This is Part 2 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted article with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Operationalized Multi-Echelon Training

Time is a finite resource and units cannot simply add requirements to training calendars that are already overloaded. Increasing lethality and the ability of ABCTs to synchronize all WfFs requires multi-echelon training with clearly defined objectives and outcomes. During a properly designed company live-fire certification, an infantry company—the primary training audience— will train on all of its assigned METs. Additionally, that training event provides an opportunity for the parent battalion to establish its own Main Command Post (CP), Tactical Command Post (TAC), Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP), and Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) while validating current operations functions at each node. The company has an opportunity to deploy its CP and company trains. By evaluating the infantry company on its performance while receiving a Logistics Package (LOGPAC) at a Logistics Release Point (LRP) during a service station resupply, the distribution platoon and Forward Support Company (FSC) for the battalion can demonstrate proper tactics and validate their SOPs. The brigade trains the Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) and Fire Support Element (FSE) on managing airspace and de-conflicting fires by incorporating lift aviation, attack aviation, artillery, mortars, Shadow Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), and Raven UAS into the company live fire. Sappers from the Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) participate and integrate into the company by conducting a combined arms breach. By executing all of these events at the same time, the ABCT builds readiness and lethality across multiple echelons in one training event.

Opportunities for multi-echelon training extend beyond the organic ABCT. Despite the robust capabilities housed within the ABCT, it depends on numerous enabling capabilities. All units in the brigade must efficiently integrate attachments and detach elements to other units. Battalions and companies need enabling capabilities, and they will only integrate them successfully through repetition and training. In a company live-fire, a Military Police (MP) company from the corps MP brigade can certify their squads and train several of their own METs. By attaching an MP squad to each Company and using a supporting CAB to add role players as Internally Displaced Persons, the MPs can train their squads on performing route regulation enforcement, conducting roadblocks and checkpoints, and performing civil disturbance control to enable the Infantry Company as it clears the objective. By adding detainees on the objective, that same MP squad can train on receiving detainees and conducting Detainee Collection Point (DCP) operations. This opens up opportunities to train the Brigade’s Military Intelligence Company on HUMINT operations at a Detainee Collection Point. Training objectives should be discussed early in the exercise design and through multiple iterations of commander dialogue during training meetings and between staff at MDMP. All available enabling capabilities, assets, and echelons should develop specific training objectives to enable them to orient on the tasks they are training.

The value of this example is that the training is operationalized for all units in a way that replicates how they actually fight. The MP squad links in with the rifle company while the company executes Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs). The infantry company exercises the enabler integration checklist in their TACSOP and assigns a leader to supervise that integration while preparing for the mission. The MP squad obtains the infantry company’s radio frequencies and loads their radios with the same COMSEC fill to communicate on the battlefield. To do this, the brigade COMSEC account must account for attachments and assign them frequencies on the Brigade Signal Operating Instructions (SOI). The infantry company includes the MP squad in their headcount to ensure they have adequate food. The infantry company Field Maintenance Team (FMT) identifies what unique equipment the MPs have that they do not have resources to repair or recover. The company XO ensures the parent battalion adds the MP’s equipment into Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A). The battalion S4 includes the MP’s ammunition in their forecast and ensures the FSC distributes it. All of these seemingly small details require repetition and practice to get right. They are not trained with virtual or constructive training and if units do not execute these tasks routinely to standard, they will fail.

These generalized examples help frame the problem but do not provide unit commanders or staff with a starting place for building training plans that prepare them for combat. Ultimately, the training outlined in the CATS and TC 3-20.0, Integrated Weapons Training Strategy, is a necessary guideline, but not sufficient to ensure ABCTs prepare to fight and win during Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). During the course of an 18-month ABCT Training progression, there are multiple opportunities to conduct multi-echelon training and integrate external enablers during crew gunnery, Lethality Validation Exercises (LVEs), platoon LFXs, company LFXs / Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises (CALFEXs), and brigade Field Training Exercises (FTXs). The following will help commanders visualize and enable staff to operationalize opportunities for building lethality.

