We have all heard the ubiquitous saying that causes most of us to slap our foreheads in a mixture of shame, dread, and loathed acceptance: “I spend 90% of my time on the bottom 10% of my people.” Our admitted dilemma centers on the sense that there is a population that requires so much direction and maintenance that their presence is detrimental to the whole.  With this acceptance is the underlying assumption that that top 90% can make up for the performance of the bottom 10%.  In the current military paradigm, this assumption is not only not pragmatic, but it is also dangerous. 

The increasing threat from potential opponents’ militaries makes accepting a theoretical substandard 10 out of every 100 detrimental to mission accomplishment.  In addition, the way the US military is developing for future conflicts places an even greater focus on the talents of the whole unit, thus it can no longer accept individuals not providing a synergistic capability to succeed. It is necessary to effectively change the phrase to a more balanced “I spend 10% of my time on the bottom 10%.”  Leaders must develop all individuals and, while there will always be a bottom tier in any organization, a focused effort of education and training can enable this formerly unloved cohort to contribute to unit success and US strategic goals.   

Why should we raise the capabilities of every service member above the traditional norm?  It is because the US capability to operate un-contested around the world is no longer guaranteed.  Other militaries are becoming better equipped, organized, and trained.{1}  The once–large margin of performance between the US military and everyone else is eroding, and we may soon be faced with the most undesirable of prospects: a fair fight without superior talent as an advantage. How are we, the military, to combat this new reality?  According to the National Defense Strategy; two desired key capabilities are critical: {1} 

1:) Joint lethality in contested environments: The Joint Force must be able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection platforms. This will include capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in complex terrain. 

2:) Forward force maneuver and posture resilience: Investments will prioritize ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack. 

The expectation of our total force is that we will become more adaptive, independent, and quick reacting.  This allows the US military a great deal of flexibility and lethality if it is something it can train and equip towards.  As a bellwether of how this may be accomplished, we look to the Marines and its current Commandant, Gen David Berger.  It is the Commandant’s current recommendation that the Marines shrink in total size, budget for new types of warfighting technology, and still maintain the current level of capability.  This new philosophy does not allow for much flexibility in the way of substandard performance from individuals{2}.  With the strategic expectation that units need to be more independent from centralized decision making and with the top leadership placing more responsibility on every individual, the allowance for an underperforming segment of warfighters is now an antiquated practice.  The capacity to not have every Soldier/Airmen/Sailor/Marine meet expectations is disappearing. 

To the demands of this new strategy we, as leaders and commanders, must reframe how we view our subordinates.  Instead of accepting the idea of a “bottom 10%” as an unalterable reality, it is better to view current underperformers as individuals with untapped potential.  There are real-life examples of how this can be accomplished. The Norwegian prison system offers us a clear example and—if we put aside the initial skepticism of comparing Norwegian criminals to US warfighters—we can draw parallels to how it is possible to raise the standard of performance from a population previously considered undesirable.  In Norway, prisoners receive education, counseling, and mentorship.  It is a tailored effort meant to rehabilitate and train individuals to benefit society once released.  The main effort is to fill the education, expectations, and behavioral gaps experienced by the individual prior to entering the system.  The result has been one of the lowest recidivism rates in the world at 20%, with inmates leaving the system for good and becoming productive members of society.{3}  To be clear, this paper’s purpose is not to critique penal systems; rather, it is to show that a focused methodology of education, training, and mentorship makes it possible to re-educate and incentivize a population of individuals to perform better.  

The idea that there is an unavoidable detrimental bottom tier is false.   Prior to dismissing a subordinate as a perpetual slow swimmer, it is better to ask if it is possible to make this individual the best asset to the unit as possible.  At the risk of sounding colloquial, it is our job to develop all members of a unit to the point that we do not require the strong swimmers to prevent the slower swimmers from drowning.  To extend the analogy, the slowest swimmers can and should only be a half–stroke behind the quickest.   

I have often witnessed leaders refusing to allow subordinates to remain less than stellar, and with excellent results.  I worked with an intelligence officer that recognized several of his subordinates had poor writing abilities.  As a result, he needed to QC all issues for grammatical errors and substance problems for materials published on a weekly basis, and this unit produced a large amount of information. Instead of berating his subordinates, he recognized their performance was a product of education, or rather lack thereof, and not a product of poor ability. He created an English user guide specific to the unit’s mission and taught critical thinking and writing classes to those that needed extra help.  The result was that within six months the unit won several awards for briefing abilities and research, and his workload drastically reduced as his subordinates began to gain in ability and confidence while taking on more responsibility.  

As a shift supervisor, I similarly leveraged my educational background to obtain the certificates necessary to counsel several of the airmen in my unit facing financial issues, thus enabling them to retain their security clearances and continue with the mission.  Despite these examples, and our basic urge to do so, being a good leader does not always mean being the sole resource for a top-notch soldier in the making.  Across the DOD, there are resources available to all personnel.  Do you have a soldier who thinks a little slow on his or her feet? There is a course for that. {4}{5}  Do you have airmen in financial trouble and it is affecting daily job performance?  There are professionals for this. {6} Do you have a sailor that is otherwise solid but has issues dealing with stress?  There are counselors for this.{7}  

An almost inexhaustible amount of help for the myriad of issues an individual may encounter exists and these resources are free to the individual.  Yes, it will take some additional work at the outset.  No, this is not a recommendation to punt all the problems of your unit to a paid professional.  Yes, follow up is expected to gain situational awareness on improvement and in general to show you care.  No, life will not be perfect, and individuals will still have shortcomings.  Yes, you will have a stronger cadre of individuals and the unit will benefit.  The message here should be clear: even though we are faced with an ever-more complicated mission set that requires more of the individual, the DOD has provided the resources to aid individual improvement.  The failure and success in taking advantage of these resources ultimately reside with leadership. 

The role of the military leader is not going to get easier.  As technology develops, the speed of change increases, the demands of government shift, and the need for an ever more intelligent and responsive military force become more urgent.  The ability of the top–tier to overcome the drag of the bottom–tier will no longer be enough to defeat the enemy.  The plausible solution to this dilemma is to permanently reduce the number of “under performers” to effectively zero and, in doing so, simply have a group of “performers.”  Leaders must leverage the resources and talents around them to improve the unit by strengthening the weakest within the ranks.  The external threats to the US and the resulting strategies demand a different level of performance that raises the bar for every person in uniform.  If, as a leader, you cannot configure a path to help those under you perform and if you accept underachievers to be forever substandard, then you put the effectiveness of the greater strategic mission in jeopardy and contribute to putting others at greater risk.  Now, more than ever, you can use this unique leadership position to affect the needed change of those beneath you. 

Maj Richart is currently serving as an instructor pilot and Safety Officer at the United States Air Force Academy.  An Air Force pilot, he has operational experience with various aircraft including C-130s, MC-12s, and remotely-piloted aircraft in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa.  His most recent experience in operations was as the Detachment Commander for the 432 WG, Jalalabad Afghanistan in support of JTF Operations. These views are his own and do not reflect the opinion of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Air Force. 

{1} https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf 

{2} https://www.defenseone.com/feature/state-of-defense-2020/#marines 

{3} https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/blog/norway-benefits-from-rehabilitation-while-australia-lags-behind/ 

{4} https://www.goarmyed.com/public/public_programs_services-fast.aspx 

{5} https://www.army.mil/article/216153/class_focuses_on_improving_reading_math_gt_scores 

{6} https://www.afpc.af.mil/Benefits-and-Entitlements/Financial-Readiness/ 

{7} https://www.militaryonesource.mil/confidential-help/non-medical-counseling 

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