How do you define platoon “fundamentals?” Some would answer that with shoot, move, communicate, sustain, etc. One could not argue with those points, but we must specifically define fundamentals so that our platoon leaders can focus precious time and understand expectations. Sometimes fundamentals are the product of a simple face-to-face discussion between Commanders and their subordinates, which starts with “I expect that you can perform the following….” Once defined, we have to ask, how do you train the fundamentals?
Recently our battalion conducted a collective training exercise that focused on building proficient platoons to set conditions for live-fire certification in accordance with Training Circular 3-20.0. The basis for the exercise was found in how we defined our fundamentals. We learned several lessons preparing for and then executing the force-on-force portion of the training exercise.
Planning for Execution: Developing The Fundamentals
Before our training exercise, we produced two foundational documents; “How We Fight” and our “Platoon Fundamentals.” Our “How We Fight” document serves as enduring Commander’s Intent for subordinates to relook and re-evaluate over time. It is a start point for all operational planning. This document provided initial guidance per the Warfighting Function assigned specified tasks for Staff Sections and Company Commanders. Subordinate leaders within the battalion could take this document and then begin to understand battlefield expectations. Once published, we developed the “Platoon Fundamentals” chart (see below).
The decision on what fundamentals made the final list proved a product of dialogue, experience, and mentors’ suggestions. We settled on five or six fundamentals because we thought that we could build from that foundation. Platoon leaders received these products well in advance of our training exercise and incorporated them into LPDs and simulation execution. This helped them prepare for our training lanes as we incorporated the fundamentals into our evaluation process. Below is a summary of the major lessons learned during our training.
Phase 1: Setting Conditions Before LD
Anything worth doing is worth rehearsing. Remember that it is always important to conduct rehearsals before any major training exercise. Running a Combined Arms Rehearsal at the battalion level will only better strengthen the staff and synchronize efforts across the unit. Remember that the rehearsal is not for the Commander; it is for the entire unit. Focus on Command and Control (C2) node locations and PACE plans. Require briefers to identify how they will talk/send reports during the rehearsal. Units should invite representatives from adjacent units that may support or execute training in a nearby location to facilitate cross-unit coordination. We recommend reaching out to units that will help move armored vehicles to the field for a combined arms battalion. It’s always good to have that synchronization face-to-face versus via email.
Ensure subordinates execute confirmation-briefs following the operations order. This will enable Commanders to know if their intent and expectations get understood one level down. At times the Commander may assume too much about his or her guidance and intent. Hold the confirmation-briefs so that subordinates must articulate expectations. Before the briefs, ensure your unit pushes out a format for those events so that subordinates can arrive prepared.
Phase 2: Movement and Command Node Establishment
Moving a large number of vehicles, equipment, and manpower is a valuable training event, especially if it has been a long time since your last exercise. A unit will learn a ton about itself when the gates to the motor pool open, and vehicle movement begins. We learned that you must plan for how to C2 the movement. Who goes first, and what communications platforms will you use? If your planning and rehearsal were effective, you shouldn’t experience too much frustration. However, ensure you rehearse a vehicle recovery plan and talk through recovery options. Put together a conditions checklist that is handed to a convoy commander to work through before departure. Hold that commander accountable for that list by making it reportable. Once the vehicles have departed for the exercise, have someone walk the motor pool and create a list of what was left behind. Then, have a good conversation with subordinates about why certain vehicles and equipment were left behind. You may find that you don’t have enough crews, licensed drivers, or the equipment was not correctly annotated on your ESR.
Another important point from our “How We Fight” document centers on the simple statement; “if we can talk, we can fight.” Using this, we initially struggled with identifying the correct location for effective RETRANS. We did successfully establish it, but not before friction occurred. While working the FM RETRANS, we did utilize JBC-P to send messages, but we did not have the volume of systems that we truly needed to become effective at JBC-P. We got better during the exercise as we developed routine reporting formats, trained our command post personnel, and spent more time on the systems. Recommend that units work PACE plans routinely during Command Maintenance periods to ingrain the importance of PACE plan maintenance.
Phase 3: Training is Fun, Sustaining is Hard
Stretch your sustainment nodes early to learn critical lessons and build capability. We purposely stretched our sustainment nodes and emplaced our FTCP and CTCP at a doctrinal distance away from our Battalion Main CP and the FLOT. This required good communication, disciplined reporting, and a ton of miles on supply vehicles. Hiccups occurred, but we all learned the importance of sustainment forecasting to prevent unnecessary supply movements. Remember to develop crew rosters for your FTCP and CTCP too. This will enable proper forecasting of personnel and requirements for driver’s training courses.