Tough, Realistic Training

Seven years after returning to focus on LSCO, Army units have made significant strides in building and maintaining readiness and lethality at the individual trooper, crew, platoon, and company level. However, units struggle to bring all of the capabilities in their formations to bear. Tank platoons conduct satisfactory fire and maneuver of their platforms, but they struggle to conduct resupply operations to standard or synchronize fires with maneuver against the enemy in training. Battalions struggle to maintain Fully Mission Capable (FMC) combat platforms while deployed to the field. Against a threat with Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) detection and denial capabilities, companies do not understand their own electromagnetic signature, do not have adequate SOPs to mitigate the size of that signature, and do not know how to execute the battle drills in their SOPs. Battalions struggle to conduct the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) effectively or efficiently, and field grade leaders drown when they attempt to supervise simultaneous planning and current operations efforts. Across the ABCT, units struggle to establish effective CPs and sustainment nodes, appropriately position key leaders, route fire missions from scouts in Observation Posts (OPs) back to artillery over High Frequency (HF) or Frequency Modulation (FM) communications, and generally struggle to synchronize the capabilities resident in the ABCT at the pace that LSCO demands.

Below is an outline of an ABCT training template, including ways in which the IRONHORSE BCT incorporates divisional enablers, corps separate brigade capabilities, joint capabilities, and the interagency into training as a model to assist other ABCTs.  A suitable template assumes 12 months for an ABCT to prepare for a deployment to the National Training Center. However, this timeframe varies from eight to sixteen months and will be determined by external requirements.

Figure 3: The 1CD Brigade Training Template used as a DOCTEMP for a BCT’s Training Progression (Unredacted version available on MilSuite)

The 1CD Brigade Training template is effective as a DOCTEMP for training, but every BCT’s training progression must overlay on top of the circumstances of the BCT. Deployments, Combined Training Center (CTC) rotations, major taskings (CTC support, Cadet Summer Training (CST) / Deployment Readiness Exercises (DREs), etc), and budgetary constraints all impact the training progression. The transition of personnel under the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM), combined with summer and winter move cycles, results in high levels of leader and Trooper turnover. Brigade and battalion leaders must analyze the impacts of these transitions on unit certifications as outlined in TC 3-20.0, Integrated Weapons Training Strategy, as they place training events in the calendar.

Before beginning the training plan, the commander and staff must forecast the impacts that taskings and personnel turnover have to their training plan and mitigate those impacts through coordination with the G3 and Division Commander. Transitions, taskings, and other timelines may result in a determination that a training progression that includes a brigade FTX prior to an NTC rotation is too ambitious. In such a case, the Brigade Commander should consider what echelon of training he should attain. Fewer, high-quality training events far exceed “check the block” training. Regardless of what level a brigade trains to, the following principles and best practices apply to all training design.

The 1CD Brigade Training Model offers an effective template for sequencing events to enable an ABCT to train to win in LSCO. By understanding and adapting this model to a brigade’s specific requirements, BCTs can frame, plan, and resource a training progression months in advance. This planning and resourcing include outreach to corps separate enabling brigades (especially engineer brigades, fires brigades, chemical brigades, air defense brigades, and military police brigades), the supporting Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS), nearby fighter and bomber wings, Expeditionary Cyber Teams (ECTs), and others that may provide enabling capabilities to tactical formations. Frequently, those units are planning their own training that overlays in time with the ABCT, and by reaching out and discussing training objectives, all units leave better trained for roughly the same cost. The brigade must initiate this coordination at least six months before training events and set a series of IPRs for all units to agree to train objectives, resource requirements, and the design of the training event.

Continue the conversation on Twitter (#CAVLethal)!

Disclaimer

This series is a fusion of doctrine and regulations with the authors’ experience in training and warfighting. It does not constitute the official position of FORSCOM, TRADOC, the Army, or the Department of Defense.

COL Michael Schoenfeldt is the Commander of the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 23 years of experience as an Army Officer including Tank Platoon Leader, Tank Company Commander, Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer, Brigade Executive Officer, and Combined Arms Battalion Commander. He can be reached at michael.d.schoenfeldt.mil@mail.mil.

