Leaders throughout the Army usually fall into one of two camps regarding operations orders. Those that complain that their higher headquarters is micromanaging them and doesn’t enable them to make decisions or, the ones complaining they don’t have enough detail to execute their mission properly. There is a difficult balance between too much and too little supervision, but many fail to realize that details are essential for subordinates to be able to make good decisions. So in the wise words of the Spice Girls, “tell me what you want, what you really, really want!”

A sufficiently detailed order is the primary tool commanders use to describe and direct how they visualize the fight to their formations. Details clarify how they will take the initiative from the enemy, mass forces in close proximity, and conduct transitions. An order that is not sufficiently detailed creates an environment that enables the enemy to take the initiative and set the terms of the fight. This trend has been observed at Combat Training Centers (CTCs), rotation after rotation from the platoon to brigade; with the default critiques being “I don’t want to tell them how to do their job.” This combination of the well-intentioned desire to enable subordinates and the misunderstanding of the role of detailed planning typically results in an order that gives vague, generalized guidance. This causes subordinates to make plans in isolation, which are anything but synchronized in execution.

Commanders have a responsibility to conceptualize, synchronize, and employ all of their units’ capabilities to achieve their mission. It would be nice if we could just point at a map and give a one-sentence order to synchronize an operation. Unfortunately, none of us are operating in a Hollywood-scripted environment; subordinates don’t cross the line of departure then suddenly achieve self-actualization. Commanders do this through fully developed orders that are concise, but contain sufficient detail to provide subordinates a clear understanding of what is expected.. Issuing an order with graphic control measures, a decision support matrix, a detailed commander’s intent, and a synchronization matrix does not interfere with mission command. It is the science portion of command and control and it enhances a subordinate’s ability to properly plan and understand the operational environment; directly supporting each of the principles of mission command.

Build cohesive teams through mutual trust. When we discuss trust, we have a tendency to gravitate toward personal trust in leaders. While this is important, we miss the discussion on organizational trust and its relationship with mission accomplishment. How do we build mutual trust within organizations? Commanders develop trust in a subordinate unit’s ability to execute based on realistic training, knowing their capabilities and limitations, and past performance. When a commander assigns a mission to a subordinate unit, they take into account proficiency in Mission Essential Task List (METL) tasks and performance during previous exercises. Additionally, they account for a multitude of intangible factors, such as leader experience and the culture of the unit. Subordinates develop trust in the commander’s ability to provide clear and timely orders, resource them properly for tasks, listen to their input, and employ them within their capabilities. Challenging and realistic training is an essential component to building mutual trust as it permits both the commander and subordinates to demonstrate and observe their respective capabilities.

Create shared understanding. Detailed orders and well-executed rehearsals allow us to create shared understanding. There are several ways to add sufficient detail but the simplest, and most common, method is through the use of graphic control measures, a synchronization matrix, and rehearsals. Graphic control measures identify responsibilities and tasks, aid coordination of fires, control maneuver to prevent fratricide, and enable awareness of what other units are doing. Establishing a restrictive fire line (RFL) does not stifle initiative for a maneuver unit, it informs them not to orient their fire in a specific direction to prevent fratricide. Requiring units to move to, or stop at, phase lines during an operation shows everyone how we are synchronizing in time and space. Establishing a critical friendly zone (CFZ) over a wet gap crossing or mission command node tells the fires cell you have assessed it as critical to mission success, enabling them to plan accordingly.

A synchronization matrix enables understanding of what everyone is doing at a particular time and which assets will be supporting which unit. Combining the sync matrix with operational graphics enables leaders to understand what they will be doing, when they will be doing it, what will be going on around them, who will have priority for the limited assets available, and why. These are components of virtually every tactical order, but the critical part is providing enough detail to enhance execution. Is there something a subordinate unit should not do during a particular phase because you will lack a certain capability for a time? Is a phase line actually tied to the sustainment function because there is a set of logistical conditions necessary before a unit moves beyond a particular location? Will a retransmission team need to move before units can cross a phase line because they will lose communications? Is this properly communicated and has the staff included these details in the order in a way that can be easily understood?