Everyone observed the importance of fuel to the ABCT fight. We did execute a refuel on the move (ROM) to work on the importance of sustaining a movement and to allow our Distribution Platoon the opportunity to train on the ROM fundamental. Build ROM tasks into your training plan to help build familiarization and capability both within your subordinate commanders and your sustainment planners. Furthermore, use trigger-based SP instructions for movement to the ROM location versus time-based. This significantly reduced congestion at the ROM site. The FSC leadership at the ROM location determined when 50% of the current serviced company was complete and then instructed the next company to SP from its TAA to the ROM site. At times units may adhere to a timeline, resulting in a sizeable force massing at a ROM site and making an attractive target for enemy forces.
Understanding and effectively employing the MILES / TADSS system is the key to dominating the battlefield during force-on-force training. Our junior leaders learned that constantly. Units that took our instruction for MILES PCCs/PCIs did better during our force-on-force period. Others that took it for granted…lost. It was a great opportunity to familiarize the formation with capabilities. Recommend that units find the most lethal crew and have them build a MILES/TADSS smart-book. Furthermore, we recommend providing specific training for the Javelin MILES systems. This training will require units to check assigned CLU maintenance status before training. We learned that our systems required maintenance before the MILES would even function. That was a great discovery for us during our PCC period. Our dismounted infantry Soldiers must know how valuable they are to the fight as they pour out of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, occupy a position of advantage, and hit enemy armor with JAVs.
Our Field Maintenance Teams enjoyed fixing “forward” in the field. It was incredible training for the crews AND the maintainers. We established our UMCP and worked parts flow and maintenance operations. Junior leaders learned critical lessons on maintaining equipment and constantly performing maintenance checks to preserve combat power. Build a crew roster for who will move out with the UMCP and which vehicles make up that node.
Get drivers of ALL vehicles out on terrain to gain confidence and to better understand vehicle capabilities. Don’t rush into collective training until you provide a couple of days for subordinates to get used to equipment, capabilities, and terrain. We should have conducted a tactical exercise without vehicles on the terrain, including holes, drop-offs, and slope. We had a couple of vehicles get stuck as they maneuvered to gain a position of advantage. Great training for our recovery teams, but could probably have been avoided with teaching better driving techniques.
Work your Mortar Platoon into the scenario to test your fires network. We specified our mortar platoon’s expectations to support both the OPFOR and the BLUFOR during the training lanes. This enabled the mortar platoon to train on receiving and processing calls for fire while also working on other identified fundamentals, such as establishing a mortar firing point. The platoon leaders needed to plan for and implement indirect fires. Before the lane execution, the mortar platoon visited each maneuver company and provided an introductory class on mortar capabilities.
Phase 4: Don’t Forget What You Learned
Every unit returns from a training exercise with lessons learned. It is a powerful aspect of our culture; we want to improve by learning how to improve. Don’t neglect to schedule dedicated time for AARs at echelon. Collect comments and share those comments horizontally and vertically. Sometimes we find ourselves completing one exercise only to focus on what’s next instead of determining what we learned AND how we will fix those areas so that we become better. We hosted an hour-long session with platoon leaders after the training exercise to gauge what they learned. It was important to have that session in the field and within that peer group so that they can start cross-talking with other platoon leaders to learn lessons and get better. We also recommend assigning someone responsible for collecting the AAR comments and then briefing them at the beginning of the next OPORD to ensure that a unit doesn’t have to learn the same lesson twice.
We must also be willing to adjust our foundational documents based upon what we learned. Were our fundamentals correct? Do we need to make changes to our “How We Fight” document? Answers to those questions come from self-assessment, effective AARs, and commander dialogue sessions, to include bottom-up comments from the formation because sometimes the youngest Soldier will bring forth the greatest suggestion.
Build the Foundation from Fundamentals
Ultimately, we learned that defining fundamentals early allowed our junior leaders to properly allocate critical time as they prepared for training. Also, we constantly asked whether or not our training reinforced the fundamentals and made us better. Our “Platoon Fundamentals” document gives us a known point to shift from and a method to increase complexity and expectations.
We continue to record multiple lessons from training exercises. Our intent is to share a few lessons from our latest experience that may assist with your unit’s planning and progression. As we identify opportunities to apply the lessons we learned, we will also update our foundational documents because strength develops from learning and getting better. That’s also how we will become more lethal. All things considered, remember to ask yourself one question, “Do your platoon leaders know what you expect them to perform?”
LTC Ethan Olberding currently commands 4-70 AR, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. Commissioned as an armor officer, he has served in armor and infantry brigade combat teams, with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
MAJ Ryan Feeney is an infantry officer currently serving as the Battalion Executive Officer for 4-70 AR, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. He has served in tactical assignments within all three types of brigade combat teams (Light, Stryker, and Armor).
MAJ Jonathan Punio is an armor officer currently serving as the Battalion Operations Officer for 4-70 AR, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. He has served in tactical assignments in stryker and armor brigade combat teams with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
CPT Graham Foresman is an armor officer currently serving as the Battalion Assistant Operations Officer for 4-70 AR, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. He was previously assigned to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.