MAJ Patrick Stallings is currently the Cavalry Squadron Operations Trainer at the National Training Center and was the Brigade S3 for the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 15 years of experience as an Army Officer including Armored Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, and Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer. He can be reached at michael.p.stallings4.mil@mail.mil.

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full-page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 2: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.

This is Part 1 of an 8 Part Series. The full and unredacted paper with all enclosures is available on Milsuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

Preface

Cavalry – The cavalry soldier must consider his horse as a part of himself, and the perfect management of the horse cannot be learned either in schools or in a few weeks of practice. If daily exercises are dispensed with, both horse and man return to their natural state, and such mounted men cease to be efficient… Cavalry is indispensable in time of war. It will always take a leading part in pursuing a retreating enemy; it is the proper arm of ordinary reconnaissances; it will always serve as eclaireurs, and as escorts, and should, in the present state of war, carry carbines and be prepared for service on foot. It is weakened and destroyed in a country without forage. Its first cost, its constant maintenance, the defects of its employment, and the system of providing horses make it expensive; but it ought nevertheless to be maintained in a complete state, for its art can only be exercised by men and horses that are properly instructed.

Cavalry Tactics – The individual instruction of men and horses should be regarded as the most important point of the whole system, and should be as simple as possible; the man should be taught to manage his horse with ease and address over all kinds of ground and at all gaits, to swim rivers, to go through certain gymnastic exercise – such as vaulting, cutting heads, to fence, to fire very frequently at a mark, and to handle his weapon with accuracy and effect at all gaits, and in all situations… Insist upon the sabre being kept sharp in the field, provide the men the means of doing so, and lay it down that the strength of the cavalry is in the “spurs and sabre.”

From Military Dictionary: Comprising Technical Definitions; Information on Raising and Keeping Troops; Actual Service; and Law, Government Regulation, and Administration Relating to Land Forces,

by Colonel H.L. Scott, USA, 1861.

Introduction

This article describes how the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (BCT) employs the 1^st Cavalry Division’s Training Template to train the formation from individual Troopers to the brigade level. Doctrine tells us WHAT to train and why it is important, but this paper lays out HOW to make training effective and make your brigade lethal with all of its capabilities converging on the enemy. This template builds lethality by integrating all Warfighting Functions (WfFs) into multi-echelon training events. These assist commanders, brigade and battalion staff, operations sergeants major, and command sergeants major in training their formations with lethal individuals, crews, squads, platoons, and companies that can fight and win. Commanders visualize and communicate their vision for the training progression to enable the staff to operationalize training management and synchronize all WfFs in multi-echelon training events. This is the only way to achieve readiness and lethality in a time and budget-constrained environment. Ultimately, this template helps commanders, S3s, XOs, and staff plan and resource a cohesive training progression to bring all warfighting functions together.

Commanders owe their Troopers effective training plans that build readiness and lethality by maximizing the training value of each training event. Effective training that builds formations capable of fighting and winning in combat is a critical dimension of caring for Troopers and their families; resourcing effective training must begin months ahead of time with a clear and cohesive training template. Below are the three most critical principles for maximizing the lethality and training outcomes of training:

1) Vision: Develop and communicate a clear and commonly understood vision of how the brigade fights including which leaders have responsibility for training and running Command and Control (C2) and sustainment nodes.

2) Operationalized, Multi-Echelon Training: Maximize the use of multi-echelon training; every echelon should have training objectives that train all WfFs during all training events. If a C2 node or sustainment node deploys to the field then the responsible leader must train the node as though it is the primary training audience.

3) Tough, Realistic Training: Certifying training events are tough and realistic crucibles that replicate fighting against peer threats. Training must push formations to their limits while allowing time for quality After Action Reviews (AAR) and retraining. Not all leaders are up to the rigors of combat; replace leaders who cannot meet standards or quit.

