Published towards the end of the Cold War, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May is a classic book worth revisiting by the current generation of military planners. Neustadt and May use historical case studies, ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Swine Flu Scare of 1976, to illustrate how a more reflective and systematic approach can help decision-makers and their staffs use history more effectively.[1] Most military planners are familiar with the cautionary suggestion to first understand what the problem is; the techniques offered in Thinking in Time echo this sentiment as they focus on “sharpening the picture of the present situation and for clarifying what is of concern about it.”[2] Some of the techniques or “mini-methods” as Neustadt and May refer to their recommended best practices, can help refine planning methods or processes, and improve the situational understanding for a planning team or decision-maker. Rather than serve as a book review, this piece intends to introduce some of Neustadt and May’s methods most relevant to military planners to pique the interest of those who may seek out this seminal work for professional development.

Neustadt and May urge practitioners to “disassemble ‘now,’ the situation at the moment,” as the first step in analyzing a problem.[3] They suggest an admittedly elementary first step—take apart and define the situation by separating the Known from the Unclear and the Presumed.[4] For military planners, this concept should sound familiar, as it echoes one of the actions of Mission Analysis during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), that of identifying Facts and Assumptions. According to Neustadt and May, this basic but necessary step is “nothing but an injunction to get the facts straight before acting;” physically listing out the Known from the Unclear and the Presumed grounds the situation and focuses on matters of evidence.[5] Separating the key elements of a situation into Known, Unknown, and Presumed puts attention on the mission at hand, and can help stave off the question of “what to do.” Instead, it encourages the initial thinking to focus on answering, “what is the problem.”[6]

When faced with a complicated or complex problem, planners and analysts often turn to history to inform their efforts. While history should inform contemporary planning and decision making, Neustadt and May offer a warning to guard against the “seductive influence of an analogy.”[7] This does not mean that one shouldn’t use historical analysis; rather, it is a reminder to not use history as a shortcut for analysis. When benefitting from historical examples, those examples must be put in context. The simplified way that the authors recommend to do this is to list out likenesses and differences between supposedly analogous situations to “compare “now” with “then” before turning to what “should be done now.”[8] The real benefit of this simple exercise is taking one more step, and stratifying the likenesses and differences for historical events, comparing locales, the geopolitical context, the domestic situation, and current military threats. They use the example of President Truman’s instinctive references to seemingly similar events of his life in response to the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea: Truman recalled the Manchurian Incident of 1931-32, Italy’s 1935 aggression against Ethiopia, and the 1938 Anschluss and made his decisions influenced by these analogies. However, if we compare the likenesses and differences for these events in the context of the immediate locale and political context, the global security environment, and domestic politics—the differences become more glaring. As Neustadt and May repeatedly demonstrate—with analogies, context is king.

Issue History: Three Techniques

Once the situation is “tolerably clear,” Neustadt and May suggest the routine use of three techniques to help inform objectives.[9] Their three techniques—the Goldberg Method, timelines, and journalists’ questions, are easy approaches that can help define what they refer to as “issue history.” Issue history holds great utility in defining or framing desired future states because, as the authors write, “…looking back at past realities suggests the limitations on some future possibilities.”[10] The recognition of what may be impossible to attain, and what is possible (and at what cost), can aid in selecting objectives.[11] In short, what has failed in the past, may fail again; what has succeeded, may work still—however, the opposite may also prove true. Like much of what Thinking in Time advocates for, the best way forward has as much to do with the current context, as it does history.

The three devices (recommended for adoption for routine use) for using issue history to inform the desired future state unfold beginning with the Goldberg Method. The Goldberg Method, named after its inspiration, Avram Goldberg—former CEO of the New England grocery store Stop and Shop, is premised on one of his managerial techniques. Rather than asking a manager “what is the problem,” Goldberg would ask them to “tell me the story.”[12] While pausing to ask what the problem is before acting is always preferable, Goldberg’s request to hear the story, not just the current problem, is the first step to make sure that understanding the current obstacle is placed in context.  Next, use a timeline, beginning with the earliest date that seems to be significant. Placing dates on a timeline gives us the “when” of traditional journalists’ questions: “when, where, what, who, how, and why?”[13] While not all of these may be answerable, these easy steps can help identify the trends influencing the current problem, and the particulars. These techniques help set things in context, and remind the planner of “what got us here.”[14]

Conclusion

As Neustadt and May assure the reader, their work is “not a history book.” At its core, the book is about “how to use experience, whether remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today about the prospect for tomorrow.”[15] Their suggested methods can help ground planners or a planning team and force them to consider their particular problem in the context of larger events, guard against the misuse of analogy, and focus on understanding a problem before attempting to act on solutions. As Harvard political science professors, Neustadt and May are certainly qualified to state that “good political judgment rests, we suspect, on historical understanding,” but it is a sentiment that applies to all decision-makers, not just politicians.[16] Neustadt and May emphasize approaches that can enable planners, analysts, and decision-makers how to best use history while avoiding the misuse of history, making Thinking in Time a timeless work for practitioners.

MAJ Rick Chersicla is currently a Strategic Planner at USARNORTH. An Army Strategist (FA59), he is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the School of Advanced Military Studies, and Fordham University. This article reflects his views and not those of the Department of Defense or the United States Army.

[1] Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, “Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Makers,” (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 2.

[2] Ibid, 91.

[3] Ibid, 37.

[4] Ibid, 37.

[5] Ibid, 37-38.

[6] Ibid, 235.

[7] Ibid, 58.

[8] Ibid, 41.

[9] Ibid, 235.

[10] Ibid, 236.

[11] Ibid, 236-237.

[12] Ibid, 106.

[13] Ibid, 106-107.

[14] Ibid, 106.

[15] Ibid, xxii.

[16] Ibid, 195.