, Joseph Warren, not George Washington, would have likely led the Continental Army when it was formed a month later.

Washington’s profile was another stunning account and Philbrick was not kind. The future President had a managed persona and took a dim view of his army. He disparaged them in letters, but he listened, kept himself approachable, and made some necessary changes. He thought the New Englanders and their Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland cousins were an undisciplined rabble. Washington did not like free blacks in the army despite the overwhelming support to award a citation to Salem Poor for extraordinary heroism on Breed’s Hill. He enforced strict rules and held leaders accountable using the whip. He was as close to American aristocracy as there was and took residence in a grand house on ‘Tory Row’ while his army lived in the field. Called ‘His Excellency’ by his soldiers, Washington didn’t like his army, but he knew they would fight.

Even with an army full of fighting spirit, Washington had few options. A plan to take Boston by ground assault over the neck and an amphibious landing was considered and discarded. The army couldn’t storm Boston without destroying the city; the British army and navy were too strong. With immense pressure to do something by Congress, Washington could not make a decision without the accent of his council of generals. It was Arnold, Knox, and Putnam who saved the revolution.

Philbrick covers only briefly Arnold’s triumph at Fort Ticonderoga but spends a bit more time on Knox’s effort to move the captured artillery to Dorchester Heights. An unlikely artillerist, Knox was bookish and had read everything he could on military engineering and artillery. He figured out how to drag the artillery back from the captured fort. Putnam’s contribution was figuring out how to entrench the artillery on the heights without the telltale sound of pickaxes to alert the British. He devised a plan to build chandeliers and fascines filled with earth (the 1775 equivalent to the HESCO barrier). These structures were placed on the high-ground and filled with earth during the night. Upon sunrise, the British saw the fortification on the commanding heights triggering their evacuation.

Philbrick describes the book’s namesake in all its fury and confusion. Much to unpack here: the problem of the unity of effort versus unity of command, the criticality of logistics, and the importance of leadership. The British troops showed incredible discipline as they succumbed to withering fire. The New England marksmen were experts at killing British officers but that did not stop the British advance. Interestingly, the British repeatedly extolled themselves with the rallying cry of ‘to conquer or die,’ a phrase I thought attributed to Washington during the Battle of Long Island. The indiscipline of militia camp did not transfer to the action on Breed’s Hill. The militiamen fought fiercely against a disciplined foe and only withdrew once their ammunition was exhausted. While the British won the field, it was a pyrrhic victory. As one Rhode Islander noted, “Wish we could sell them another hill at that price.”

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.

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Published towards the end of the Cold War, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May is a classic book worth revisiting by the current generation of military planners. Neustadt and May use historical case studies, ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Swine Flu Scare of 1976, to illustrate how a more reflective and systematic approach can help decision-makers and their staffs use history more effectively.[1] Most military planners are familiar with the cautionary suggestion to first understand what the problem is; the techniques offered in Thinking in Time echo this sentiment as they focus on “sharpening the picture of the present situation and for clarifying what is of concern about it.”[2] Some of the techniques or “mini-methods” as Neustadt and May refer to their recommended best practices, can help refine planning methods or processes, and improve the situational understanding for a planning team or decision-maker. Rather than serve as a book review, this piece intends to introduce some of Neustadt and May’s methods most relevant to military planners to pique the interest of those who may seek out this seminal work for professional development.

Neustadt and May urge practitioners to “disassemble ‘now,’ the situation at the moment,” as the first step in analyzing a problem.[3] They suggest an admittedly elementary first step—take apart and define the situation by separating the Known from the Unclear and the Presumed.[4] For military planners, this concept should sound familiar, as it echoes one of the actions of Mission Analysis during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), that of identifying Facts and Assumptions. According to Neustadt and May, this basic but necessary step is “nothing but an injunction to get the facts straight before acting;” physically listing out the Known from the Unclear and the Presumed grounds the situation and focuses on matters of evidence.[5] Separating the key elements of a situation into Known, Unknown, and Presumed puts attention on the mission at hand, and can help stave off the question of “what to do.” Instead, it encourages the initial thinking to focus on answering, “what is the problem.”[6]