Mission Essential Tasks (METs) and the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) do not readily provide a training glide path that prepares the brigade to fight. The BCT is currently the lowest echelon combat formation capable of deployment with self-sustaining capabilities in all WfFs. BCTs must serve as the cornerstone from which subordinate commanders and staff anchor their training plans. This series shows you how to train in a narrative format with all of the supporting references, templates, and graphics included in the enclosures.

How We Fight

Ideally, Commanders have an opportunity to evaluate their units and forge a common understanding of how the unit operates before beginning the training progression. Approximately 4,200 personnel work in an ABCT from 141 Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and Areas of Concentration (AOCs) with a variety of experience levels and familiarity operating in their assigned duties. The ABCT, cavalry squadron, Combined Arms Battalions (CABs), a field artillery battalion, Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB), and Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) are all complex organizations with their own systems. Proper integration of these battalions adds an additional layer of complexity and requires directive guidance about primary responsibility, expectations during execution, and standards for execution.

Brigade and Battalion Commanders must develop and communicate a common understanding of how the BCT fights and how the battalions operate together. The brigade fight is primarily in shaping the deep area with the cavalry squadron, field artillery battalion, and Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) capabilities. Even though shaping deep is the primary fight, the brigade must also synchronize actions in the close area to enable CABs to fight and win. Finally, the brigade must assign responsibility for nodes in the support area, resource the BEB with appropriate combat power to secure the support area, and build functional sustainment and maintenance systems to preserve the brigade’s combat power over an extended distance.

The BCT commander must assign leader responsibility for C2 and sustainment nodes, including which leaders are responsible for training and executing critical organizational functions. Unfortunately, the Sustainable Readiness Model, Summer / Winter move cycles, TC 3-20.0 Integrated Weapons Training Strategy requirements for certifications at echelon, leader moves for career progressions, major taskings such as Cadet Summer Training, and deployments result in a constant state of personnel transition at the BCT.

The brigade must generate a Leader Professional Development (LPD) program that educates and reinforces how the BCT fights as its Combat Leader University. The Combat Leader University also allows the brigade to achieve buy-in from battalion commanders, CSMs, field grade officers, company commanders, first sergeants, warrant officers, and staff officers on various plays on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Additionally, the Combat Leader University provides commanders an opportunity to clarify ambiguities in node responsibilities that exist in doctrine and assign those responsibilities to specific leaders. Ultimately, the BCT will not succeed without buy-in and a common understanding of roles and responsibilities. The first discussions at the Combat Leader University must begin shortly after taking command.

Figure 1: How We Fight diagram showing a basic battlefield geometry and the positions and responsibilities of key leaders at Command and Control (C2) and sustainment nodes.

The Playbook

Figure 2: An example Playbook Play for Movement to Contact

The Playbook is a powerful tool for communicating how the commander visualizes fighting the brigade. While the Playbook does not relieve the staff of requirements to conduct the operations process or complete a detailed plan, it enables leaders across the brigade to understand how their formations fit into the brigade fight. Doctrine provides the baseline for the Playbook. However, the Playbook synthesizes different governing doctrine, including FM 3-96 The Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90-1 Offense and Defense, FM 3-90-2 Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, ATP 3-09.42 Fire Support for the BCT, ATP 4-90 Brigade Support Battalion, with the commander’s experience and expertise.

Initially, developing The Playbook removes the abstractions and ambiguity that exist in doctrine by enabling leaders in all units in the brigade to visualize how their specific unit fits into the fight. In training and combat, the Playbook enables leaders across the BCT to initiate movement whenever a new play is called, minimizes ambiguity during transitions, greatly expedites communications between units, and enables efficient C2. Efficient C2 is especially important in an Operational Environment (OE) without permissive upper or lower tactical infrastructure between headquarters. A quintessential tool, The Playbook is a visual guide for leaders to reference, revise over the course of the training progression, and discuss during Leader Professional Development (LPD) sessions.

Let us hear your thoughts and continue the conversation on Twitter using #CAVLethal!

Disclaimer

This series is a fusion of doctrine and regulations with the authors’ experience in training and warfighting. It does not constitute the official position of FORSCOM, TRADOC, the Army, or the Department of Defense.

