U.S. Army photo by Markeith Horace, July 16th 2019
As a Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Observer Coach/Trainer (OC/T), I have come to observe a trend. In a cursory glance of archived Warfighter Exercise (WFX) bulletins, which synthesize OC/T observations over the course of an exercise year into more generalized trends, I was alarmed at how similar each annual publication read. Why was this, and what’s the problem? Are all the formations in the Army similarly flawed? Moreover, is everybody simply wrong? Unfortunately, the answer to this isn’t simple.
Perhaps the problem isn’t the competence of our Army, but rather the efficacy of our doctrine and the structure of our training. Think about it this way. If a teacher has 100 students, and 100 students fail the final exam, or receive an “F” on their report card, who is at fault? The 100 students? Or the teacher? In any reasonable situation, most of us would offer the teacher has some explaining to do. In the same quick glance of archived bulletins, one can see the locus of control is completely external. How can we continue to assess the shortfalls of our Army staffs, so simply and consistently, without pivoting inward and looking at ourselves as the source of problems? I offer that our units are merely following the Army playbook (doctrine). If the playbook isn’t working, maybe it’s time to draft a new one or consider serious revisions. To improve the performance of our units, we must look at how we author doctrine and change the way we execute WFXs for Army staffs above the Brigade Combat Team Echelon.
Doctrine is important. It provides a vision, unifies action, and standardizes language. It is necessary, but at times it can be too complex. Many will suggest doctrine is inflexible, inconsistent, and sometimes even incomprehensible. I suggest there’s simply too much of it. Ever peruse Army pubs? It’s overwhelming and even circuitous (several times doctrine will reference you to external pubs, which will then refer you to a different pub). It’s the type of vortex madmen appreciate. French Philosopher Blaise Pascal is credited with saying “if I had more time I would’ve written a shorter letter” (or maybe it was Abraham Lincoln), but then again, he was never an Army doctrine writer.
Our doctrine can quickly encumber leaders and stymie creativity. Staffs approach doctrine as if it were a checklist or an Easter egg hunt — trying to hit every step or collect as many doctrinal eggs as possible before moving onto the next task. This creates a “missing the forest for the trees” type dilemma, and can often create staff stove pipes as staffs pursue task accomplishment. As a result, you will frequently read in Army bulletins that staffs ‘do not understand their roles and responsibilities,’ and thus the recommended fix is reference an Army pub and “capture duties roles and responsibilities in unit SOPs.” This sounds alarmingly simple, and is thereby suspect. Are we to believe units really don’t understand their duties, roles, and responsibilities, and it is so problematic that multiple units experience the exact same issue over a years-long time horizon? And if such is true, then does that problem reside with the training unit or with the broader Army? Or have we over-burdened our staffs with doctrine that often minimally contributes to mission accomplishment and success, while stunting collaboration and creativity? Look no further than an echelon above Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT) battle rhythm. You will quickly notice it is full of working groups, decision briefs and boards, and numerous commander touchpoints at varying echelons – all prescribed in ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organizations. This overcrowded battle rhythm minimizes the staff’s ability to collaborate and think critically.
What our doctrine is missing here is a sanity check. Is this all really necessary and sustainable? Or are we building the rules for a game nobody can win? We must take action to limit the voluminous works of doctrine to force ourselves to boil it down to basics. Identify what is necessary, then CUT CUT CUT. Unencumber units and stimulate creativity. We can acknowledge some areas where we cannot compromise form or rigidity, but in others we can assume necessary risk and encourage junior leaders to creatively solve complex problems. This is addition by subtraction.
Next, I believe we must change the way we conduct WFXs. We often believe experiential success in training events like Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations or WFXs will beget future success in similar events, when leaders move onward and upward in rank and position. This simply isn’t true. The Army, and the broader National Security enterprise, is too dynamic to reverse this fallacy. We must craft complex, dynamic scenarios that challenge our staffs and leaders in unique and unforeseen ways. The Army often totes the importance of being flexible and dynamic in order to operate in the context of uncertainty. However, a WFX, much like a CTC rotation, is fairly predictable, and there is frequently enough staff experience at echelon to share learning and subsequently ease the burden of the exercise. Many factors not explained here affect the way the Army executes WFXs, however, if we want to completely challenge our staffs and create meaningful leader development opportunities ripe with difficult problems, we should carefully look at changing the construct. We should make WFXs no notice Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs) for all participating units. Units should deploy into contested environments, with a full complement of OC/Ts for observation, and should staff unique and complex national security problems that challenge the entirety of the staff (fires, intel, and sustainment usually absorb the brunt of WFX burdens).These problems should vary with each rotation to prevent sharing between training units and to similarly challenge the MCTP cohort to think broadly and critically as they design scenarios (perhaps supporting GCCs in framing existing or emergent OPLANS). OC/Ts could then generate more diverse and meaningful annual training observations that serve to capture and share learning. While restructuring the existing WFX framework would require significant work at multiple echelons of command, and would be rife with challenges and dilemmas I cannot completely forecast at the moment, it would facilitate more complete and authentic leader development and complex problem solving, which would help leaders navigate complicated environments in the future.
I acknowledge this may bring about more questions than answers. There are likely many unforeseen personnel, equipment, and resource issues I cannot begin to address in this assessment that has bearing on the possibility of implementing the proposed solutions. However, I firmly stand on the belief that the Army must look inward and think critically about how it authors doctrine and structures WFXs to challenge Army Staffs. If we do not address the issue, we can look forward to years of the same annual training bulletins and observed trends, with no meaningful variance or learning. These generalized assessments will do little to advance the development of future leaders and Army staffs.
Subscribe to The Field Grade Leader!
MAJ Zagursky is a movement and maneuver OC/T at the Mission Command Training Program in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. An infantry officer, he has served in IBCTs (ABN), and SBCTs, with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. He completed his KD time in 1/503rd IN (ABN), 173rd IBCT.