When faced with a complicated or complex problem, planners and analysts often turn to history to inform their efforts. While history should inform contemporary planning and decision making, Neustadt and May offer a warning to guard against the “seductive influence of an analogy.”[7] This does not mean that one shouldn’t use historical analysis; rather, it is a reminder to not use history as a shortcut for analysis. When benefitting from historical examples, those examples must be put in context. The simplified way that the authors recommend to do this is to list out likenesses and differences between supposedly analogous situations to “compare “now” with “then” before turning to what “should be done now.”[8] The real benefit of this simple exercise is taking one more step, and stratifying the likenesses and differences for historical events, comparing locales, the geopolitical context, the domestic situation, and current military threats. They use the example of President Truman’s instinctive references to seemingly similar events of his life in response to the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea: Truman recalled the Manchurian Incident of 1931-32, Italy’s 1935 aggression against Ethiopia, and the 1938 Anschluss and made his decisions influenced by these analogies. However, if we compare the likenesses and differences for these events in the context of the immediate locale and political context, the global security environment, and domestic politics—the differences become more glaring. As Neustadt and May repeatedly demonstrate—with analogies, context is king.

Issue History: Three Techniques

Once the situation is “tolerably clear,” Neustadt and May suggest the routine use of three techniques to help inform objectives.[9] Their three techniques—the Goldberg Method, timelines, and journalists’ questions, are easy approaches that can help define what they refer to as “issue history.” Issue history holds great utility in defining or framing desired future states because, as the authors write, “…looking back at past realities suggests the limitations on some future possibilities.”[10] The recognition of what may be impossible to attain, and what is possible (and at what cost), can aid in selecting objectives.[11] In short, what has failed in the past, may fail again; what has succeeded, may work still—however, the opposite may also prove true. Like much of what Thinking in Time advocates for, the best way forward has as much to do with the current context, as it does history.

The three devices (recommended for adoption for routine use) for using issue history to inform the desired future state unfold beginning with the Goldberg Method. The Goldberg Method, named after its inspiration, Avram Goldberg—former CEO of the New England grocery store Stop and Shop, is premised on one of his managerial techniques. Rather than asking a manager “what is the problem,” Goldberg would ask them to “tell me the story.”[12] While pausing to ask what the problem is before acting is always preferable, Goldberg’s request to hear the story, not just the current problem, is the first step to make sure that understanding the current obstacle is placed in context.  Next, use a timeline, beginning with the earliest date that seems to be significant. Placing dates on a timeline gives us the “when” of traditional journalists’ questions: “when, where, what, who, how, and why?”[13] While not all of these may be answerable, these easy steps can help identify the trends influencing the current problem, and the particulars. These techniques help set things in context, and remind the planner of “what got us here.”[14]

Conclusion

As Neustadt and May assure the reader, their work is “not a history book.” At its core, the book is about “how to use experience, whether remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today about the prospect for tomorrow.”[15] Their suggested methods can help ground planners or a planning team and force them to consider their particular problem in the context of larger events, guard against the misuse of analogy, and focus on understanding a problem before attempting to act on solutions. As Harvard political science professors, Neustadt and May are certainly qualified to state that “good political judgment rests, we suspect, on historical understanding,” but it is a sentiment that applies to all decision-makers, not just politicians.[16] Neustadt and May emphasize approaches that can enable planners, analysts, and decision-makers how to best use history while avoiding the misuse of history, making Thinking in Time a timeless work for practitioners.

MAJ Rick Chersicla is currently a Strategic Planner at USARNORTH. An Army Strategist (FA59), he is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the School of Advanced Military Studies, and Fordham University. This article reflects his views and not those of the Department of Defense or the United States Army.

[1] Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, “Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Makers,” (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 2.

[2] Ibid, 91.

[3] Ibid, 37.

[4] Ibid, 37.

[5] Ibid, 37-38.

[6] Ibid, 235.

[7] Ibid, 58.

[8] Ibid, 41.

[9] Ibid, 235.

[10] Ibid, 236.

[11] Ibid, 236-237.

[12] Ibid, 106.

[13] Ibid, 106-107.

[14] Ibid, 106.