COL Michael Schoenfeldt is the Commander of the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 23 years of experience as an Army Officer including Tank Platoon Leader, Tank Company Commander, Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer, Brigade Executive Officer, and Combined Arms Battalion Commander. He can be reached at michael.d.schoenfeldt.mil@mail.mil.

MAJ Patrick Stallings is currently the Cavalry Squadron Operations Trainer at the National Training Center and was the Brigade S3 for the IRONHORSE Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT, 1CD) with 15 years of experience as an Army Officer including Armored Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, and Cavalry Squadron Executive Officer. He can be reached at michael.p.stallings4.mil@mail.mil.

Special credits to the following personnel who made invaluable contributions to this paper:

LTC Rich Groen, Commander, 1-7 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Neil Hollenbeck, Commander, 2-5 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Steve Jackowski, Commander, 2-8 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Ron Sprang, Commander, 2-12 CAV, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Nick Dvonch, Commander, 1-82 FA, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC John Ordonio, Commander, 91 BEB, 1ABCT, 1CD

LTC Stacy Moore, Commander, 115 BSB, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ Brian Bifulco, Brigade XO, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ George Gordon, Brigade FSO, 1ABCT, 1CD and 1-82 FA Artillery BN XO

MAJ Josh Schulz, Brigade S2, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ Chad Lorenz, Brigade S2, 1ABCT, 1CD

MAJ Randy Donathan, Brigade S6, 1ABCT, 1CD and Brigade XO, 7^th Signal Brigade

MAJ Bernie Mabini, Battalion XO, 2-5 CAV (2-5 CAV Embedded Graphics)

MAJ CJ Wonsettler, Battalion XO, 2-12 CAV (2-12 CAV Embedded Graphics)

MAJ Tommy Sacchieri, Brigade XO, 3ABCT, 1CD (1CD Brigade Standard Training Model)

MAJ Bo Olsen, Squadron XO, 1-7 CAV (1CD Brigade Standard Training Model Whitepaper)

CPT Alex Forman, Brigade Planner, 1ABCT, 1CD

CPT Raymond Leroux, Brigade Planner, 1ABCT, 1CD

CPT Erica Ndlovu, Brigade Adjutant, 1ABCT, 1CD (Editor)

The full paper and files below are available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/abct-training

• Embedded Charts (includes full-page slides of each figure in this paper)
• IRONHORSE Playbook
• 1CD Brigade Training Model Information Paper.docx
• DA Big 12
• Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

5A) Crew Gunnery Administrative OPORD Brief (IRONHORSE Smoothbore)

• Platoon LFX and CALFEX Administrative OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury)
• Wet Gap Crossing Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase 0)
• CALFEX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury Phase I – IV)
• CALFEX OC Packet Example
• FCX Tactical OPORD (IRONHORSE Fury 2.0)
• Brigade FTX Administrative OPORD

The post Part 1: Got Shock? How to Train your Brigade for Lethality and Winning in Large Scale Combat Operations appeared first on The Field Grade Leader.

I forget what time it was, but it was dark, and we had finally gotten the semblance of a TOC established “in the box” after a long day leaving the RUBA. I was trying to account for the trail of equipment scattered along the route when the wind picked up – somehow the Ops Group was able to conjure up a dust storm just in time for our push through the “whale’s gap.”  I could not help thinking to myself that this was just the beginning.

The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are a crucible experience that field grade officers either get results or get exposed.  They are awesome experiences for company-grade leaders, yet home station training can replicate many of those operational environments.  It is at the field grade level that organizations endure stresses at scales that are difficult to reproduce elsewhere.

The purpose of this essay is to offer my insights from a recent rotation at the National Training Center (NTC).  I witnessed events from the perspective of the battalion executive officer of 1^st Battalion, 64^th Armor Regiment.  I will use the lens of nine NTC goals that I gave my organization across three lines of effort: Operations, Sustainment, and the Staff.  I endeavored to make the goals sound simple but represent difficult systems that would enable a successful rotation.  In hindsight, we did not reach any of these goals, yet had a highly successful rotation.  The accomplishment of these goals was not as important as the process we took to try and accomplish them. Most of these goals should drive home station training—you cannot “fix” large organizations once you reach the crucible.  I believe these to all to be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound, but in the laboratory of the CTCs, you will realize attaining them to be just out of reach.

