Category Archives: The Profession

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What is the “New Normal?” 

Snow

 

It was Romania, and four feet of snow had fallen the night before.  Nearly all functions base-wide had been shut down for two days, but my Detachment still had a mission to do.  With limited support, to include an impassable three-mile stretch to our office, my Detachment Sergeant and I were literally frozen in time.  As we walked through a dug out tunnel of snow to our dining facility, we war-gamed what was important, what could wait, and what just didn’t matter anymore.  We knew that we had to decide how and when to put our soldiers in harm’s way to complete the essential aspects of our mission. Even considering the Army’s prescribed Mission Essential Tasks (METs), our definition of essential had changed.  

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Thinking Differently through Think Tanks

A Guest Post by Cody Griner

 

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Shawn White, 20 Jan 2020

Over the course of my career, I have had some incredible experiences to discuss strategy with some of the world’s most brilliant minds. One particular moment that really stands out to me is when I had the opportunity to sit in an off the record meeting, in a small, intimate group with a former Secretary of Defense, who I had previously served under. Although I did not agree with all the decisions he had made, through the conversation I came to better understand how he came to those life and death decisions. It was illuminating to hear him discuss the difficult decisions of his career and then his reflection upon in retirement. Ultimately, did what he felt was right at the time for American security and few people have been in such an important role under that kind of microscope. Learning from people with this kind of experience is the best means to prepare for future difficult decisions. This opportunity did not come as part of a formal military program but through a Young Leader program at a think tank.

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Humility and Its Discontents

A Guest Post by Matt Kopp

Humility has taken its place in the pantheon of critical military leadership qualities in recent years. The highest praise of a senior leader often is that they accomplish great goals through their units – with a sense of humility. Toxic work environments, operational failures, and personal indiscretions all appear to stem, in part, from an underlying lack of leader humility. The challenge for military leaders is that humility exists on a continuum, and too much humility can lead to passivity and indecision. Also, attempts to demonstrate humility through statements and acts can give off an aura of disingenuousness. Given the amorphous and contradictory nature of humility in military leadership, the concept may provide little functional utility for officers. The following narrative attempts to give a brief framework of the factors that allow officers to lead in the optimal zone of humility.

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Success in the Army is spelled with a P.

A Guest Post by Joshua Trimble


In more than 20 years of service there have been several opportunities to offer guidance, mentorship and opinions to other Soldiers on career moves and life decisions. Every situation is slightly different as most individuals have slightly different career, life or family goals. While it may make sense for that aspiring general to move their family five times in six years, it may not be the right move for someone who believes in the Chief of Staff of the Army’s guidance that taking care of our people is the key to success.

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Why We Read

A Guest Post by Joseph Michaels

Many – if not all – Field Grade Officers (FGOs) can recall the enormous leap from being a highly proficient tactician to an accomplished strategist at a Joint Command. Up until that point in their career, they had forged reputations based on applying their technical expertise in complex scenarios that left little time for second guessing and debate.  The first day serving at the operational or strategic level can be particularly nerve-racking.  After offering an extensive overview of the mission to a new Major in our Division at Joint Command, he asked how he could best prepare for his new position.  The response was simple; read as much as possible.  Professional developmental reading will always have a place in each officer’s growth, but every officer can benefit from purposeful reading that facilitates a depth of knowledge capable of assessing dynamic complexities across a wide spectrum of problems. 

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Disease and Readiness

Lessons from the Russian Army in Chechnya

Town hall meetings across the Army in recent weeks have been filled with similar rhetoric from leaders: “we will be safe where possible, but we still have to train in order to maintain our readiness.”  Stories from social media and the Army Times have detailed the specifics of this guidance.  Large accountability formations, morning physical training in groups, physical fitness tests, Expert Infantryman Badge testing, barracks cleaning parties, units headed to the field to train, the stories of leaders flaunting CDC guidance are almost unending.  All of this is being done in the name of readiness.  Medical readiness is not simply about ensuring a unit is “green” on MEDPROS slides.  Leaders who blindly strive to meet requirements, without understanding or complying with the intent behind them, are missing the point.  Leaders seem to forget that health, perhaps more so than training, is an essential part of readiness.  While disease is an invisible threat, history shows us that ignoring it or treating it as a tangential factor in decision-making is a costly mistake.

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Doctrine and Warfighter Exercises: Addressing the change needed to improve staffs

A Guest Post by Chris Zagursky

U.S. Army photo by Markeith Horace, July 16th 2019

As a Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Observer Coach/Trainer (OC/T), I have come to observe a trend. In a cursory glance of archived Warfighter Exercise (WFX) bulletins, which synthesize OC/T observations over the course of an exercise year into more generalized trends, I was alarmed at how similar each annual publication read. Why was this, and what’s the problem? Are all the formations in the Army similarly flawed? Moreover, is everybody simply wrong? Unfortunately, the answer to this isn’t simple.

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Mission Command

A Guest Post by Ryan W. Pallas

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Tanner D. Lambert. Oct. 25, 2019

The title gives the reader two words: (1) Mission and (2) Command.  For the purpose of this discussion, “Mission” will be referenced as a noun. It is an assumption of the author’s that missions will continually evolve but military forces remain ready to adapt to achieve a successful end state.

“Command” on the other hand will be referenced as a noun and a verb.  “Command” is a position found throughout varying levels of the military.  “Command” is also a verb. For example, “A Lieutenant Colonel commands a battalion.” 

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A Rose by Any Other Name

A Guest Post by Andrew Bordelon

Sept 25, 2019. US Army photo by Master Sgt. Alejandro Licea

The new mission command approach to command and control identified a confusing gap in command techniques for Army leaders.  Prior to the revised 2019 publication of ADP 3-0 Operations and ADP 6-0 Mission Command, mission command and command and control were presented as two techniques for leaders to accomplish their mission.  Both techniques had guiding principles, but the commander ultimately chose how much to empower or control a subordinate’s initiative. Both Mission command and command and control, as described in doctrine prior to 2019 strove to reach a similar endstate.  A commander wants his subordinates to understand what they have to do and what information he needs to know throughout an operation. He understands that the “fog” of war will present unforeseen challenges to his unit. The two previous concepts were simply different ways to manage multiple subordinates working towards an end state.  Today, these concepts have been codified into Mission Command doctrine. The new Mission Command doctrine lays out what the Army wanted to emphasize all along which is the importance of leadership.

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Evolutions of Mission Command

A Guest Post by Christopher L'Heureux

Seven years after replacing command and control with mission command, the Army decided to bring it back. There was an oft-stated problem that mission command was a confused concept. It was a group of communications systems, a warfighting function, and a philosophy. The rewrite aimed to clear the ambiguity. In addition, the Army was on its own doctrinal island and the rewrite realigned the Army with sister service, joint, and allied doctrine that had retained the concept of command and control. Finally, the Army had an opportunity. We were planning to consolidate ADPs and ADRPs anyway.

The problem in the Army wasn’t understanding the difference between a CPOF, using mission orders and intent to get things done, and tasks and processes needed to produce orders. The problem was that we misunderstood the philosophy. Most commonly, leaders interpreted mission command as a hands-off approach to let subordinates figure it out. Mission command was decentralized command and control.