[15] Ibid, xxii.

[16] Ibid, 195.

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I read The Ugly American for the first time eleven years ago on my way to Iraq as an advisor. It’s one of the few books I’ve ever rated with 5-stars, a rating I reserve for books that change the way I think about something. I picked it up again based recently with a renewed interest in foreign policy.

This is a story of Americans in a fictitious Southeast Asian country where the United States and the Soviet Union are vying for influence. Written in 1958, it foreshadows our foreign policy debacle in Vietnam, but do not let that fool you into thinking it lacks relevance. The fictitious nation trying to balance relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union could be one of several countries in the world today. Simply replace the Soviet Union with a contemporary American adversary like Russia or China and the effect remains.

I would love to say the portrayal of the American officials’ insensitivity to language, culture, and custom is rare, but the authors’ critical sarcasm of U.S. foreign policy comes from their witness to our arrogance. They base their stories on true accounts; in fact, the book was initially written as non-fiction. It was a plea for change. Not four years after this book was published, we helped the South Vietnamese government with the strategic hamlet program, a best practice copied from the Malayan Emergency. Culture and customs in Vietnam tied people to their land, something not found in Malaysia. Instead of improving conditions, the program helped isolate the population from the South Vietnamese government, not at all what was intended. Arrogance happens, and frankly, I saw some of the described behavior from senior U.S. officials while advising in Iraq not long ago. Not all behaved this way of course, but this book is a warning to approach interactions with caution and be wary of ourselves.

But if arrogance is innate, where does it come from? There are at least two potential drivers of arrogance highlighted by the story. The first source stems from hubris. Pride is easy when you globally dominate the economic and military spheres. Our success often blinds us, as can our national narrative. We believe hard work will bring success, but in some places, you need more than that. Another source of arrogance comes from bureaucracy. There are always disagreements between allies and this tension is exacerbated by bureaucracy. The hidden bureaucratic incentives drive us to dismiss others to achieve the stated and unstated goals in our organization. A contemporary Army example is our penchant for action and making things happen, a trait that serves us well on the battlefield but not so well when compromise is necessary. Hubris and bureaucracy cloud our ability to listen to another.

To overcome this flaw, Lederer and Burdick believe character is the answer. The protagonist, Homer Atkins, is an inventor, not a member of the government establishment. His dirty hands always “reminded him he was an ugly man.” He was humble, patient, and understanding. He listened and compromised to get things done for the country he loved and cared for, even if it was not his own. Because of that, he was the epitome of an ambassador.

The Ugly American sold over a million copies and had a profound impact on U.S. foreign policy. It is said to have been the genesis of President Kennedy’s Peace Corps. The funny part is that term ugly American is stuck in our lexicon the wrong way. The ugly American was the hero; it was the arrogant American, impeccably dressed, that was ugly.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.

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Part of a book club a few years back, I read and discussed a book that half the group thought read like a college paper. They were turned-off, their attention applied to structure over the content. This skewed the subsequent discussion away from the author’s arguments towards the monotonous tone of the book. It was a well-reasoned and thoughtful thesis, but it did not capture the attention of at least half of us. How do you prevent that in your own writing?

Improving your ability to write is difficult; not only must your ideas be logical, but you must be engaged to keep an audience. Feedback is essential but difficult to obtain, particularly if you are a halfway decent writer.

“It’s a good essay but kinda boring.”

“Thanks,” you say, “Any ideas to liven it up?”

“Uhhhh…no.”

Reflective practice is something we can use to self-develop and this book gave me a few basics to apply. In less than 100 pages, Strunk and White give eleven rules of usage, eleven principles of composition, some thoughts on the form, pitfalls of expression, and an approach to a writing style.

The elements of usage cover important mechanics of grammar-focused on sentence structure. Many of the elements are not new and upon introspection, are things I am aware of in my writing. A few reminders were in the store, nevertheless. I forgot what an appositive was or why to use a dash in a sentence. Tense is now something I think about deliberately while I write instead of listening for it during the editing phase. This section refreshed my memory of knowledge lost from decades of using Microsoft Word.