Operations

Rogue Discipline – “SP On-Time!”

Most anyone that has served long enough will joke that being in the right place, time and uniform is 90% of what it takes to succeed in the Army. As depressing as that may be to the proponents of talent management, there are a lot of conditions that allow a large organization to actually move on time at echelon.  While I will touch on many of these conditions under other goals, the most important driver of this goal is the enforcement of standards and the troop leading procedures at the lowest echelon—what we referred to as “Rogue Discipline.”  Constant checks on Soldiers and equipment, routinized briefs and back briefs, and exercising disciplined initiative is required to prevent the ubiquitous “Murphy’s Law” unlucky breaks when your unit is supposed to be moving.  The truth is there are no unlucky breaks—you just failed to do the routine things routinely which resulted in failure.

“Can you Talk?” PACE Plan

Most cadets can tell you what a PACE plan is, but sadly most of our knowledge ends at reciting the acronym.  If I have four different plans to communicate with you, we should have no problem transferring information to each other, right?  Like most of these goals, I would like to meet the person that was actually able to communicate effortlessly across their formation for an entire rotation.  In fact, so many units fail to understand the enemy is jamming a particular communications platform because they just assume the equipment is not working.  A lack of competence, proficiency, and architecture is what will truly hinder the ability to execute a PACE plan.

First, there is a bewildering amount of communication platforms available to units today, which is a blessing as well as a curse.  Who can effortlessly operate FM, HF, TACSAT, JCR, JBCP, Ventrillo, or the myriad other options available? We referred to this as the hardware problem.  In reality, there are three common radio operators: the “MacGyver” that knows a little about each thing, the “expert” that is really good at setting up the HF radio, and just about everyone else; those who know just enough to change the frequency on their FM radio. Units try signal academies, radios at staff duty, or other novelties to bridge this gap, but the reality of manning cycles renders these to be short term gains.  Therefore, units end up with single points of failure to place equipment into operation.  The only remedy I can come up with to change this is culture; Refuse to allow the MacGyvers and experts to touch anything-make them use others to work on things, forcing them to be teachers rather than executors.  Working communications is more apprenticeship than anything else, and this shift may actually diffuse knowledge.

Second, there is a “software problem”. How many Soldiers can communicate effectively on each platform and utilize its true capabilities?  In the simplest form, it is the RTO in the TOC that has no idea how to actually talk on the radio or understand the meaning of transmissions they receive. In other cases, very few understand how to send data files over HF or JBCP that could contain important operational documents.  I believe you can attack this with nature and nurture.  By nature, I mean to say that new Soldiers do not belong in a TOC or headquarters.  Instead, battalions should treat these positions as broadening assignments for prospective NCOs, taking talented senior specialists that already understand downstream problems and returning them to the line as sergeants that understand higher headquarters problems.  Ranger Regiment sends future team leaders to Ranger School; BCTs need to send them to their own headquarters.  By nurture, I mean how you run your headquarters.  Force RTOs, staff soldiers, or others to run a 2-minute drill, not just the battle captain-use these moments to develop them and force them to understand what they are doing, empowering them through trust and shared understanding to take disciplined initiative when necessary.

Third, take a look at the architecture of your PACE plan.  Is it feasible?  Brigades love to rely on upper TI, but forget that battalions rarely have that asset up and running.  That leads to how people know when to go up or down the PACE chain, and what type of transmission it is.  For example, FM is on everyone’s PACE plan, but how good is that for transmitting graphics? Likewise, a VOIP phone call may be a horrible means to conduct a rehearsal.

“Rehearse, Rehearse, Rehearse!”

Rehearsals are truly the only effective means to build shared understanding prior to an operation.  Orders and back briefs are important, but useless if not rehearsed.  Units should execute an IC/Fires, CAR, and Sustainment Rehearsal prior to each operation.  In many cases, due to compacted timelines, the rehearsal is the first time that leaders are looking at a plan, and that is okay.  The alternative could be even worse.

