Philbrick writes an extremely accessible and well-balanced account describing the opening phase of the American Revolution. The Battle of Bunker Hill, certainly the centerpiece of the story, is only part of the narrative. In true historical form, Philbrick provides both the context and happenstance of events beginning with Paul Revere’s warning and ending with the British evacuation of Boston. The allure of this book is not the history but the detail that causes you to question the commonly understood narrative.

The revolution was not a forgone conclusion. The New Englanders initially revered King George III and the other colonies thought them radical in their opposition to Parliament. Even the spark on Lexington green was contingent on happenstance. During the march, a New England militiaman stood in the middle of the road and fired his musket at the approaching British column.  It was a ‘flash in the pan’ that did not ignite the charge. Had the musket fired, a New Englander would have been the cause of the violence, eliminating a grievance that unified the colonies. Additionally, it was that incident that caused the British to load their weapons. Marching into Lexington with unloaded muskets would have slowed down the escalation on the green and certainly prevented an accidental discharge…

But that’s not all. The profile of Joseph Warren is remarkable. Commissioned by the Continental Congress on June 14th, Warren was a well-respected doctor when he arrived on Breed’s Hill. The assembled militia leaders asked him to assume command, but Warren refused. He told them his appointment was political and that he was inexperienced in military matters. One can only assume he felt deficient in the task, but he didn’t lack courage. Warren took to the redoubt as a private soldier and was killed during the British attack on the 17th. Was it possible that a coordinated defense led by Warren might have offered some better outcome for the revolution? And had he lived, Joseph Warren, not George Washington, would have likely led the Continental Army when it was formed a month later.

Washington’s profile was another stunning account and Philbrick was not kind. The future President had a managed persona and took a dim view of his army. He disparaged them in letters, but he listened, kept himself approachable, and made some necessary changes. He thought the New Englanders and their Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland cousins were an undisciplined rabble. Washington did not like free blacks in the army despite the overwhelming support to award a citation to Salem Poor for extraordinary heroism on Breed’s Hill. He enforced strict rules and held leaders accountable using the whip. He was as close to American aristocracy as there was and took residence in a grand house on ‘Tory Row’ while his army lived in the field. Called ‘His Excellency’ by his soldiers, Washington didn’t like his army, but he knew they would fight.

Even with an army full of fighting spirit, Washington had few options. A plan to take Boston by ground assault over the neck and an amphibious landing was considered and discarded. The army couldn’t storm Boston without destroying the city; the British army and navy were too strong. With immense pressure to do something by Congress, Washington could not make a decision without the accent of his council of generals. It was Arnold, Knox, and Putnam who saved the revolution.

Philbrick covers only briefly Arnold’s triumph at Fort Ticonderoga but spends a bit more time on Knox’s effort to move the captured artillery to Dorchester Heights. An unlikely artillerist, Knox was bookish and had read everything he could on military engineering and artillery. He figured out how to drag the artillery back from the captured fort. Putnam’s contribution was figuring out how to entrench the artillery on the heights without the telltale sound of pickaxes to alert the British. He devised a plan to build chandeliers and fascines filled with earth (the 1775 equivalent to the HESCO barrier). These structures were placed on the high-ground and filled with earth during the night. Upon sunrise, the British saw the fortification on the commanding heights triggering their evacuation.

Philbrick describes the book’s namesake in all its fury and confusion. Much to unpack here: the problem of the unity of effort versus unity of command, the criticality of logistics, and the importance of leadership. The British troops showed incredible discipline as they succumbed to withering fire. The New England marksmen were experts at killing British officers but that did not stop the British advance. Interestingly, the British repeatedly extolled themselves with the rallying cry of ‘to conquer or die,’ a phrase I thought attributed to Washington during the Battle of Long Island. The indiscipline of militia camp did not transfer to the action on Breed’s Hill. The militiamen fought fiercely against a disciplined foe and only withdrew once their ammunition was exhausted. While the British won the field, it was a pyrrhic victory. As one Rhode Islander noted, “Wish we could sell them another hill at that price.”

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L’Heureux is an Armor Officer currently assigned as an instructor at the School of Command Preparation. He commanded 2d Squadron, 2d US Cavalry in Vilseck, Germany.