While the first 13-pages dwell on sentence structure, the principles of composition relate more directly to the art of writing. Again, there is nothing here not learned in high school except that exceptions exist for every principle. Have an outline but do not tie yourself to it. Use the active voice except when the action is more important than the actor. Do not use split infinitives unless it adds clarity. Express ideas in a similar form but do not use the same sentence structure over and over; watch for that singsong effect of mechanical symmetry.

The composition makes up the paragraph, but form guides the structure which will vary depending upon the style you use. APA is different than Chicago for example. If you don’t have a go-to, Strunk and White give you a shortlist to consider.

After form, the writers shift to the misuse of words and expression. This section helps bring clarity by replacing vague words with the concrete. Most understand the difference between effect and affect but do you remember the difference between compare and contrast? That is a stronger word than which. The ball that, refers to something concrete while the ball which, is somewhat weaker. Further describes conceptual distance while farther defines actual measurable distance. The list is long and not something you can memorize, but it is a useful resource. I used it to look up the difference between however and nevertheless while writing this.

The last section is a conversation about developing a writing style which I took as how you want the reader to perceive your writing. Do you want to be read as honest, funny, or considerate? Strunk and White give 21 different points to consider, but first, decide who are you writing for and what you aim to achieve. With that answered, you can focus on being clear, concise, and persuasive. You can keep a similar form but avoid mechanical symmetry. What else? Be purposeful about where you place your emphasis. Revise and rewrite. Be specific, definite, and concrete. For example, write rifle instead of weapon or write M4 instead of rifle; it depends on the audience. There are many other bits of knowledge in the last section that I try to practice in my writing. I am not sure what style will emerge, but I know I am more thoughtful in my approach.

Elements of Style is a worthy read and its greatest piece of advice to remember is this: writing is about the reader. Whatever keeps the reader’s attention, makes it clear, and best conveys the message is your aim – even if you break established conventions or rules.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is learning to write and an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.

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Most of us have experienced Homer in high school or perhaps college, so this story should not hold any surprises. Though I did not expect them, I found a few new things to share.

The trope is a familiar one. The hero is on a journey rife with challenges on a path to love and riches. It sounded like a Dora the Explorer episode to me. Every time the gods came to help, I heard the map song and every time they tried to thwart Odysseus, I heard that shaker sound of Swiper. But Homer brings more than just the original Dora concept and a captivating narrative. He describes the self-interest, loyalty, and resilience found in human nature.

If we all acted in our own self-interest, the world would be easier to predict, but it would be a sad world. The suitors act in their self-interest using societal norms to justify eating and drinking Penelope and the family out of everything. There is nothing progressive here; they treat the disguised Odysseus as inferior because he looked inferior. The suitors do what they can, not what they should. Vengeance is their reward. While few of us are completely altruistic, we must remember the moral aspect of our conduct over the legal.

Though many thought Odysseus would not return, their loyalty remained. Others, the suitors again, never considered the needs of their sovereign or his family. It was the great test, the disguise enabled by the patroness Athena, which showed true motivations. It was easy to see why loyalty was strongest with Penelope and Telemachus, being the wife and son, but why did Homer vest the same in lowly servants? The swineherd and old maid held considerable loyalty to their king. Might this be the loyalty we show our leaders when they care and develop us?

The last theme I took away was that of resilience. It is abundant in this poem. Failure and setback followed one another through both Telemachus’ and Odysseus’ journeys. Neither gave up hope despite the challenges or the time that passed. The fight against the suitors left the town divided but Odysseus and family pressed on…and were rewarded with peace brokered by the gods.

I really was not expecting to gain much while listening to this classic. I intended to check the box, “Yes, I’ve read Homer,” but I came away with a few gems. It spurred thought, contemplation, and a bit of emotion…what more can you ask for? The moral of this story: pick up a classic and give it a look. It could surprise you.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.

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What does the future of war look like? Why is the world’s most formidable military no longer winning? Is the US military pursuing the wisest course of action in preparing for great power conflict? Two recent books with much in common ask similar questions about what warfare will look like and provide divergent answers regarding where the US needs to go. Written by two professors of PME, both argue that the future of war looks anything but conventional. Indeed, they caution readers to expect more of the same regarding what we have become accustomed to in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last two decades. 