We all aspire to avoid scripted rehearsals in order to identify friction points yet we normally devolve into reciting tasks, purposes, and other diatribes that do little to help identify the seems in our plans.  This is human nature.  For many, it is our comfort zone, and for others, it is an unconscious posturing exercise in front of our raters.  Only commanders can halt this, by immediately stopping any portions that do not affect the actions of other elements.  Otherwise the rehearsal will drag on with little actually accomplished beyond a recitation of the operations order.  Remember that formats matter-sometimes a radio rehearsal can be more effective than a large terrain model.

Sustainment

“PMCS the RIGHT way!”

The “5988 count” has become something akin to “lying to ourselves” as we focus on the metric of how many 5988s were distributed vs. collected.  This is understandable.  The actual metric we want to measure is how accurately are operators identifying faults and are we expeditiously ordering parts to keep our equipment fighting.  Unfortunately, there is not an easy metric to describe that.  The “5988 count” is what we gravitate toward, yet it only measures quantity, not quality.

The true use of the 5988 flow is to fix non-deadlining faults rather than deadlining faults.  Deadline faults will receive enough attention to get fixed without a proper 5988 flow because that combat power is lost until it gets fixed. They are like gunshot victims in the emergency room-impossible to ignore. The non-deadlining faults are what gets ignored in the absence of good maintenance-and these can metastasize into future deadlining faults over time.  So, how do we build a system that properly does this?

I argue that it takes training, time, and leader engagement. Does your formation know how to conduct proper -10 and -20 inspections of their equipment? Do your mechanics know how to identify the root causes of faults rather than simply treating symptoms? Do they and your clerks know how to find proper NSNs for ordering parts? Can your shop office track and find those parts? Can your leaders actually read their ESR and apply pressure where it indicates they need to? All these steps take time.  Our original goal was to distribute 5988s, execute PMCS, and update faults in GCSS-A every 24 hours, but I believe that goal was too ambitious if the goal is quality.  Instead, this process takes 48 hours, sometimes 72 hours depending on the environment.  Ultimately, any maintenance program that succeeds or fails will depend on how much you are able to empower Soldiers at the lowest level to take ownership of their equipment, which relies more on doing things right rather than fast in order to check a block.

“Deliberate LOGPAC”

The intent of this goal is to avoid emergency resupply missions at all costs.  We aspired to plan LOGPAC missions 72 hours out with timelines understood at the company level.  Operations are hard to plan more than 24 hours out at NTC, frustrating attempts to achieve this goal.  However, there is a rhythm to operations that can allow predictive analysis by logisticians.  This can at least allow daily changes to a plan based on new information than continually reacting each day.  Likewise, dissemination of this “shadow operational plan” is equally important as the plan to fight the enemy.  Timelines matter and everyone needs to know when the next resupply arrives.  This affects the tempo of operations, movement of people, and locations of key leaders on the battlefield.

“Tactical CSDP”

This goal highlights the key role of front-line leaders to constantly check on their people.  At higher levels, we tend to assume every squad leader carries a laminated MAL in his or her pocket and our “Green 2” reports are the end result of their twice daily (at least) checks on all equipment they are accountable for.  First, see if they actually have that MAL handy.  Second, think about the downstream effects of accountability reports due at certain times to higher echelons.  Do you expect this check to occur on the ground at 0300? Set the conditions for leaders to be successful.

Staff

Predictable-Precise-Professional

I feel that these three principles concisely articulate what a staff owes their organization.  Being predictable requires adhering to the 1/3-2/3 rule, focusing staff efforts on planning beyond the current fight, and sticking to your battle rhythm or adjusting it as far in advance as possible.  Companies should be free to react to contact, but not have to “react to higher.”

Precision is difficult at the battalion level since the staff is relatively junior.   Still, it must remain a goal.  In general, that means to be specific.  There is a reason the Army writing style is active voice: it requires the writer to articulate who is actually doing what action.  Being precise can be as simple as providing a realistic timeline or a thorough list of tasks to subordinate units.  Higher-level staffs can afford hand-wave concepts, but at the tactical level, they need precision.