A well-executed rehearsal develops the entire organization’s understanding of how the operation will be conducted. Rehearsals are the clearest form of communication during the operations order process. It is the only opportunity a commander has to have all subordinate leaders in the same place at the same time. However, if the level of involvement is not clearly communicated and the time is not protected; rehearsal quality will suffer (as will the execution of the mission). This effect magnifies as subordinate units begin planning. A detailed timeline is the most effective planning tool for enabling well-executed rehearsals. The HOPE (Higher, Operational, Planning, Enemy) method is the most effective tool for developing and illustrating a timeline. Conducting the analysis required to include a detailed HOPE timeline in the initial order will pay dividends and increase the quality of rehearsals. It provides visibility of overlapping events and enables deconfliction and prioritization, which will aid in having key personnel available for rehearsals. Incorporation of light data can help prevent scheduling rehearsals during periods of limited visibility, where they will do little to create a shared understanding. Additionally, this reduces the likelihood of forcing subordinate units to conduct their rehearsals in poor conditions.

Provide clear commander’s intent. A clear commander’s intent provides the expanded purpose (why we are doing all of this), key tasks that must be accomplished for success, and what the commander visualizes at the end state. Subordinate units need this information to plan their part of the operation, and respond to changes rapidly and violently. A commander’s intent that lacks sufficient clarity and detail will slow the subordinate commander’s decision cycle, potentially ceding the initiative to the enemy. It is important the commander gives their intent personally to subordinate commanders. This allows the commander to discuss their intent and ensure everyone truly has a shared understanding. This shared understanding is the basis upon which the plan is built and future decisions will be made. This becomes especially important during large scale combat operations. A potential peer threat will not permit the level of communication we have become accustomed.. A clear commander’s intent is the bridge between shared understanding and disciplined initiative.

Exercise disciplined initiative. Disciplined initiative is seeing, understanding, and taking advantage of opportunities in the absence of orders. A shared understanding of the operating environment and the higher commander’s intent are essential to disciplined initiative. This is achieved through sufficiently detailed orders, which allow the visualization of how everyone is synchronized in time and space. Commonly understood graphic control measures enable a shared understanding of the environment. We combine this awareness with our understanding of the higher commander’s intent to answer the question: Is this the decision my commander would want me to make, if they were here now and see what I see? If it does not have these factors ingrained, it is not disciplined initiative. It is nothing more than freelancing on the battlefield, which is dangerous to the entire organization.

Use mission orders. Mission-type orders have a clear commander’s intent and leave subordinates the latitude to make decisions, but this does not mean we neglect our responsibility to provide sufficient detail. Good orders synchronize the integration of fires, maneuver, establish priorities of support, and manage the operating environment; all while enabling subordinate commanders to make decisions. Mission orders have both positive control (direct commander involvement) and procedural control (reduces higher headquarters direct involvement) to facilitate this. Examples of positive control can be found in the Decision Support Matrix and include employment of a reserve, task organization changes, or initiating a passage of lines. Procedural controls, such as graphic control measures for integrating fires, controlling maneuver, and providing airspace control; all enable subordinates to plan their parts of the operation. How many times have you received an order and complained about some form of coordination missing that made your planning more difficult? While we must not stifle the initiative of the subordinate commander, we have an obligation to provide them with detailed orders to enable and empower them.

Accept prudent risk. No commander wants subordinate leaders who are unwilling to accept risk, but how does one determine if a risk is prudent or unwarranted? It is a mix of experience, training, and judgement nested within his or her understanding of the current situation and the higher commander’s intent. We have an obligation to enable our subordinates to exploit opportunities. However, if we have not provided a sufficiently detailed order, conducted rehearsals, and communicated a clear commander’s intent, are we enabling them to accurately assess risk within the operation?

Negotiating the balance between providing insufficient guidance and micromanaging everything is difficult, but it is our responsibility. Where you end up on the scale will vary based on the complexity of the operation, but it is our job to enable our subordinate units. We do this through a clear commander’s intent, orders with enough information to make good decisions, and rehearsals. This balance is hard work, and it’s not part of an operation anyone will make a movie about, but it is essential to accomplishing the mission.

MAJ Paul Hill is an infantry officer and graduate of the Command and General Staff College. He has served in staff positions at the brigade and division level, with operational experience in Africa, Iraq, and various other parts of the Middle East. He is currently the Chief of Operations for the National Training Center and Fort Irwin.