Retired Air Force officer Phillip Meilinger’s book Limiting Risk in America’s Wars reflects the influence of his recent time spent at the Naval War College. He borrows much from British military and naval theory to argue for an indirect strategy that entails opening a second front through an expeditionary or amphibious operation. He also argues that the US has deterred the likelihood of conventional conflict, and thus he insists that the US must develop a new strategic paradigm for unconventional conflicts. Some Army and Marine officers will want to hold their noses at aspects of his solution, as he views conventional groundpower not only as increasingly irrelevant but also as harmful in OEF and OIF. Rather, he argues that the US needs to apply force with airpower at the helm, supported by special operations, indigenous troops, and intelligence. In other words, his solution is that we should be doing more of what we have been doing for the last twenty years, just without conventional ground forces. This is a disappointing conclusion, but Meilinger asks many of the right questions while encouraging the US military to think strategically.

Whereas Meilinger mines the past for what has worked in previous conflicts, Sean McFate leans more toward identifying important developing trends and potential solutions. Still, they have much in common. McFate’s New Rules of War targets some similarly sacred cows—mainly conventional forces—but this time he takes on not just the Army and the Marine Corps but the Air Force and the Navy as well. 

McFate sees the post-Westphalian era of nation states controlling the means of violence crumbling. Like Meilinger, he thus views the future of conflict as characterized by “durable disorder” (i.e. conflicts like OEF will continue to be the norm). He predicts a world where people identify more strongly with their surrounding area than their nation-state and where capitalism runs amuck in the hiring and firing of mercenary armies. The “illusion of states” will “continue on maps but not in reality,” with wealthy individuals and companies wielding far more power and influence than most nation states (149, 152). 

As such, McFate wants to invest far more in special forces at the expense of military technology like carriers and F-35s that he dismisses as irrelevant. Unlike Meilinger, then, McFate challenges what he sees as the technology-centric solutions of the US military, which he characterizes as largely irrelevant in future conflict except to line the pockets of the military-industrial complex. In future warfare, “[s]haping people’s reception of reality is more powerful than mobilizing a carrier strike group” (113).  

Thus lethality should be deemphasized because the “utility of force is declining” (107). Since 9/11, for example, McFate claims that SOF has “honed the way of the knife but . . . let other skills dull” (40). By contrast, he highlights Russian success in “weaponizing” Syrian refugees. By intervening in Syria, Russia achieved immense strategic effect by effectively destabilizing much of Europe (104-5). Meanwhile, the US continues to prepare for a “conventional” conflict that will never be fought again, which he defines as “state-on-state fighting” (5, 29). 

McFate defines war as “armed politics, nothing more.” In advocating for thoughtful future strategists, he advises that we think of warfare like “smoke: always shifting, twisting, moving.” To have too “rigid” a view of war is to invite “strategic surprise and defeat” (185). Like Meilinger, McFate wants to abandon Clausewitz, for he “curses chaos and ‘the fog of war’ as barriers to victory” even as “Sun Tzu creates chaos and weaponizes it for victory” (205). And anything can be weaponized: “refugees, information, election cycles, money, the law.” Even time (228-229). 

Both works suffer from not proving their cases rigorously enough and taking overly extreme stances. For example, McFate is entirely too dismissive of artificial intelligence, claiming it can “barely accomplish basic cognitive tasks” (15). Yet AI continues to stack up victories, most recently at poker. Even worse, he insists, are the cyberwar “doomsayers” who are the “biggest con artists” of all (15). Likewise, Meilinger does not really offer a new solution or connect the means that he repeatedly stresses (airpower, SOF, indigenous armies) to desired strategic ends. 

But we need the kind of contrarian views espoused in these books to make us examine our deeply held assumptions. Taken together, both works have much to contribute to larger conversations about warfare’s future, insisting on the need for a coherent grand strategy while casting doubt on how wisely the US military is preparing for what is to come.

Dr. Heather Pace Venable is an Assistant Professor of Comparitive Military Studies at the Air War College and an editor for the Field Grade Leader. Follow her on Twitter at @Heather_at_ACTS

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