Professionalism is an all-encompassing trait that should guide the actions of the staff.  Using doctrinally correct terms, proper radio etiquette, and showing due respect to visitors are all simple ways to display professionalism.  In addition to that, professionals “police their own” and develop knowledge in their profession.  This requires us to constantly find improvements in how we operate and maintain high standards.

Synchronize

Achieving a common operational picture is extremely difficult, and at the battalion level, the systems available make achieving this goal nearly impossible.  Synchronizing the warfighting functions is a constant struggle.  Battle rhythm events are the best way to force cross-talk and synchronization.  The “2-minute drill” forces the staff to coalesce and talk to each other.  Do the 2-minute drill hourly.  First, the 2-minute drill will take about 20 minutes for a novice staff, but get more efficient the more they practice. Second, the 2-minute drill forces each staff member to constantly update their estimates.  Third, it forces them to listen to what the rest of the staff is doing.  Over time, if the staff is doing really well, force the staff to brief other warfighting functions, and force more junior members of the staff to brief their portions.

Forcing synchronization is difficult enough if the staff is consolidated in one location, but a combined arms battalion has five command posts: the TOC, TAC, CTCP, UMCP, and FTCP.  In addition, each command post is resourced with various non-compatible communications systems that hinder tying together. The CPs are geographically dispersed enough that FM  will not realistically reach across them simultaneously.  HF radios can do this, but the lack of allocated base stations and speakers means that it is a capability that will only be available during scheduled windows, and only available in a static position.  Upper TI capabilities are only available at the TOC, so it is not a capability between the CPs.  JBCP is the only capability that you can realistically allocate to each node, but because there are not enough TOC kits some nodes will operate out of a vehicle.

In reality, the only means of synchronizing the command posts were the daily circulation of the battalion executive officer to each node.  Unfortunately, the recency of these visits may only last a few hours before the situation changes. In hindsight, the only other person with the flexibility to do this is the HHC commander.  Use your “extra field grade” to circulate as well, and if you deconflict your circulation times you can increase synchronization across the 24-hour cycle.

Brigade and higher command post exercises are poor replicators of the stresses a battalion will experience with multiple command posts as they are usually resourced for only one battalion command node.  Work with your MTC to execute a battalion CPX that replicates all five command posts.

“Equality of Expertise”

One horror story field grade officers hear is about the major that loses all functionality as he operates without sleep for 3 days straight.  Indeed, the combat training centers have corroborating data to show how this lack of sleep results in poorer and poorer decision-making and ultimate success.  The lack of a deep “bench” at the battalion level encourages the “never leave your post” mentality, since the person covering down while you sleep may be significantly junior to you.  This extends to the rest of the staff; many times, a specialist is all that is left when a lieutenant goes to sleep.

The first way to combat this is the way you build your team; you cannot put all your “studs” on one shift and your “duds” on another.  The second mitigator is by training down to the lowest level, as previously discussed.  The last reality is to determine when to accept risk.  There will inevitably be a time when the team in the TOC is weak, but if it is during lulls then that is an acceptable risk.

Final Remarks

These are field grade organizational goals; there is no goal that one person can force to completion through sheer will.  Instead, you must set the conditions through the systems you develop and how you train them (I constantly pondered how to emulate Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s Antifragile organizations that strengthen from stress).  The metaphor of the “iron major” is misleading- if you are constantly rowing then no one is steering the boat.  Realize that field grades have the best jobs in the Army- they don’t actually do anything.  If you are, then ask yourself why you have not made someone else capable of doing it instead, and why you made yourself a single point of failure.

Hopefully, this serves as a starting point for introspection.  Take big problems and make them small.  Even simple concepts like these can become quite complex once you begin to peel the onion.

MAJ Kevin Krupski is currently a Professor of Military Science at Dickinson College. An Infantry officer, he has served in Armor and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. He completed his KD time in 1/3 ID (ABCT).

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